

**PROCEEDINGS
OF
THE THIRTY-SECOND
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
SRINAGAR, KASHMIR
1957**

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The present volume contains the Presidential addresses and the symposia papers of the Srinagar Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress (1957) and two other papers—a lecture delivered by His Highness Jayachamaraja Wodeyar, Governor of Mysore, in the Congress Session, and another symposium paper of Prof. A. Shishkin read at the Annamalainagar Session. Sectional papers which generally constitute the third part of the Proceedings have been omitted this year for certain reasons. The Congress was held at an unusual time, in the middle of the year, and so the publication of the Proceedings had to be postponed for several months. Many of the more important papers were therefore published in the Philosophical Quarterly before the Proceedings could be brought out. It was thought advisable not to republish them and to drop the whole section.

N. A. NIKAM,
Secretary.


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THE
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
(32nd Session at Srinagar [Kashmir], 1957)

Inaugural Address

by

ŚADAR-I-RIYASAT YUVARAJ KARAN SINGH

YOUR HIGHNESS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

It was with considerable reluctance that I agreed to inaugurate this Conference, because I thought it would be most presumptuous for a student like me to lecture to an audience of distinguished philosophers. Nevertheless, I agreed because I am happy to have the opportunity of welcoming you all to Kashmir. This Conference is being attended by delegates not only from different parts of India but also from several foreign countries who have come thousands of miles in order to participate in these deliberations. This is as it should be, because the realm of philosophy is one which far transcends national and racial barriers and which should embrace humanity entire.

It is indeed appropriate that the Philosophical Congress should be held in Kashmir, which is well known for its contribution in the domain of philosophy. The natural beauty of Kashmir and the grandeur of its mountains and lakes inspired many seers in ancient India to devote themselves to meditation and metaphysical studies here, and they made a lasting contribution to Indian philosophy in the Vedic and Pauranic times. In the Buddhist era also the contribution of Kashmiri philosophers was significant. The fourth Buddhist Council was held in the days of Kanishka in the first century B.C. at Kanishkapura, about 25 miles from Srinagar. In fact Kashmir became the channel of communication between Buddhist thought in India and the spread of Buddhism in China and Tibet. The name of Nagarjuna, an outstanding philosopher, is well known in this connexion.

From the 8th century A.D. onwards a new school of philosophy developed here known the world over as Kashmir Shaivism.

Partly it embodied the tradition of Vedantic studies in India, and partly it was a reaction against the predominance of Buddhism in this part of the country for many centuries. Kashmir Shaivism developed into a distinct cult, and its first leading exponent was Vasu Gupta who lived in the 9th century. His great disciple Kallata, and Somananda, probably another disciple, supplied philosophic elaborations in support of their master's teachings and spread them wide. They laid the foundations of Advaita Shaivism as a distinct system of philosophy. Somananda's disciple Utpalacharya elaborated his philosophy into a compact and self-contained system. The best known Shaiva Philosopher in Kashmir, however, was Abhinava Gupta, another philosophical genius who lived towards the end of the 10th and beginning of the 11th centuries. He wrote commentaries on Utpala's works and also composed an independent treatise on Tantra which became a distinct element in Kashmir's Shaivism. Although certain common principles are included in Vedantic and Shaiva philosophies the distinct factor in the latter is its exposition of the cult of Shakti, as against the Maya of the former, as the creative power underlying Reality. The manifestation of the Parama Shiva takes place through its own power or Shakti which manifests itself in various forms.

स्वेच्छया खमिक्तौ विश्वमुन्मीलयति

"He unfolds the universe at his own will on his own canvas". The elaborations of the Shiva-Shakti doctrine are embodied in the numerous treatises of Kashmir Shaiva philosophy.

With the advent of Islam in Kashmir from the middle of 14th century, philosophic speculation was mainly inspired by the Sufi cult. Both Arab and Persian Sufis came to Kashmir and made a fresh contribution to its tradition of mysticism. Many of their philosophical principles were expounded through the more popular medium of poetry, both in Persian and Kashmiri. The names of Lalleshwari and Sheikh Noor-ud-Din are respected by all the people of Kashmir regardless of their religious denominations. Kashmir has thus made a significant contribution to the imposing edifice of Indian philosophy.

Perhaps never before in its history has the human race been in such a crucial phase as it is today. Our scientific knowledge has progressed tremendously over the last century and this progress has brought with it an unprecedented increase in the standard of living of millions of people the world over and has added greatly to the conveniences of daily living. But unfortunately,

along with its beneficent uses, science has also been put to use for destructive purposes. We have invented weapons of such tremendous and incalculable power that the very existence of the human race is threatened. These weapons, if newspaper reports are to be believed, are increasing in destructive power and mobility almost every day. We are thus faced with deadly peril, and the destiny of the race appears to be at the tender mercies of a few people in a few countries in whose hands lies the power to use these weapons against their fellowmen.

It is indeed a tragedy that while we have been able to split the atom and to explore the infinitely complex structure of matter; to travel faster than the speed of sound; to explore the depths of the earth and the ocean and the infinite reaches of space; we have not been able to study our own selves, to plumb the depths of our own being or to grasp the true nature of human personality. We have conquered matter but we have not been able to conquer our own selfishness or to sublimate the lower instincts in which the human race is not very different from the myriads of other forms of life which exist in this world of ours. The individual today appears to be less integrated, with himself and with his surroundings, than he was in bygone years, and though scientific progress might have brought increased material prosperity to many it can hardly be said to have really increased the sum of human happiness. We are beset today by strange and new diseases, of body and of mind, which reflect the fundamental disequilibrium that exists in our present society.

It is in this context that the role of philosophy takes on immense significance. You will excuse me if I express the view that philosophers should not only interest themselves in abstract speculations entirely removed from the realities of day-to-day living. It is true that the basic purpose of philosophy is to explore the nature of Reality itself. But at the same time I feel that philosophers should be of real help to those men and women throughout the world who are beset with the daily problem of existence and who need fresh hope to enlighten their efforts. The great religions which arose in the world many centuries ago and which continue down to this day have, for most of us, lost the vitality and power which they once possessed. What is required at present is not yet another religion but a fresh effort to interpret, or rather reinterpret, the fundamental truths which these great religions embody.

एकं सद् विप्राः बहुधा वदन्ति ।

"The Truth is one. The wise call It by many names". You are the wise, or at least we trust you are the wise, and it is for you to bring new life into old dogmas and to reinterpret the fundamental truths in such a way as will help weary and ravaged humanity to escape the precipices ahead and to progress towards an ideal world society embodying the noble concept of the true Brotherhood of Man.

I wish you all success in your deliberations, and it gives me great pleasure to inaugurate the 32nd session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

Philosophical Implications of Pancha Sila

Address by

DR. G. P. MALALASEKERA

General President of the Congress

I am deeply conscious of the great honour that has been conferred on me by being appointed President of this august assembly. I am also profoundly aware of my own unworthiness for such exalted distinction. I recall with immense pride that this Congress had as its first President Rabindranath Tagore, who for more than half a century dominated the intellectual scene not only of India but also of the whole of Asia and further beyond. Since then, the Presidential dais has been occupied by a galaxy of brilliant personages, in comparison with whom I would appear a mere glow-worm. I derive courage and consolation, however, from the fact that in promoting me to this high office, the Congress has recognised not any particular merit on my own part but the significance of a great event, the Buddha Jayanti, the 2500th anniversary of the Buddhist Era, which has been celebrated with great *eclat* in many countries and with special splendour in India, the land of the Sākya-muni's birth. By electing a Buddhist to preside over this year's deliberations therefore the Congress has sought to take notice of this significant event and, as President of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, I should like on behalf of the Buddhists of the world to convey to the members of the Congress our profound gratitude for this noble gesture.

This same fact has prompted me to select as topic for my address to you as General President, the Philosophical Implications of Pancha Sila, the Five Vows or Precepts the observance of which every Buddhist voluntarily takes upon himself. So closely is Pancha Sila associated with Buddhism that when someone of another faith wishes to indicate that he has now become a follower of the Buddha, he does so by repeating, in some suitable place, preferably in front of a Buddhārūpa or at the foot of a Bodhi-tree, a formula in which he declares that he has accepted the Three Refuges (the Buddha, his Doctrine and the Sangha, the

holy Order of Monks) and undertakes to observe the Pancha Sila. This formal act of conversion—if one may so call it—is taken to mean that he has now received the hallmark of the true Buddhist. The repetition of this formula, on awaking and on retiring and on every formal occasion of a religious character, marks for the Buddhist what would correspond to the “progress” of followers of other faiths. It sums up for him not only the fundamental principles of his ethical conduct but also the philosophy underlying the whole of the Buddha’s teaching.

I do not propose to discuss here whether Buddhism could be better described as a religion or a philosophy. The Buddha himself called his teaching a *paṭipadā*, a Way of Life. Generally speaking, Buddhism is accepted as one of the world-religions, in fact, the oldest of the historical world-religions. There is no need to enter into the perplexing question of the definition of “religion,” for we know in a general way what is meant by a man’s religious faith, opinions and practices. Religious beliefs differ, for instance, from economic or political principles in that, though the latter are concerned with very important aspects of life, they are limited in their scope, whereas in our religion we express our total reaction to the universe. It regulates and directs our total reaction to every aspect of experience—or, at least, claims to do so. It is true that in every day life religion is largely composed of traditional ways of acting and thinking, which are only partially grasped, dimly understood and vaguely accepted by the individual. But religion, in its essential nature, is an all-embracing world-view and the determiner of life’s values. All the major concerns of humanity living in society presuppose some belief which is in its nature religious.

Man is an ideational creature. Men’s conduct and their institutions are shaped by what they assume to be real and important, true and false, right and wrong. What men desire their society to become and their vision of a tolerably satisfactory community are profoundly affected by the beliefs they hold about the nature of man, about the nature of the universe as a whole and man’s relation to it. Our beliefs determine the qualities we want to foster in ourselves and in others. Human beings, thus, develop what are called values, and these constitute their philosophies. Chesterton has declared that every man has his philosophy and that this is the most practical and important thing about him. Philosophy, in the minds of many, is concerned with abstract, scholarly study of concepts and ideas, far removed from the

practical issues of the everyday world. They think of a philosopher as a long-haired eccentric individual, whose chief interest is an attempt to master the secrets of the universe, regardless of whether his search has any useful significance or not.

But there is also another concept of philosophy which recognises it as a study that should make life here and now as intelligible, meaningful and purposeful as possible. Such a concept implies that the most important obligation of any individual is to clarify his basic beliefs and assumptions. He should be able to state, explain, organise and defend the premises upon which he bases his scientific, political, economic, religious and educational practices. It should be the concern of every citizen to develop such a personal philosophy to enable him to cope with the numerous problems arising daily in our complex society. It must be admitted, however, that as far as the vast majority of us are equipped with anything like an outlook on life and the world, it consists mainly of a great deal of superstition about the supernatural, a smattering of social theory, a whole heap of group-prejudices, a few wise saws, a rumour or two from science and a number of slipshod observations about life. So long as this state of mind exists, there will be in our minds only a chaos of immediate experience, like that of small children. Historical man begins definitely in a culture only by bringing order into his experiences and demanding a consistent explanation of them.

A life without a guiding philosophy is narrow and selfish, producing intolerance, ignorance and prejudice. It is not a happy life. A purposeful, intelligible, meaningful life is one that is alert and active, ever learning and constantly growing. The measure of a man is his character. Certain distinctive qualities mark an individual character. He holds specific convictions regarding his purpose in life and in the way in which he means to live that life. He has formulated an ideal upon which he bases a personal code of ethics. One can no more rid himself of the notion of moral law than of time or space. Moral law dominates man whether he respects it or defies it. The wise man recognises this and thereby becomes a philosopher. Philosophy has been aptly described as "walking in the path of wisdom". It is this philosophy that gives direction to his intellectual searching and stability to his emotional being. In the case of the others, they are brought to this recognition by the society in which they live. It exercises upon him the restraint of the mores and public opinion that surround him and prevents him from going adrift without proper bearing and consequent

anti-social behaviour. In the case of the follower of a religion, his religion moulds his character and gives it a motivation and this motivation becomes the determinant of his judgment and wisdom. The precepts of his religion contain the accumulated experience of many ages and provide the necessary guidance for the development of his character. Character involves spiritual man as well as intellectual man. Religious understanding and commitment, a constant observance of moral principles in every phase of life are the necessary elements and expressions of character. For these to be really effective, they must be built on a deep, inner attitude towards life and living. It is this attitude that constitutes a man's philosophy.

Throughout the ages, happiness has been the object of all human endeavour. Philosophy guides men in the pursuit of what they consider happiness. But it does more than that. It also provides them with attempts to rationalise the mystery of the universe, to translate in the language of concepts that which is inexpressible in concepts. These attempts have resulted in varied interpretations. These differences have often led to conflicts and even wars. In the modern world, when peoples have become close neighbours through the scientific conquest of space and the technical presence of instantaneous communication, the development of true neighbourliness has become a vital necessity. This is possible only through the promotion of global understanding. Such understanding must be philosophical, in the sense that we should be aware of the different assumptions underlying different cultures. Mankind can realise its unity only by thinking of its unity in terms of its many perspectives, expressions and experiments.

In doing this the various religions that men follow afford a profitable way of approach. The precepts of a religion provide the formulations of the good life as envisaged by its followers, the basic minimum upon which spiritual development could be built. Most historic cultures are the result of such developments that have taken place among large masses of mankind. But not all historic cultures are religious, though they are all based on different world-views and assumptions and, therefore, on different evaluations of life. Looking back on the history of the world, it would be true to say that cultures differ mostly in affirming or denying a religious world-view. During the last 400 years, for instance, western civilisation has become increasingly anti-religious as shown by its worship of national and social values or economic and class values. The other predominantly anti-religious civilisation

was the one that developed in the last four or five centuries of the Roman-Hellenistic empire.

Among the religions that have influenced the growth of cultures with spiritual values, Buddhism has been one of the most powerful, in that it has commanded the allegiance of a very large section of mankind for twenty-five centuries. Buddhism is not a "revealed religion". Its world-view differs greatly from that of revealed religions. Revealed religions postulate a God who is absolute and who is outside the world which he has created out of nothing. This creation thus has beginning; it has also a middle and an end and is, therefore, a "transitory history". Man is created in the image of God, as the subject of his actions and responsible for them. God speaks to man, revealing himself. Man's response to God is faith; by faith he participates in God's life and becomes an initiated co-worker and participant in a divine providence. If he refuses to take notice of God's revelation, he falls into nothingness and sin and his existence then becomes meaningless. He is for ever damned.

The most essential feature of man's being is the possession of a soul. It is this which distinguishes him from the beasts, who have no souls. Man's soul is a part of god himself and, therefore, permanent. If in this life man has followed God's will, the soul will, on the demise of his body, find happiness by union with God. The will of God is expressed in commandments and dogmas given to mankind by a Prophet who is either a manifestation of God himself or one appointed by him. The accumulation of material goods is only a means to reach a higher objective—unity with God, harmony with his creation and respect for his laws.

The teaching of the Buddha differs fundamentally from all this. There is no transcendent God, there is no personal revelation of God to man. And because man does not believe in God, he does not feel himself called upon to make everlasting commitments. Man is a creator himself and is the master and moulder of his destiny. His "self" is an endless variety of fleeting experiences and perspectives. It is a becoming, developing "self". Life is an educational task. Buddhism seeks the meaning of life in life itself. In this search, life is ennobled. Life becomes an external and a fulfilled Now. Truth is not a revelation but a discovery. The human person has to realise itself as the subject of knowledge, as socially responsible and as artistically creative,

Buddhism has no "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not". Its ethics are autonomous and independent; moral problems are basically human problems. The moral law is its own foundation. Obligation to one's family or one's neighbours and such virtues as truthfulness and honesty remain objective tasks in all circumstances, they remain obligatory whether one lives up to them or not. The moral law is identical both in individuals and societies. The State is the individual writ large. Conflict and suffering and sorrow are the result of a great delusion, the delusion of a separate Ego-entity, a self or a soul independent from individual action. There is no such thing, according to Buddhism, as an individual apart from its activities, just as there is no life apart from the process of living. This denial of the individual as a separate entity apart from its activities and its relationships is not a denial of the life and reality of the individual. It is the sense of separateness that has to be overcome, because separateness leads to attachment, to craving, to grasping. The goal is "selflessness" and the way to this goal is the steadfast practice in learning to see that what we call evil is always tied to some particular want. As long as we want something, we create the evil of being frustrated in what we want. Man cannot realise his supreme fulfilment because of his inveterate tendency to identify himself with some assortment or other, with the specific goods of the world. Thus, the human being left to itself is always overtaken sooner or later by defeat or self-annihilation. In order to find happiness man must alter the direction and anchorage of his living. When this is done, the pressures and miseries of life are overcome, and there is introduced into human living the greatest possible good that man can ever experience.

In order to achieve this end, the mind must be disciplined, and for that purpose the Buddha suggests that a beginning should be made by following certain "rules" of conduct which are to be undertaken voluntarily by the seeker after harmony and happiness. These "rules" are formulated as vows and are stated not positively but negatively as abstinences. They are known to the Buddhists as Pancha Sila or the Five Precepts and are as follows :

1. I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from causing
 . hurt to living beings.
2. I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from taking
 that which is not given (by its
 owner).

3. I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from wrong conduct in the satisfaction of sense-desires.
4. I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from falsehood.
5. I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from drinks and drugs and from things that cause confusion and heedlessness.

It will be seen that these rules of conduct primarily deal with the relationship of the individual with others. Through the understanding of the impossible position of an isolated ego arises naturally the comprehension of its relationships. These are conceived as rights and duties. Buddhism is essentially a teaching of relationships, not of absolutes. This is expressed most significantly in the doctrine of *Paṭicca-Samuppāda* (Dependent Origination which is summed up in the formula *asmim sati idam hoti*, that being present, this comes to be), i.e., nothing exists by itself, apart from something else. Even Nirvāṇa, which is the goal of Buddhism, exists because of the prior existence of Samsāra. The individual cannot exist apart from the community, from society. Individual responsibility for self-improvement and social responsibility are not separate. The individual must trust and hope that the community will not fail to carry out what the individual can never finish by himself.

This relationship between individual and society is conceived most easily as rights and duties. Very elementarily stated, the right of living involves the duty to respect the life of others. The right to possess the means of living involves the duty to respect the possessions of others. The right to enjoy the pleasure of living involves the duty of recognising that others too have the same right and undue indulgence would, apart from everything else, deprive others of their fair share of the good things of life. The right to search for the highest truth involves the duty of truthfulness. No transaction is possible if a man's word cannot be believed. If a man is intoxicated either with drinks or with obsessions and prejudices (which are equally intoxication) he loses his self-respect and his inhibitions and becomes a nuisance.

In the way very briefly stated above, it would be impossible to indicate at all satisfactorily the implications of Pancha Sila. But to do so in detail would involve more time than is available for the purpose. For the sake of clarification, however, a few observations are essential. It is often asked, especially by

Westerners, why is it that in Buddhism the good life is stated in negative terms. To the Westerner, abstinence or renunciation is a negative attitude; he prefers a positive approach instead. To the Eastern mind, however, contemplation is the acme of activity and renunciation is a very positive thing. Also when we come to think of it, is the concept of Freedom, for instance, entirely a positive thing? Is it not, at least in its most inspiring form, a rejection of oppression, a resistance to enormous strangling forces, which keep for ever renewing themselves and stifling the spirit of man? The rejection of evil is regarded by the Buddha as a fight and a struggle. "Warriors, Warriors, Lord, we call ourselves—In what way are we warriors"? "We wage war, Brethren, therefore are we called warriors". "Wherefore, Lord, do we wage war"? "For lofty virtue, for high endeavour, for sublime wisdom—for these things do we wage war. Therefore we are called warriors".

This fight has to be waged incessantly; it needs constant vigilance, the ceaseless remembrance of it as a duty. It is a spirit, not a dogma, a process, not an end. The individual is a growing organism; this struggle will help him to grow, correcting bit by bit what is wrong, vigilantly dealing with the new wrongs and the resistances that arise as conditions alter. The goal is freedom, because to be happy one must be free. Freedom is identified and equated with happiness (*mokkham sukham*); and freedom is essentially an inner thing.

To the Buddhist, all forms of life, whether high or low are one. By Non-injury to life is meant all forms of hurt and harm, of cruelty and oppression, of depreciation; and the Buddhist concept of *ahimsa* or non-injury is not confined to abstinence from killing human beings, nor is it confined to the observance of the first precept. It is intimately connected with the second precept also. It embraces ethical conduct in all its boundlessness. *Ahimsa* does not mean either non-action or inaction. It has been well said that one could draw up a whole declaration of human rights in terms of *ahimsā*, for denial of human rights is doing injury to human nature. The Buddhist statement *ahimsa paramo dharmah*, that non-injury is the highest law, implies that the moral factor is the backbone of all law and that the individual and not the State is the ultimate subject of law. It asserts that the rights of man are grounded in a law superior to the laws of the State. It forbids us to commit crimes against humanity including such things as the denial of freedom or the exploitation of others. Thus the law

of ahimsa is one of the greatest expressions of human rights, far transcending the ideal of *caritas* found in some other religions.

Ahimsa has also its positive counterpart. It demands not only abstaining from injury but also the practice of friendliness (*maitri*) helping every living being on its onward way. *Maitri* begins with oneself; a man who is not his own friend will not act as the friend of another. As his own friend, he seeks his own fullest development. To do this he must recognise that he is much more than an "embodied function", a cipher, that he has social relationships, and that he also has a destiny of his own, self-perfection through enlightenment. This recognition of his own destiny involves the recognition of similar destiny in others as well, the practice of *samānātmatā* (equality). He realises that all men are equal, not in regard to their aptitudes and talents but in their essential quality, which lies in the depths of the spirit where the road is open to each man for fulfilling his destiny. He recognises that no man should be treated only as a means and not at the same time as an end in himself. This recognition of equality entails among other things a social order in which there should be equal opportunities for all its members, for education and work, for health and cultural development. This follows upon a realisation of the fact that human nature is part of Nature and involved in it, and that men cannot achieve harmony in living, if the outward conditions of living are unsatisfactory and the inward spirit is distracted.

In as much as the goal of the good life is complete Freedom, the third and fifth precepts are meant to help in the achievement of that Freedom by gradually eliminating man's bondage to craving and delusion, greed and passion and confusion, avarice and ambition, false imagination and erroneous speculation which are called *micchādiṭṭhi* or wrong views. To enjoy true freedom man must not only be free from all forms of tyranny but he must also liberate himself from many "isms" and win his way into insight, the realisation of Truth. The ideal is not merely complete freedom from desires, but complete freedom from attachment, the attainment of complete, final and absolute detachment. This is Nirvana, and it can be won in this very life. In Buddhism, happiness does not have to be a *post mortem* achievement. The saint, having won Nirvana, continues to live till he dies. Between the attainment of Nirvana and his death, he has "desires" of a sort, because he must eat and drink and sleep and so on; but such desires are "rootless", they are not rooted in any self. His personality is not involved or entangled in them. This

detachment is one of the *Brahma-viharas*, the four kinds of noble conduct, the last of which is *upekkha* equanimity or, inner harmoniousness. He is no longer involved in the flux of time and history; he transcends these things and is lifted above them. He has not merely gone through a transition, either spatial or temporal, but a complete transformation in which he has completely realised himself. There is here no question of subordination or merging. In Buddhism, the individual is not part of the universe but the universe itself, so that when he knows himself he knows the universe. He becomes higher than any god or Brahma; he is *bhāvitatta*, completely evolved and *brahmabhūta*, become the highest.

In recent years, the term Pancha Sila has passed into the vocabulary of politics and it may be worthwhile to examine what kind of relationship, if any, the Pancha Sila of the politicians has with the Pancha Sila enunciated by the Buddha.

It was Dr. Soekarno, now President of the Republic of Indonesia, who on the 1st of June 1945, introduced Pancha Sila into the domain of politics, as the "Five Principles of the State", during the first Session of the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Independence. They became the Five Principles of International Conduct, when formulated on April 29, 1954, in the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, as follows: —

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Non-aggression;
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

In a joint statement made by the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, and the Prime Minister of the Peoples' Republic of China, Chou En-lai, issued on June 29, 1954, the "Prime Ministers agreed that these (five principles) should also be the guiding principles for relationship between China and Burma. If these principles are observed by all countries, the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social systems should be ensured, and the threat and fear of aggression and interference in internal affairs would give place to a sense of security and mutual confidence."

The President of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam assured the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal

Nehru, on October 17th 1954, that he believed fully in the five principles which had been agreed upon between the Prime Ministers of China and India and wished to apply them in the relations of Viet-Nam with Laos and Cambodia as well as with other countries.

This was followed on the 22nd of December, 1954, by the affirmation of the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshall Tito.

On April 10th, 1955, the Asian Conference at New Delhi, attended by 200 delegates from fourteen countries, adopted a resolution pledging support to the Pancha Sila as "the sure foundation of mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence among Nations".

Thus these five principles began to constitute a challenge from Asia to the world, a challenge to which each country will have to give a direct answer. Twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa, comprising nearly three-fifths of the world's population, met on April 18th, 1955, at Bandung in Indonesia, and in the final resolution these five Principles were incorporated. Marshall Bulganin expressed in June 1955 his resolve that the friendly Indo-Russian relations shall continue to be informed and guided by the five Principles.

Incorporating the Pancha Sila under three broad heads, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, meeting at Helsinki on the 29th of August, 1955, adopted a resolution on the juridical and moral principles of co-existence. It said that the maintenance of peaceful co-existence required the loyal observance by all governments of the rules of international law and especially of the following principles :

- (a) mutual respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and equality of each country,
- (b) renunciation of all interference in the internal affairs of other countries,
- (c) non-aggression.

On November 30th, 1955, Jawaharlal Nehru in his presidential speech on the occasion of the Civic Reception at Calcutta, accorded to the Soviet Leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, explained once again and emphasised the Pancha Sila as being 2,500 years old for India.

It is sometimes said that the five principles of national and international conduct that have come to the fore during recent

times, have, except in name, no similarity or relationship with the Buddhistic principles of moral conduct.¹ It is particularly this point which I wish to contradict, and instead, show the harmony, agreement, logical development and natural evolution of the five principles of international conduct from the five principles of individual moral conduct as enunciated by the Buddha, 2,500 years ago.

Here we have to consider first of all the specific teaching of the Buddha, which made him the great reactionary and revolutionist among all founders and reformers of religions. For he alone among the many broke down the basic principle, for the purpose of upholding which the many had constructed metaphysical systems ensuring the continuation of that principle, the individual self-entity, the eternal soul. In his categorial denial of such enduring principle,—as a substance upholding the phenomena, as a spiritual principle of intellectual life, as an everlasting individual soul,—the Buddha made use of the method of analysis, adopted many centuries later by several materialist philosophers, and practically all scientists. He analysed the material and the intellectual phenomena of life and reduced even the material elements to the phenomena of extension, cohesion, caloricity and oscillation, which are not properties of matter, but which essentially constitute matter.

Similarly, the intellectual faculty was analysed by him into receptive sensation, perceptive absorption, conceptive ideation and conscious cognition, so many steps in the evolutionary process of thought, without an independent thinker who could be separated from the thought. And thus, in this analytical system, the time-honoured place of the "self" was taken over by "action", and hence, from the ethical viewpoint, the salvation of a soul was replaced by "right action" (*dhamma*) as opposed to "wrong action" (*adhamma*). Now, *dhamma* is whatever is natural, that which forms the constitution, the norm, and *adhamma* would, therefore, be whatever is against the constitution of nature, abnormal. On this distinction between right and wrong, as between normal and abnormal, natural and unnatural, the five principles of the Buddha's ethical code are based.

It is natural to protect one's own life, and it would not be natural to deny that right to another. Hence one should abstain from killing.

1. See e.g., *Pancha Sheela*, M. N. Kaul, New Delhi, 1955, p. 2.

It is natural to employ various means to preserve life, and so long as the possession of the means of livelihood does not become a means towards a different end,—such as property becoming a source of power, or need becoming greed,—it would not be natural to deny the right of property to others. Hence one should abstain from “stealing”.

It is natural to preserve life by satisfying the needs of life, but it would not be natural to allow this satisfaction to become an obsession disturbing one's inner harmony and a matter of greed depriving others of what belongs to them in order to satisfy one's lusts, whether lust of passion or lust of power. Hence one should practise self-restraint as a natural thing.

It is natural for the intellect to search for the real meaning of phenomena, of events, of causes and effects and their implications and anything which would thwart this search is unnatural. Hence one should abstain from untruth.

Finally, if the appreciation of human attainment is natural, anything which would degrade this attainment would be unnatural. Hence one should abstain from all things that bemuddle the mind and confuse it.

And so these five principles of conduct, the Buddha's *Pancha Sila*, are mere natural consequences from his view of life, according to which an individual is not a separate and isolated entity, but an aspect in the process of becoming, in which each individual action sets up a practically universal reaction. The Buddha's denial of the existence of the individual ego-entity apart from action, as accepted by modern philosophers and men of science, naturally leads to a broadening view of life, in which the individual is a constituent part of the whole. Even the family, the nation, the race, are extended individualities without existence of their own, but constituting the total mass of phenomenal life. And with the growing understanding of the place of the individual in the state, and of the individual state in the international political sphere, has come also a growing understanding of those moral principles, which now find their application in the international sphere.

Thus the Buddha's first moral principle, according to which an individual undertakes to abstain from injury to life, finds expression in the five Principles of International Conduct, as the principle of non-aggression, which is also a condemnation of all

attempts to subject other countries to political and economic domination.

The Buddha's second moral principle, according to which an individual undertakes to refrain from taking what has not been given to him, is expressed on an international scale by the principle of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, the principle of equality among states in their mutual relations and in their relations with other states.

The Buddha's third moral principle, according to which an individual undertakes to practise self-restraint becomes internationally a compliance with the principles of mutual respect for, and non-interference in, internal affairs for whatever reason, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature.

The Buddha's fourth moral principle, according to which an individual undertakes to refrain from falsehood, slander and even frivolous talk, assumes international importance as a principle of equality which must be based on trust, a principle of mutual benefit and co-operation, removing all those factors in international relationship which hamper the development and exchange of production in the mutual interest of the nations concerned, eliminating every form of conduct which creates distrust or impedes in any other way the establishing of an atmosphere conducive to constructive international co-operation.

The Buddha's fifth and last moral principle, whereby an individual undertakes to abstain from all things which bemuddle the mind, including the various "isms" that claim for recognition, aims at harmonising the various intellectual faculties and emotional tendencies in the individual himself and the removal of misunderstanding, thereby creating an atmosphere of harmony in his surroundings, which with international application grows out into the principle of peaceful co-existence.

Thus whether we take the Pancha Sila as enunciated by the Buddha or whether we take it as formulated and adopted at several international conferences quite recently, it constitutes the fundamentals of human rights and duties between individuals, between individual and society, between society and the state and between states mutually. They are based on the understanding of the individual, of his place in and relationship with society; they acknowledge the existence of the individual, but not as an isolated entity; they acknowledge the individual as an essential and integral

part of the process, which has no movement, no progress, if not through individual effort. It is the individual who makes the world, and makes the world go round. It is the same individual who has no existence apart from the process, who gives life to the process, and who also takes his life from that same process.

It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that both the individual and the state in its international relationships should be guided by these principles so essential to natural, human life. It is only on the basis of these principles, the Pancha Sila, that maintenance and promotion of international peace and security may be expected.

Peace in the individual is not to be obtained by prayer and sacrifice, but is the result of his being in harmony and accord with his environment. When his inner strivings disagree with the natural tendencies of the universe around him, he has to attune himself rather than to expect the universe tuning in to him. Any discord in this harmony finds its origin in selfish isolation, and can only be dissolved by an unselfish or altruistic attitude. And only when the individual has attained this harmony, when he can look upon himself no longer as an isolated entity but truly sees himself as a force, however small, which goes to swell this greater force of life on the nation, or the universe, only then may we expect these five principles of individual moral conduct to become effective on the international stage, and individual existence to pave the way to international co-existence.

The Logic of Metaphysics

Presidential Address

SECTION: LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

by

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Logic, which had formerly provided for a theoretic defence of metaphysics — directly, by entailing it, and indirectly, by being entailed — has, in recent times, undergone a transformation which is ominous not only for metaphysics but for the value-sciences as well. The threat of this new logic of spectral forms and symbols is not perhaps less serious for humanistic sciences than that of the nuclear weapons for human existence. I do not, however, mean that this is commonly appreciated. On the contrary, even among the votaries of metaphysics there are many who have sincere admiration for this new and spectacular development. There is nothing wrong in developing a technique. But a technique should be developed *as* a technique and along proper lines. A technique, for instance, should not be so construed as to generate the illusion of a self-complete discipline, an autonomous science. Nor should it be paraded as a new kind of philosophy in the way Russell and his modern successors would like to parade it.¹ A knowledge of forms constitutes a very essential step in the development of scientific knowledge. But the forms and symbolic structures should have their basis in facts and should have reference to the 'concrete'² reality which is the goal of knowledge and of science. Knowledge is interpretation of facts by forms or categories; a manipulation of facts by forms or a free construction of forms by postulational analysis can be an intellectual pastime but cannot develop into an intellectual *quest* which scientific knowledge aspires to be.

1. Russell—*Mysticism and Logic* P. 111. Compare also Carnap's claim that philosophy is the logical syntax of language, and the modern view of philosophy as logical analysis.

2. The word 'concrete' is used to mean any indubitable fact, not only the 'given' of sense.

Thought like sense-perception is not so much a knowledge as a *mode* of knowing. Since there can be no perceptual knowledge without perceiving, no conceptual knowledge without thinking, we have developed a wrong sense of identity of the two. Such a mistaken sense of identity does not materially affect our enquiry so long as we do not isolate a 'form' or mode of knowing from the concrete knowledge situation and try to build up a system of knowledge by means of the abstract thought-forms and what these may 'implicate'. Science, of course, needs abstractions and cannot develop into any generalised knowledge without them. But the forms treated by the different sciences are not of the same kind, nor are they employed in the same way. There are 'forms' which are constructs or 'conscripts'³ from the given reality. These have an empirical origin and this bespeaks of their substantial identity with the concrete particulars. These remain 'objective' in some sense. The situation does not alter substantially if instead of regarding such forms as empirically derived we regard them as products of a hypothetico-observational procedure⁴ such as Professor Eddington speaks of. The patent fact remains that these forms are located *out there* in the objective field, and have a certain stability and 'definedness', which thought-forms do not have. Through a study of the 'forms' common to the concrete particulars of a special field of enquiry we can obtain generalised knowledge of that field. But the 'forms' which are treated in the demonstrative sciences are very much different. They are not forms of *things*, they are *ways* of our thinking. A reflective analysis or demonstration of these forms cannot give us any knowledge of *facts*. We may derive a knowledge of knowledge which is *not* knowledge in the primary sense. It may be intellectually superior, but intellectual superiority is not the basic criterion of knowledge. With no opposition of facts to limit it a demonstrative science of pure forms may become absolutely unbridled and licentious. It, therefore, needs control from a higher source, from the normative sense, so that it may remain limited to the 'useful'. Otherwise, there is the danger of its developing into a game of nonsense, harmless or harmful.

Logic *may be* regarded as 'some kind of study of *thought* in distinction from a study of *things*,⁵ as Prof. Cookwilson in his

3. James—Some Problems of Philosophy. P. 58.

4. Eddington—The Philosophy of Physical Science Pp. 12-27.

5. Cookwilson—Statement and Inference Vol. I, P. 32.

characteristic cautious way describes it. But a study of thought should be the study of thoughts which are employed in thinking of things and not simply the study of thoughts that think or 'imply' other thoughts. Otherwise, a science of demonstration is likely to turn into a science of implicational construction. A demonstration is reproduction and review of the *actual*, a construction is free manipulation of the *possible*. The first shows how something *followed* from something else, how it can be justified by the other, and, *in that sense*, 'deduced' from it. The second shows what *may* result or *follow* from what is present and given, what *may be* derived and *in that sense* 'deduced' from the given. There are sciences in which demonstration and construction may meaningfully go together. There are sciences in which such a union is an offence. Mathematics belongs to the first group, Logic to the Second. But this distinction seems not to have been maintained in the Formal logic of Aristotle and the modern symbolic or mathematical logic. And the words "deduction" and 'demonstration' seem both to have been used in an altered meaning.

Apart from the question: What thoughts which form the subject-matter of the science of Logic should be like, should they be actual thoughts that think of things, or free thoughts which imply or follow one another?,—there is the other question: What kind of 'study of thought' logic is to be. The description of logic as a normative science had the suggestion of an answer which did not favour a purely formal development of logic, did not also support its limitation to any special kind of procedure. The procedure followed in *any* science, be it deductive, be it inductive or be it otherwise, had a legitimate claim for inclusion in logical science provided it was logical. From this the idea of logic as a methodology had developed. It is as the methodology of all sciences that logic won for itself the glorious title 'Scientia Scientiarum'. It was not conceived as a general science in any other way. Its forms or principles could not be devised *a priori*, could not be selected arbitrarily.⁶ For materials as also for the illustrations of its methods it was dependent on the special fields of inquiry. As a knowledge of knowledge it was dependent on primary knowledge, could review or criticise it but could not proceed without it. It had no patterns of thought or formal structures of its own; nor did it seek to devise any general structure of thought by means of abstraction and generalisation from the

6. Cookwilson—Statement and Inference, Vol. I pp. 29-30, Vol. II. P. 640.

structures illustrated in the special fields. It set itself to the task of reviewing and evaluating the methods and principles employed in all branches of knowledge including metaphysics or philosophy. In this way, it was normative and demonstrative.

In the context of everyday knowledge, the task of logical thinking, as different from the science of logic, was to estimate the value of that knowledge in term of truth or falsity. This it would do with the help of the fundamental laws of all thought as also the special principles having relevance for the case in hand. The laws and principles were taken to be the 'norms' in the light of which the given knowledge was to be evaluated.

Neither in logic as a science nor in the logical estimation of ordinary knowledge any attempt was ever made to bring all knowledge under a certain uniform procedure and to take an *ex parte* decision. But the new logic which does not defend the claim of logic as a normative science has altogether given up that normative aim. It has become demonstrative in the sense mathematics or geometry is demonstrative. Given certain things certain others follow formally or implicationally. This I presume is the nature of a mathematical demonstration. This involves deduction in the sense of a *a priori derivation* of the possible, of that which is likely to follow—from some assumed grounds, actual or ideal. It is a mode of formal proof. Prior to its formulation as a formal science, a science of formal reasoning, logic did not take demonstration or deduction in this mathematical sense. Demonstration or deduction meant proving the *actual* by reference to its *implicit* grounds. This, of course, involved showing the latter as the 'logical' ground of the former, and so the mathematical mode of demonstration was involved in an indirect way. But logical demonstration did not mean the mathematical mode of demonstration *directly*. That *q* follows from *p* which constitutes its ground was sought to be made objectively evident by showing how *p* implies *q*; that *p* implies *q* had no immediate interest for the logician. So logical demonstration was at bottom material; it was limited to a normative assessment of the actual and logic was thus very much different from a science of pure forms, or a *science of the possible*.

The Indian distinction between *Svārthānumāna* (process involved in the individual's own act of inferring) and *parārthānu-*

māna (process involved in the demonstration of that knowledge to others) brings out clearly the above sense of logical demonstration. The Indian logic did not take logic as a formal science. It was the science of actual thinking and no act of thought, inferential or otherwise, was conceived as merely formal. This is evident also from its use of illustrations which are not symbolical. In a demonstration of logical inference illustrations were taken from actual inferential situations. The use of concrete 'instantial premisses' was a safeguard against a too formal taking of the so-called major premiss. Demonstration did not depend on any formal rules or 'formal arrangements' of the terms in the premisses. It rested on 'material' knowledge of the premisses. In this way, the normative aim of logical demonstration was made manifest. Logic remained a science of truth as different from a science of the formal laws of validity. No complete separation of logic from metaphysics was possible.

The symbolic development of logic, sometimes described as the 'generalisation of logic' is dependent on certain arbitrary procedures. Thus, in the first place, to be representable as a 'general mode' of a particular type of thinking, say 'judgment', thinking requires to be isolated from the *concrete* context of its employment. It is to be taken not as the thought of a specific 'this' or 'that', but as the thought of an unspecified group of similar particulars. This necessitates the use of 'variables' and in this way a 'form' of thought consisting of functional relation between or among symbols is secured. In the next place, this formal structure which is a purely logical construction is to be allowed a certain platonic mode of being so that it may be used as the premiss of a future deduction or implicational manipulation. It is, of course, possible to take it hypothetically but in that case reasoning will be circular. That a development on such lines may help logic to grow into a science of *pure* forms nobody can deny. That in this way logic can realise completely the ideal of demonstration is equally undeniable. But whether such a move is essential for developing logic from an '*art of thinking*' into a science of thought⁸ and whether this arbitrary procedure is at all permissible are issues that require close examination.

Logic, it can be seen, has not been universally acclaimed as a formal or demonstrative science. Even those who accepted it in

8. Stebbing—A Modern Introduction to Logic pp. 163-65,

that meaning formerly did not accept it in that meaning fully. In fact, the idea of logic as a science by itself and the idea of logic as a method of philosophy or science developed side by side. What is more peculiar, sometimes even in the same theorist the two notions were harmoniously combined together. Logic as a science of the principles of valid thinking was dependent on the special fields of enquiry for the knowledge how logical methods actually operate in concrete situations and what conditions regulate their satisfactory use. No attempt was made to *generalise* logic or to devise the most general and the most fundamental patterns of logical thinking. Aristotle who founded the new science of formal logic, and to whom the 'original sin' to conceive that 'reflective thinking can itself become the subject-matter of a special science', can be historically traced, regarded logic as incompletely demonstrative. The demonstrative logic of Aristotle presupposed a non-demonstrable metaphysical logic like that of Socrates and Plato. The scientific syllogism of Aristotle was dependent on certain indemonstrable premisses. These were syllogistically indemonstrable but were not on that account merely *assumed*. Nor were these arbitrary constructs or postulational suppositions. They were to be 'better known' than their conclusion and were required to be logically 'prior' to it. The fundamental premiss of that syllogism was either a *real* definition, or a proposition stating a species-genus relation, or an axiom involving immediate certainty.⁹ Not only syllogism but every form of inference was, according to Aristotle, based on previous knowledge which constituted the ground of the possible demonstration of the conclusion. Thus he says, "All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. This becomes evident upon a survey of all species of such instruction."¹⁰ Such a view of inference or reasoning accords well with the Indian view of inference as knowledge caused by some previous knowledge — *jñānakaraṇakajñāna*.

The premisses of syllogism being indemonstrable, how can there be a complete demonstration of syllogistic inference? That a process of inference cannot be reduced to symbols is admitted even by the *Principia Mathematica*.¹¹ So a pertinent question may be asked: What does a symbolic representation of syllogism really

9. Stebbing—A Modern Introduction to Logic pp. 482.

10. Analytical Posteriora, 71-a, 1-7.

11. *Principia Mathematica* P. 9, cf. also pp. 94, 132,

demonstrate? Aristotle's treatment seems to suggest that the syllogism as expressed through symbols is *not* so much the *demonstration of an inference* (which is a mental process) as it is an instance of *demonstrative inference*. The idea of formal or deductive inference also lends support to this second view. So syllogism is to be taken as a formal inference. But, if this is true, in what sense can the premisses of syllogism be called 'indemonstrable'? Why, again, should they be *better known* than their conclusion? Does the conclusion even of a formal process of inference depend on the 'material knowledge' of the premisses? If so, one knowledge may lead to another and so the conclusion can follow from the premisses by means of an *epistemic* connection and the formal rules of syllogism are irrelevant and meaningless. Certain rules will still guide true inferential operation and serve to distinguish true reasoning from false reasoning, but these rules will not be merely 'formal'.

Aristotle's treatment on this point is not free from ambiguity. That he had intended to demonstrate an 'actual' process of inference in which conclusion *follows* from grounds more general and more certain than itself cannot be doubted. It is equally indisputable that he demonstrated how the conclusion follows from the premisses by showing how the premisses *imply* the conclusion. But all the same he had regarded the latter procedure as the proof of the former procedure, an implicational construction or deduction as the proof of an epistemic, non-implicational inference, and not *identical with it*. This explains why he so much insisted on the material correctness of the premisses, why the premisses could not be simply 'assumed' but had to be better known. But once the spirit of formalism had taken possession of him, he was not so definite if syllogism as a process of knowledge was different from a symbolic or verbal expression of it. This left a lacuna which has directly contributed to the development of the verbal logic — the logic of symbolic forms.

There are thus two alternatives: Either the formal logic of Aristotle is a verbal expression of a real logic which is *not* formal and does not abide by the so-called formal rules of syllogism, or the formal logic is a *new* logic of 'formal' inference as different from 'true' inference. Let us consider the first alternative first. As a symbolic demonstration of real inference, the syllogism of Aristotle seems to misrepresent it and creates more problems than it solves. Thus, the premisses *as stated* cannot be the same as what they are when *actually employed*. Moreover, the word

'premiss' seems to contain a wrong suggestion as if it is that *from* which (explicitly stated) we reason and not that *according to* which we reason, as Mill has pointed out. Taken in the former sense which is vital for a *formal rendering* of syllogism, the syllogism is vitiated by a *petitio principii* which is really inescapable. As Joseph has shown, the major or the fundamental premiss of syllogism can neither be taken denotatively nor again connotatively. In the first case, the major premiss begs the conclusion, in the second case, the minor premiss does so. The major premiss is not the 'base' from which the conclusion can be deduced—it is a principle, a rule,—the statement of a condition determinative of a conditioned. What fulfils this condition comes to be related to the conditioned. The task of the minor premiss is to show that a new circumstance comes under the implicational operation of the rule.¹² If this is true, the dictum as it is usually interpreted does not prove the syllogistic conclusion, it misrepresents the syllogism totally. The author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣa also supports a *functional* interpretation of the so-called major premiss. It is not as an explicitly stated proposition that the premiss becomes instrumental to the derivation of the conclusion but as an unconscious functional process — *Samskāra*.¹³

Moreover, as the constituents of an actual inferential process, the premisses cannot be taken as distinct propositions, nor can the inferential act (which has been supposed to 'deduce' the conclusion from its premisses) be taken as an external or alien agency operating from without. Nor, again, an inference, whether inductive or deductive or mixed, can be *merely formal*. We have no proposition till we reach the conclusion. This conclusion 'follows from' its "constitutive conditions", as a product from a process, but is not in any sense 'implied' by them. Real inference is not dependent on any 'form' or figure, nor does the conclusion as a formal structure implicationally follow from the 'formal structures' of the premisses. Real inference is not *implicational*, nor is it deductive¹⁴

12. Joseph—An Introduction to Logic, Ch. XIV, pp. 308-12.

13. Vedānta Paribhāṣa—Ch. II, "Tatsamskāro' vāntaravyāpārah".

14. The word is taken in its new meaning "deriving something out of something else." The concept of 'implication' seems to have turned into an instance of Bacon's *idola fori*. Modern logic swears by it, but as to its definite logical meaning, the acutest analysts seem to be very much uncertain. Several have suggested what they considered better substitutes for the expression, such as 'entailment'. But it is doubtful if the word 'implication' or any of its verbal substitutes have rendered the notion of inference clearer than it originally had been,

or formal. It is a knowledge of an objective content which is dependent on some other knowledge which is not a merely hypothetical suggestion or assumption. The relation between its 'constitutive' conditions and conclusion is not translatable into an "if—then", since there is no "if" here, and so it is not implicational. This relation is epistemic and describable as 'inferential'. This is a unique relation, not further definable.

What is inferred is *not* again a proposition or propositional form. It is a 'content' which is stated by the conclusion and is a *material part* of it, but not the statement or proposition *as such* or *as a whole*. This has been clearly brought out by the author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā when he said that the inferrible content is not the proposition 'the hill is fiery' but 'being fiery' (*bahnimatvam*), since the hill is only the locus of the inferrible content (*sādhya*) and is a perceptual content and so it is not a part of the content inferred.¹⁵ Thus what is inferred is not the proposition 'Socrates is mortal' but the *fact* of 'mortality' of Socrates, already known as a man. As a man this new individual comes under the operation of the rule 'if man, then mortal'—operating as an unconscious process more or less. This process in its *interpretative operation* of the presented fact such as 'Socrates, a man' extends the meaning of that content beyond the given to *signify* a new content which is 'mortality' of Socrates. Thus, there is no 'if x then y , if y then z , so, if x then z ', and the so-called "transitivity" relation has nothing to do with inference. On the contrary we have here ' x has y ' which is a mark of z , so x has z —where the relation 'has' and the relation between the symbol and the symbolised cannot be meaningfully translated into any formal relations. Aristotle was mistaken in so far as he regarded the syllogistic inference as *subsumptive*, but he was right in not distinguishing between " $<$ " and " \supset ", since for the purpose of inference of his meaning both required to be replaced by something akin to the 'applicative principle' of Mr. Johnson.¹⁶ Even the so-called 'subsumptive' syllogism of Aristotle requires symbolisation, such as, $a < b. c < a. \supset. c < b$ and not $a < b < c. \supset. a < c$, or $a < b. b < c. \supset. a < c$. Further, only if we take Aristotle's syllogism to stand for a 'formal demonstration' of inference and

15. Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Ch. II—"Parvatobahnimān iti jñānasya bahnnyamśa eva anumititvam..."

16. Logic. Part II. P. 10.

not as 'formal inference', it becomes clear why he did not distinguish the two forms of the subsumptive and why he omitted the *a fortiori* argument and was thus led to the 'absurd limitation of deduction to a single form'.¹⁷

The rival supposition that Aristotle by his doctrine of syllogism had really intended to 'illustrate' purely formal process of reasoning is not, again, without some foundation. According to this view, the syllogism is not a demonstration of inference, not a process of deduction or justification of an inferential conclusion by reference to its hidden logical grounds, but it is a *demonstrative* inference which shows how certain propositions can follow from certain others according to rules of implication. In fact, this is the more commonly accepted view and by the advocates of this view Aristotle has been acclaimed as the father of formal logic, the precursor of the present-day movement in symbolic logic. But if this view is true it is also true that this purely formal conception of logic as a science is based upon a confusion of the business of logic with that of mathematics. Mathematics is a science of pure *relations*, logic is a science of forms of *thought*. For this reason, it is not possible in logic to leave off, what Johnson calls 'epistemic' conditions of thinking and yet to retain its significance. Moreover, while the mathematical relation or quantities are independent of the objective order of things and in that sense purely formal, logical forms are abstractions and arbitrary generalisations from given experience and not therefore *pure a priori*. Lastly, mathematical forms retain their meaning even independent of any application to experience, but without a reference *beyond* themselves the logical forms cease to be logically meaningful. The logical propositions have to be 'asserted' in some way before any deduction or implicational construction can be possible. This is not necessary in mathematics. If $A=B$, $B=C$, then $A=C$ or if $a < b < c \dots < n$, then $a < n$. This is mathematically *necessary* and there is no dependence on assertion. The equations and other relations of mathematics are true even though not asserted. The same cannot be said of logical relations which are not quantitative at all and cannot be translated into relations of quantities without distortion of their nature as logical relations. Analogy has its use in the analytic understanding and interpretation of one kind of

17. cf. Stebbing—A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 174—for the opposite view.

18. Logic. Part I pp. 3-4.

facts in the light of some other analogous to the former. But there are certain natural as also logical limitations to the proper working of the analogical method.

But on the analogy of mathematics and its relations, there has not only been a reconstruction and remodelling of logic, but on the analogy of this new logic and its formal structures there has developed a reconstruction and reform of language. While mathematics in its relation to metaphysics maintained an attitude of neutrality and while the new logic was sceptical about it, this logic of language is anxious to deport metaphysics from the province of logic and language alike. To meet this last challenge it is necessary, therefore, to challenge the foundations of the new logic which has inspired this neo-mediaevalism, the doctrine that philosophy is nothing but the logical syntax of language.

The mischief of formalism had its final expression in the misrepresentation of the *logic of knowledge*. Thus, knowledge was identified with a verbal expression of it and, on the analogy of the structure of language, knowledge or judgment came to be analysed into the so-called 'terms' and their 'relation'. If Aristotle was wrong in naming the 'that'-part and the 'what'-part (which are not real parts) as terms, and in describing the so-called relation between them as a 'connecting link', the logicians of the present day are more wrong in tracing out propositions having forms other than the traditional subject-predicate forms and in multiplying the number of terms in a proposition and in multiplying their so-called constituent relations. The patent fact is that the traditional copula was *not* a *constituent* relation at all nor were the terms constituent elements of propositions. Every proposition needs an assertion and every assertion is the logical expression of a belief or disbelief, and every belief or disbelief involves a necessary reference to the given reality. This assertion or the 'assertedness' of a proposition, itself a fundamental logical act, was sought to be symbolised by the so-called copula. This copula was not therefore more 'bloodless' than was natural for it and Mr. Russell and his followers have practically annihilated it by reducing it to the so-called constituent relation. The constituent relations really figure in the content of predication while the copula represents the logical act of predication and *nothing else*. The relation symbolised by the logical act is nothing external to the proposition. It is not again a link interposing between the terms since it is prior to the distinction of the terms as terms. If the traditional formal logic misrepresented it by naming it as a 'connecting link' between

elements apparently distinct and separate, the new logic has taken a very arbitrary step towards absurdity by leaving off this fundamental logical act altogether. As a result, the form which it has secured is *not* a form of thought at all but a form of possible arrangement of the constituents of thought—an arrangement akin to the mathematical but very much different from the logical arrangement. Linguism under the inspired leadership of Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap is not content even with this mystification of logic by mathematics, but wants to mystify philosophy also by applying the 'norms' of this new logic to the task of so-called logical interpretation of language. In this way has developed not only a progressive mystification of logic but a complete metamorphosis of philosophy as well. A logic of knowledge has been transformed into a logic of symbols, deductive implication has usurped the place of real inference, and the logic of truth has been replaced by a logic of formal validity.

But it seems that the new logic can neither be the technique of genuine philosophy nor its source. So there is no wonder that metaphysics came to be repudiated as a body of nonsense. Metaphysics seems to have a logic of its own. It begins exactly where the verbal logic begins, viz., given experience, but it moves in a radically opposite direction. It does not involve a passage from knowledge or experience to a verbal expression of it, from such verbal expressions to their more general symbolic structures, does not pass from symbol to symbol; it moves from *meaning* to *meaning*. As different from a progressive manipulation of the meaningless, a gradual 'moving away' from the concrete meaning in search of generality of structures, metaphysics involves the process of progressive exploration of the deeper and fuller meaning of the given experience. In this it is aided by its own logic, a logic of *exploration* as different from the logic of *manipulation*. No wonder, therefore, that there is no meeting ground or point of contact between these two forms of logic. The ultimate point of reference of the verbal logic is, as our present day positivists have shown, the experience *as it is given*; the ultimate point of reference and the ground of verification of the logic of metaphysics is '*that*' which constitutes the *full* and *final* meaning of the given experience and in the light of which alone this experience can be rationally understood.

As different from the so-called science of logic, the logic of metaphysics, like the logic of sciences, is a method. But although we may interpret its nature we cannot attempt a formal demon-

stration of its forms and processes without the suggestion of nonsense. While as a method of science, demonstrative or empirical, logic stands for those principles and procedures which are instrumental to either implicational analysis of concepts or inductive generalisations,—as a method of metaphysics logic stands for the reflective analysis and interpretation of the given experience with a view to determine its 'meaning' and 'truth' by means of an ultimate reference. The ultimates of the different metaphysical systems have varied and as a logical consequence thereof, we have various theories of truth and meaning. But this absence of agreement among metaphysicians does not suggest any logical contradiction nor can it constitute a proof of the fact that metaphysics is puerile nonsense. The so-called 'antinomies' of Pure Reason are not the antinomies of the self-same reason. The conflicting conclusions belong to different levels of analysis, higher and lower, and are not thus collateral events.¹⁹ Different metaphysical views represent different degrees of approximation to Truth and Reality.

There can be no advance in any theoretic knowledge without employment of the interpretative and reproductive faculties of the mind—thought and imagination. The roles of these two faculties correspond to the roles of understanding and intuition in the Kantian Theory of Knowledge. Kant made a profound epistemological discovery that thought, both for its analytic and synthetic operations, is dependent on certain intuitions, pure or empirical, and cannot operate in a vacuum. In natural sciences, these intuitions are furnished by immediate sense-experience initially. But these require to be reproduced in terms of 'pure' intuition in order to be 'judged' and known. In a demonstrative science like mathematics these intuitions originate in the faculty of pure sensibility. All this then illustrates the role of imagination as a faculty of pure intuition or 'images' in the progressive development of theoretic consciousness or knowledge. There is 'imaging' in some form in every science, and the abstract sciences of mathematics and symbolic logic which operate on signs or symbols are no exception to the rule. In Metaphysics also we have this 'imaging', this *metaphorical thinking*. But while a demonstrative or symbolic science may limit itself to the symbolic forms or verbal metaphors and to their analytic interpretation or postulational manipulation, an objective and explanatory science like metaphysics has to make an 'interpretative' use of its metaphors and

19. cf. Nikam—His presidential address on 'Logic and Metaphysics', Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress 1946—p. 5.

analogies. Metaphysics is to operate *with* them and should not operate *upon* them, and build conceptual systems by their means. This cannot give true metaphysics. What we derive in this "deflectional" use of the understanding from the line of its penetrative movement is a verbal metaphysics. This, of course, is not more nonsensical than the logic of symbolic construction which results from a 'reflective' operation of the understanding upon itself and its cognate symbolic forms. There, thus, seems to be no scope for system-building in genuine metaphysics, and regarded in this light, not only the metaphysics of the Cartesians but even that of the Hegelians seem to be perversions of true metaphysics. Sankara was right when he remarked that reason or logical understanding is naturally unbridled. This is evident in its natural tendency to stray away from the path of its 'directional' movement into a postulational construction of a conceptual order as soon as a particular level of experience is reached. Its proper business, however, is to pass from level to level and to progressively explore what may be the 'true' meaning of that which apparently seems to be 'meaningful'. This is a Socratic enquiry and the logic of metaphysics has a good deal of affinity with the Socratic dialectic. The experience-situation of every level is referred beyond itself as the symbol or appearance of what lies beyond. Thus metaphysics is a *quest*, not a theory,—a process of knowing rather than a system of propositions. It gives rise to propositions only when it halts at certain stages in its restless career, and assuming the point then reached to be the final goal indulges in framing verbal reports of its findings. In this way, the diverse philosophical views regarding the nature of the real order have arisen. Every such system is based on certain postulates and is thus a postulational construction analogous to the deductive system of the new logic. But this system cannot be interpreted in the way ordinary language is analysed. Some acquaintance with the methods of analysis so peculiar to metaphysics, some familiarity with the logic of metaphysics is essential. In the absence of that, metaphysical propositions are likely to appear as "frames without pictures".

So that metaphysics in its progressive and ever renewed search for the meaning and truth of the successive levels of experience may keep a uniform direction and ultimately reach its goal which is Reality or Reality-experience, it is necessary for it to accept guidance of authority or intuition. This guidance need not be accepted unconditionally or finally, but it has to be accepted initially if the logic of metaphysics is to work successfully.

Every proposition needs an assertion, every assertion is the expression of a belief. This belief claims 'truth' for itself, and implicitly takes its content to be a 'real' content. So 'reality' and 'truth' are inalienable features of every experience. A metaphysical judgment is not descriptive of a fact as it is given. It is not, for instance, of the form 'This is that' or 'This is so and so'. That may be typical of the ordinary logical judgment. A metaphysical judgment is an 'identity judgment' such as, 'That Thou Art', 'That is this'. It does not take 'this' as 'that'. It reverses the order of ordinary judgment and takes 'That as this'. 'It is *reductive* and not *reproductive*' 'That is this' 'That Thou Art', 'That is truth', 'That is Reality'—are statements which may represent metaphysical judgments. One great difficulty about such judgments is this: the 'subject' of the judgment is *not* the given reality as it is given. It is something beyond the given to which the given is referred, not adjectivally or as a predicate, but as what is *essentially identical* with it.²⁰ But metaphysics is not interested in judging or describing, not interested in making assertions. Its primary interest consists in sensing a problem where apparently none exists. So we have the interrogatives: What is this? What is Truth? What is Reality?—and so on. It has no ready-made answers for these questions. It endeavours to find them at the end with the help of its own logic which is not a logic of propositions and their relations, but a method of investigation having Truth and Reality for its goal.

20. The more correct expression will be 'non-different from it' or 'ananya' as in the Vedānta Sūtra "Tadananyatvamārambhaṇāśabdādibhyah". Brahma-sūtra II, 1. 14.

Contemporary Psychology

Presidential Address

SECTION : PSYCHOLOGY

by

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I am gratefully conscious of the honour done to me by the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress in asking me to preside over the Psychology Section of the Congress. The privilege is doubly welcome since the venue of the congress session this year happens to be Kashmir, a place of beauty, mysticism and philosophy—a place which has produced mystics and philosophers like Vasu Gupta, Abhinava Gupta, Sheikh Noor-ud-Din and Ghani Kashmiri.

The subject which I have chosen for my discourse this morning relates to some trends in Contemporary Psycho-pathology. I have selected this topic because it refers to a field which has not been sufficiently explored as yet. Moreover, it is this field to which the Indian genius can make its special contribution.

Psychology in India has had a practical outlook. The attainment of highest religious experience or the superconscious state of Samadhi has been its goal. This state of Samadhi is not possible without total integration of mind.¹

The practice of concentration and meditation as prescribed by the Svetasvatara Upanishad, the first two steps of Raja Yoga, Yama (ethical observation and mental control) and Niyama (physical cleansing and dietetic restrictions) as recommended by Patanjali,² the Jaina traditions for attaining the stability of mind,³ the Buddhistic teaching in Saddharma Pundarika for attaining spiritual insight and tranquillity of mind⁴ are but a few examples of

1. Hindu Psychology & Its Meaning to the West—Swami Akhilanand.
Also see 'Mental Health & Hindu Psychology' (Ch. I) by the same author.

2. Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali.

3. Uttaradhyayana, discourse XXIX.

4. Saddharma Pundarika ch. XIII.

the therapeutic value of Indian Psychology. Similar instances are to be found in the traditions of Muslim mystics of India. Concentration and meditation, purification of heart, identification with the spiritual guide, all-absorbing love of God, and such other techniques help the mystic to integrate his personality and to harness his energies in the service of one all-consuming end. However, at present I am not concerned so much with the achievements of the past as with the possibilities of the future. For this purpose, I propose to undertake a brief survey of various trends in modern psychopathology and psychotherapy. It will enable us to see, in clear perspective, the direction in which lies the possibility of further progress in the field, and the possibility of our special contribution to it.

Before proceeding to the discussion of our problem, it seems desirable to clear away some confusion that unfortunately exists with regard to the use of certain terms connected with the subject. For instance, let us start with the very theme of our paper viz., psychopathology. For Ernest Jones Psychopathology and Abnormal Psychology are synonymous, but he regards the term 'clinical psychology' as the more usual one.⁵ Freud also seems to favour the same point of view. In one of his earliest works,⁶ he cites the instances of the unconscious working of human mind, from everyday experience, implying thereby that these phenomena are psychopathological in nature. In fact, Freudian analysis tends to obliterate the very distinctions of the normal, the abnormal and the psychopathological, altogether.

We may, however, profitably adopt the terminology of D. B. Klein.⁷ According to Klein, 'psychopathology is the science which is concerned with the study of mental disease'. Abnormal psychology studies mental disease, no doubt, but it also studies phenomena which do not come under disease, e.g., dream, hypnosis, and the like. Thus Abnormal psychology is of wider scope than psychopathology.

Clinical psychology is the application of Abnormal psychology. In spite of these subtle academic distinctions, these terms are very often used in an interchangeable way.

5. Article on Abnormality—Encyclopaedia Britannica 14th edition 1929. Vol. I.

6. Psychopathology of Every-day life—Freud.

7. Abnormal Psychology by D. B. Klein.

8. For a detailed discussion of the problem, "An outline of Abnormal Psychology" by McDougall may be consulted.

Now, a few words about the different approaches and points of view about the subject. By the very nature of the case, various approaches are possible to the problem of mental disorder. The same disorder may be studied from the organic point of view, from the neurological point of view, from sociological and anthropological points of view, and from psychological point of view. We are naturally concerned with the psychological approach, remembering however, that one approach does not necessarily exclude or disprove other approaches. This point can be illustrated from an early controversy, between the respective supporters of the functional and the structural points of view. Morton Prince, Freud, Jung, McDougall, and the majority of other psychologists held the view that mental disorders are primarily functional in nature. Medical men and the organicists believed that these disorders are caused by some defect in the structure of the brain or in some other parts of the organism. Arguments were put forward from both the sides, and, for the time being, the conflict seemed to be irresolvable. Now the controversy has become a bit stale.

The popular separation of mind from the body—the unhappy legacy from Cartesian Dualism—is now fast disappearing, and the organic relationship and interdependence of physiological and conscious activities is being increasingly recognized. This new approach is reflected in the emergence of the psycho-somatic view point, which has been emphasized and popularized by Dunbar, Hoebler, Alexander, Hunt, Weiss, and others.⁹ This view-point shatters the dogmatism of the extreme organicists, and lends support to the psychological point of view, by recognising the role of the psychological factors in the genesis of mental disorders and their bodily symptoms.

Another instance of the divergence of points of view is to be found in the rise of various schools of Abnormal psychology. It is not possible, in the space of this brief essay, to trace the development of all these schools. However, a brief mention may be made of the representative figures and their view points. First, we may mention the pure Mechanists and Behaviorists, the followers of Watsonian or Pavlovian traditions in psychology. They

9. For details the reader may be referred to (i) *The Journal of Psychosomatic medicine*, (ii) *Psychosomatic Diagnosis*—H. F. Dunbar, (iii) *Psychosomatic Medicine*—E. Weiss & O. S. English.

try to explain mental disorders in terms of reflex arcs, reflex actions and conditioned reflexes. This school, which has never been popular in abnormal psychology, is now considerably losing ground. Some traces of its influence may be discovered, however, in the school of Experimental Psychology, represented by Alexander Wolf, M. J. Sanders, O. H. Mowrer, D. M. Levy, J. McV. Hunt and others. The following experimental studies may be referred to here to indicate the nature of work this school is engaged in pursuing.

The Dynamics of the Selective Inhibition of Specific Functions in Neurosis¹⁰ by Alexander Wolf (Columbia University).

The Origin and Development of Nervous Disturbances Experimentally produced¹¹ by W. Horsley Gantt (Pavlovian Laboratory, Baltimore).

The Effects of Infant Feeding—Frustration upon adult Hoarding in the Albino Rat¹² by J. McV. Hunt (Brown University.)

The Alteration of Instinctual Processes Through the Influence of Conditioned Reflexes¹³ by H. S. Liddell (Cornell University).

An Experimental Analogue of 'Regression'¹⁴ by O. H. Mowrer (Yale University).

Some Conditions Determining Adjustment During, and Re-adjustment Following Experimentally Induced Stress¹⁵ by Ernest A. Haggard (Harvard Psychological Clinic).

It is yet premature to judge the achievements of this school. But we cannot fix our hopes too high on it as it suffers from some serious misconceptions like those of its parent movement of Behaviourism. The experiments performed on animals, under the artificial conditions of the laboratory, can never throw sufficient light on the intricate dynamics of human behaviour.

Another School of Abnormal psychology that shows some indirect influence of mechanistic behaviourism is represented by

10. The Journal of Psychosomatic Medicine (Jan. 1943).
11. American Journal of Psychiatry (Jan. 1942).
12. The Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology (July, 1941).
13. Psycho-somatic Medicine (October, 1942).
14. The Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology (Jan. 1940).
15. The Journal of Experimental Psychology (October, 1943).

H. L. Hollingworth.¹⁶ For Hollingworth, "Redintegration", very much like conditioned reflex, is the master principle which he offers to explain mental disorders, their symptoms, and even normal phenomena. It is a mechanism whereby a partial stimulus evokes the response which was originally connected with the whole stimulus or situation. The emotional response of a lover to the kerchief of the beloved, patriotic fervour attached to the flag of a country, reverence shown to the relics of the heroes and saints and, of course, the neurotic fear of an apparently innocent object are clear examples of the redintegrative mechanism.

There is much truth in what Hollingworth refers to as redintegrative reactions, but his weakness lies, as pointed out by McDougall, in making this one principle the sole master-key to the understanding of all neurotic disorders.¹⁷

Next comes the school represented by Prof. Piere Janet. Janet, starting with a mechanistic and sensationalist psychology, tries to explain mental disorders as due to exhaustion of psychic forces.

In the normal person, mental life is synthesized by a psychic energy. In the neurotic, this psychic energy is inadequate and hence there is a dissociation or splitting of the stream of consciousness.

Prof. Janet has given some useful concepts to Abnormal Psychology, such as splitting of consciousness and dissociation etc. He also recognizes the importance of emotional shock and traumatic experiences in inducing neuroses. But his point of view is more intellectualistic than dynamic, and inclines towards mechanistic behaviourism. The real progress in psychopathology, however, has come from acceptance of psychodynamic point of view. It was Freud (1856-1939), the founder of the school of psychoanalysis, who brought about this revolution in psychology. Freud, with his hypothesis of the determinism of human mind, and his theories of the unconscious, of the polarity of the life and death instincts, of infantile sexuality and aedipus complex etc., tried to explain the working of human mind, both in its normal and abnormal aspects.¹⁸

16. The Psychology of Functional Neuroses—Hollingworth.

17. An Outline of Abnormal Psychology—McDougall.

18. See 'Outline of Psychoanalysis' and 'Freud's New Introductory Lectures' etc,

Freud's psychology contains much hypothetical matter, many unwarranted assumptions and undue generalizations, many unverifiable assertions which cannot be proved one way or the other, many double-edged mechanisms which cannot be refuted by any empirical evidence. But, in spite of these shortcomings, his credit lies in giving a new point of view (of psychodynamics) and a new method (of psychoanalysis) to psychology.

Here mention may be made of two related schools of psychoanalysis viz., "the School of Individual Psychology" and "the School of Analytical Psychology" represented by Alfred Adler and J. C. Jung, respectively. Adler and Jung started as followers of Freudian point of view, but being dissatisfied with extreme one-sidedness of the master, they broke away from him and founded their own schools. Adler made the self-assertion instinct or 'superiority urge' the sole basis of human behaviour, and explained various symptoms of neuroses as "masculine protest", or the neurotic style of life for indirectly satisfying the urge for superiority.¹⁹ Jung distinguished between the "collective unconscious" and the "personal unconscious", and explained neuroses as being caused by the present difficulties of adjustment with reality, and as resulting in regression to earlier or primitive modes of behaviour.²⁰

There are many elements of value in both Adler and Jung. But Adler is guilty of over-simplification and one-sidedness. Jung often becomes speculative, and transcends the limits of scientific verifiability.

Similarly, Rank was also among the "early deviants" from Freud. He differs from Freud in that he considers the 'birth trauma' as the main determinant in the development of personality.

The psychodynamic point of view in abnormal psychology, so much emphasized and popularized by Freud, was taken up by another school of psychologists represented by Morton Prince, W. H. R. Rivers and McDougall.²¹ McDougall calls it the Psychological School and formulates its fundamental position in

19. See Individual Psychology—Adler.

20. See 'Collected Papers' & 'Two Essays on Analytical Psychology'—by Jung.

21. An Outline of Abnormal Psychology by McDougall.

these words: "It is only a psychology fundamentally of the same type as Freud's, that is to say, one that recognizes human nature as founded upon instinctive tendencies, and as everywhere and always manifesting purposive strivings, rooted in the instincts, it is only such a hormic psychology that can assimilate the new insight which the genius of Prof. Freud has brought us".²² This school rejects the so-called pan-sexualism of Freud and recognizes the part played by other instincts, besides sex, in human motivation. This school gathered some strength towards the close of the 1st quarter of 20th century, and for sometime it seemed as if the future belonged to this school.

But contrary to the expectations of McDougall and other followers of this school, the general trend among the present-day psychologists is more towards psychoanalysis than towards hormic psychology. It is true, as Blum points out, that "nowadays every one is a neo-Freudian in the sense that many of Freud's original formulations are universally held to be outmoded".²³ However, the term neo-Freudians is commonly applied to those psychologists who are inspired by the method and technique of Freud, but have considerably modified his conclusions and concepts, so as to shift their orientation from biology to sociology.²⁴ They disagree with many fundamental concepts of Freud such as aedipus complex, death instinct, the nature of unconscious. They emphasize the socio-cultural factors in the development of personality and in the genesis of mental disorders. Some of the important representatives of this school are Karen Horney, Erik Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, Abram Kardiner and Clara Thompson. Alexander Franz and Erikson also come very close to this group. Alexander is one of the main leaders of the psycho-somatic point of view. Erikson introduces the concept of Ego-identity, which grows by assimilating various identifications and by integration of available roles in childhood. Apart from these neo-Freudians, we have a group of orthodox Freudians, who subscribe to most of the fundamentals of Freud, but deviate from Freud, in varying degrees, on minor issues. In this group may be listed Fenichel, Anna Freud, Richard Sterba, Phyllis Greenacre, Heinz Hartmann and Melanie Klein. Melanie Klein is such an orthodox Freudian

22. An Outline of Abnormal Psychology by McDougall.

23. Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality by Blum.

24. See Contemporary Schools of Psychology by Woodworth.

that she is said to out-Freud Freud himself in some of her formulations.

We have proceeded so far on the assumption that the concept of abnormality or mental disease is same for all. It may be true in a superficial sense. But if we go a bit deeper we find a divergence of points of view with regard to the criteria and concept of abnormality. As pointed out by D. B. Klein,²⁵ we may distinguish at least five approaches to the understanding of abnormality.

1. The Dichotomous Approach. Commonsense and popular opinion tend to divide the whole mankind into the sane and the insane or the normal and the abnormal. Allport also lends support to this point of view, when he writes: "There is no continuum of states from cancer to no-cancer Similarly, a diseased mind is in many respects functionally quite different from (and not merely an exaggeration of) the normal mind".²⁶

2. The statistical Approach. It is said that the normal represents the average while abnormal, as the very word suggests, implies deviation from this norm or average. Thus a genius will be as abnormal as an idiot.

3. The Adjustive Approach. A man is said to be abnormal when he fails to adjust to the ethico-social reality or when he does not conform with the cultural requirements or injunctions of his community.

4. The Ideal Approach. It emphasizes a better and sound adaptation, a measure of high grade performance, a standard of flawless excellence. A man is abnormal to the extent to which he deviates from this standard or Ideal.

An approach closely resembling the one, just described, is recommended by Zilboorg.²⁷ He calls it the Homeostatic Approach, borrowing the term from the physiologist, Cannon.²⁸ Homeostasis, in physiology, represents a sort of ideal standard in terms of body chemistry, blood pressure, respiration and so on. A similar Homeostasis may be discovered for mental health. A deviation from this Homeostatic ideal will signify abnormality.

25. Abnormal Psychology—D. B. Klein.

26. Personality—Allport.

27. A History of Medical Psychology—Zilboorg, G.

28. The Wisdom of the Body—Cannon, W. B.

Every one of these approaches has some elements of truth and some weak points about it. The Dichotomous Approach is right in emphasizing the qualitative difference between normality and abnormality, but wrongly ignores the intermediary degrees. It ignores the fact that a change in quantity, beyond a certain point, may lead to qualitative differences as well.

The Statistical Approach gives us a practically valid criterion applicable to many cases, but fails when the majority of a population goes crazy. Moreover, it makes mediocrity the measure of normality.

The Adjustive Approach rightly emphasizes the relation of the individual to his socio-cultural environment, but makes conventionality the criterion of normality. As remarked by E. Glover, "Normality may be a form of madness which goes unrecognized because it happens to be a good adaptation to reality." According to this approach Buddha, or Christ, or Mohammad will be considered abnormal, because at war with his environment, while a Fascist or a Nazi soldier will be hailed as normal, because perfectly reconciled to the norms of his group.

The Ideal Approach or the Homeostatic Approach deserves credit for exposing the shortcomings of the statistical and the Adjustive approaches, and for emphasizing the need to seek an ideal pattern of mental health. But it leaves us in the dark as to what that 'ideal' should be and where to seek it.

To supplement this defect I may suggest the ethical or moral approach. It implies that the empirical science of Psychology is not competent by itself to lay down the Ideal of normal human life. It should approach the normative Science of Ethics for help and guidance in this matter. Ethics will determine what constitutes the Ideal or norm of human life. The Ideal will cover a measure of harmonious self-realization as well as a pattern of healthy interpersonal relationships. The normal person, according to this approach, will be one who is at peace with himself and in harmony with the environment—not only with his immediate environment or socio-cultural group, but also with humanity at large.

Some empirically-minded persons may look askance, at this intrusion of a normative science into the territory of psychology. I appreciate their difficulty, and quite agree with them, that in a purely academic discussion of the empirical laws of science any

reference to an Ethical norm would be out of place. But in psychopathology we have to go beyond that. We have to discuss the defects and difficulties of behaviour with a view to bringing about a most desirable state of adjustment. Here the normative point of view necessarily comes in. In short, for determining the final goal of therapy we are compelled to have recourse to the moral or ethical point of view; otherwise a purely empirical approach will land us into insurmountable difficulties as already noted.

This brings us to the question of therapy. In a sense, there can be as many therapies as there are therapists undertaking the job. We may make a passing reference to the following modes of therapy, just to show the possibilities of this vast field.

Play therapy, work therapy, dance therapy, music therapy, art therapy, Gestalt therapy, Levy's release therapy, Rankian will therapy, Sullivan's interpersonal relationship therapy, and the like. These modes are over and above the classical therapies of Freud, Jung, Adler, McDougall and such other pioneers in the field. It is not possible here to give even a brief sketch of all these techniques. We may, however, mention six fundamental approaches to psychotherapy, described by six outstanding American psychologists, who are recognized as authorities in their respective fields.²⁹

Nicholas Hobbs explains and illustrates the technique of Client-centred psychotherapy. Its origin is traced back to Freud but it owes its present form to Rogers. It requires warmth and responsiveness on the part of the counsellor who plays a permissive role and allows the growth of the client in such a manner that he may deal with his problems himself in a better way.

Lewis R. Wolberg describes the technique of Hypnotherapy. It helps to establish a closer relationship between the therapist and the patient, and thus, through suggestion and release technique, often leads to the removal of symptoms and the re-education of the patient. The origin of this mode of therapy is too well-known to require any comment.

S. R. Slavson represents the case for Group psychotherapies. Unlike other therapeutic modes it has originated in the United

29. 'Six Approaches to Psychotherapy' edited by J. L. McCary of Houston University.

States. In 1905 J. H. Pratt introduced class-method in the treatment of some physical ailments. Now, Slavson has developed the technique and applied it successfully to various mental disturbances. It is not merely a device for saving time. The interpersonal relationship, in a therapy group, helps the patients to achieve catharsis, and to gain insight into their difficulties. The therapist avoids the role of a leader and only indirectly guides their activities, or rather allows them to express their repressed hostilities, aggressions and destructiveness.

Psychotherapy based on psychoanalytic principles finds its exponent in the person of Norman Reider. Freud, as is well-known, is the originator of this technique. It is based on the method of free-association. Through this method the patient is supposed to dig out repressed memories, complexes and fixations, specially of the period of childhood, and thus gains insight into the unconscious mechanisms at the back of his disorder. This insight often leads to cure. The analyst plays only a helping or an encouraging role.

Directive and Eclectic Personality Counselling has its case represented by Fredrick Thorne. Thorne has developed it as a revolt against Rogersian non-directive therapy. It is eclectic in character and takes help from every technique, but emphasizes the directive role of the therapist.

J. L. Moreno is the champion of the technique of Psychodrama. With the techniques of 'tele relation', 'primary ego', 'auxiliary ego', 'spontaneity', and 'warming up', a drama is enacted in which life situations of the patient are repeated and he is led to reveal his complexes, frustrations, aggressions, etc., and thus releases their cathexis. It serves as a method of diagnosis as well as a method of treatment. So far as the value of these methods is concerned it is difficult to give final verdict in favour of one or the other. The fact is that each method possesses certain merits and advantages, and is specially applicable to certain cases. But the results depend not so much on the use of a particular method as on the tact and personality of the therapist who employs it. So the best thing is not to be wedded to one point of view, but to resort to any technique or techniques that the situation may demand. In fact, many of these techniques are not incompatible with one another, and can be combined in one single method.

Having reviewed these techniques we may return to the discussion of the point with which we had started. We may raise a

question as to the value of mystico-religious therapy as practised by our Indian mystics and saints.

At this point it is essential to distinguish between two aspects of this question. One is the metaphysical aspect and the other is the scientific aspect. Mystico-religious approach is based on certain metaphysical assumptions about soul, God and universe. It is the business of philosophy to evaluate them. The Science of psychology is not competent to decide the issue. But the suspense of judgment with regard to its metaphysical side does not bind us to a denial of its practical therapeutic value, if it can be empirically established.

I leave this question open for more ambitious investigators. But what I want to specially emphasize to you this morning is the Moral Approach to therapy. A little experience that I have had of therapeutic work has convinced me of the efficacy of this method. I will crave your indulgence for a description of its technique as it is vital to the purpose of this address.

Freud, discussing the technique of psychoanalysis (Collected Papers, Vol. I), has remarked that the analyst should abstain from preaching any philosophy to the patient. No doubt, it seems inconsistent with professional obligations to thrust a metaphysical point of view on the patient when he is not in a fit state to judge its merits. For instance, it would be a betrayal of confidence if a therapist, exploiting the suggestibility of a patient, converts him to his own religion. In moral approach, however, a little preaching may be necessary. But what is to be preached is not a narrow sectarian outlook, but certain universally admitted humanitarian values. In certain cases of delinquency, criminality, sex perversion, etc., the individual loses faith in the moral ideal. He becomes individualistic, and sometimes anti-social. The neurotic abandons the reality principle and is governed by pleasure principle, which makes him run after indirect and unrealistic ways of seeking satisfaction of his desires. In some cases, the super-ego begins to act as a tyrant, and punishes the ego with destructive trends or death wishes directed against the self.

If, in such cases, moral ideal is re-established, interest in life is revived, and social ties are re-inforced, the patient will be on a sure road to recovery. I do not mean to say that this objective is easy of attainment. Nor do I suggest that a direct moral sermon will be desirable. There will be cases showing such aggressive,

antisocial trends and perverted outlook that any hint about morality may create resistance in them. There may be psychotics, completely withdrawn from reality, who may not be accessible to the moral approach. For these reasons it is best to avoid direct preaching as far as possible. The moral outlook of the therapist, expression of moral values in his own character and personality, and above all, unbounded love of human beings reflected in his conduct are the best means of inducing a moral outlook in the patient. The moral outlook leads to a harmonious ideal of self-realization and social obligations, and the 'harmonious ideal' means an integrated mind and character.

Sometimes, the object may be achieved by strengthening the social ties and interpersonal relationships. Very often the patient, inspite of his apparent apathy, retains a soft corner in his heart for his mother, wife, children or some friend. These sentiments may be reinforced and properly exploited and the obligations of these relationships may be driven home to the patient.

Here we may raise a question as to the ultimate motive of moral therapy. The therapist should be inspired by a genuine love of mankind. He should undertake the job with the idea of service and with missionary zeal. Freud lays it down as an important condition of psychoanalysis that the analyst should never do the job gratis but should charge high fees from the patients. In moral therapy this maxim may be reversed. The therapist should not accept fees for his services so far as possible.

Lest some one should consider moral approach to therapy as a mere academic luxury, I may be allowed to quote a few examples to show how it works :

(i) I know the case of a hardened criminal and a decoit, who was arrested by the police. All coercive methods failed to break his resistance, but when he was treated with love and sympathy and an appeal was made to his sentiments for his wife and children, he wept bitterly and made honest confessions.

(ii) A delinquent boy, who was addicted to gambling, was brought over to a respectable way of life by strengthening his self-respect and by treating him as a respectable human being.

(iii) A woman suffering from acute hysteria for a period of several years gradually recovered when her family environment was changed and when she began to receive sisterly love and attention from a relation of hers.

SRI JAGADGURU VISHWARADHYA

JNANA SIMHASAN JNANAMANDIR

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(iv) In pre-partition days, I was able to bring together on friendly terms two groups of students belonging to different communities, who were in the grip of worst type of communal hatred and tension. I made an appeal to their sentiments of patriotism and to their humanity, and they responded to it most favourably.

(iv) A student of M.A. Final developed anxiety neurosis, just before his final examination, and lost confidence in himself. He had some interviews with me. I directed the conversation to the family relationships. When I put to him the simple question, "Is your mother alive", he burst into weeping like a child. When the emotion subsided he told me that his mother had been suffering from paralysis for the last nine or ten years, and this was the great source of anxiety to him. On further probing, it was found that this anxiety was reinforced by an unconscious sense of guilt produced by indulgence in some socially disapproved forms of sex gratification. It had also given rise to some mild delusions of persecution. The boy had otherwise average general intelligence and a moral outlook. I directed my efforts to strengthening this moral outlook, making repeated appeals to his sentiments for mother. I made him feel and realize what his mother would expect from him and how he would like to serve and console her. This appeal, combined with the sympathy and affection I showed him as his teacher, worked wonderfully, and it gave him a motive to live and to better his condition. He got over his troubles, concentrated on studies and passed his examination in second division.

(vi) Aishhorn's love therapy, achievements of Hindu and Muslim saints and mystics may be quoted as further examples of this moral approach.

(vii) The efforts of Alcoholics Anonymous also come under this head. There is a group of several thousand men and women in America who are ex-alcoholics and are engaged in the work of reforming other alcoholics.³⁰

Before concluding this brief survey it would not be out of place to throw some light on the dynamics of the moral Approach to Therapy. The following is a brief statement of the mechanisms and psychological techniques involved in this approach :

1. Integration of personality under the influence of a dominant sentiment. It helps in resolving the conflicts.

30. Text book of Abnormal Psychology (p. 525)—Landis & Bolles,

2. Sublimation. The sense in which the term is being used in this context must be distinguished from the sense attached to it by Freud. For Freud, sublimation of sex, for instance, is nothing but an indirect satisfaction of sex desires. In other words, a hero or a martyr is still seeking sex-gratification. But in our view sublimation is simply diversion of the energy of organism from one undesirable or unattainable purpose to another purpose, higher in the scale of social and moral values.

3. Transference. Again we have to distinguish it from Freudian concept of it. According to Freud, the libido which had been fixated on the father or on the mother, during the aedipus period, is directed later on to a father or mother substitute. Transference according to Freud is very often an obstacle and a form of resistance that endangers the progress of the treatment. But for moral approach transference is not necessarily coloured by sex, and so it is an asset and a help in the treatment. Same is the case with Identification.

4. Regeneration of the self by conversion to new (moral) point of view helps to overcome the sense of guilt and remorse, so common to many neuroses.

5. Devotion to a cause (the moral ideal) leads to comparative immunity from frustration and insecurity.

6. Insight and catharsis through moral self-examination, confession and repentance. It also bridges the gulf between the conscious and the unconscious. At least the separation is not so wide.

7. Group therapy through brotherly love, in a community of similar ideals. The case of Alcoholics Anonymous is a beautiful illustration of this point.

8. Death Instinct and Eros harmonised in devotion and loyalty to the Ideal. All that is antagonistic to the ideal is opposed, and all that is harmonious with it is cherished.

9. Reality testing implied in the objectivity of moral point of view.

10. The moral ego which is an emblem of harmony is strengthened. It is different from Freud's Super-Ego which is a tyrant and a source of conflict.

This moral Approach to therapy is, however, fraught with certain dangers. If unwittingly applied it may lead to escapism, a withdrawal from reality. The patient may find in it an excuse and consolation for his inability to face the hard realities of life.

Again, by strengthening the super-ego, it may lead to an aggressive morality. The sense of his own guilt may lead a patient to project his defects on others and to vent his feelings of hostility and aggression against them.

Both these dangers are very real and are associated with a degenerate religious and moral outlook. The remedy lies in finding a proper guide who should possess a healthy moral outlook, a well-integrated personality, an intense love for mankind, and a sufficient mastery over psychological techniques. These should be the minimum qualifications of the therapist undertaking the moral therapy.

It may be emphasized, however, that moral approach does not necessarily exclude other approaches. It can be profitably combined with other techniques, as demanded by the circumstances of the case.

Now I will conclude my address by quoting a remark of Professor O. Hobart Mowrer which will sum up my attitude to the problem of psychotherapy and psychopathology. He says, "If I can read the signs of our times aright, one of the great tasks which confronts us in our quest for peace of mind and more meaningful existence is the rediscovery of ethics".

History of Philosophy

Presidential Address

SECTION : HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

by

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When I was a school boy, a teacher of mine, while explaining the word 'philosophy', remarked that Indian philosophy as *darśana* could give us the direct knowledge of ultimate truth and was, therefore, a thing of the highest value, but European philosophy merely gave an account of what certain persons thought about the nature of ultimate reality and was, therefore, a somewhat useless study. Perhaps the reason why he disparaged the philosophy of Europe equally applies to that of India. It would appear, however, that if the ground of his stricture be right, then, what we call history of philosophy should especially come under this stricture. A mere collection of opinions of certain persons, howsoever eminent, is not likely to fulfil the purpose for which a serious student would study philosophy.

But certainly histories of philosophy, especially those of western philosophy, do not merely record the views of individual philosophers. Even the ordinary history of a country is not a bare record of past events. What is the true conception of a history of philosophy and how is it related with philosophy as such, if it is not a mere account of various philosophical views ?

I find it difficult to give an exact definition of the concept. So I shall try only to indicate in a general way what I understand by philosophy, its history and the relation between the two. Philosophising is a mode of self-consciousness. It arises when man is not satisfied merely with living his life, whether natural, moral, aesthetic, or religious, but wants to know the ultimate value of life itself. This question of value is intimately connected with the nature of reality; and philosophy attempts to know the nature of reality, as connected with value.

Such knowledge is the immediate aim of the philosopher's endeavour. But he has a further aim which is to gain some

knowledge having a practical bearing. From his knowledge of reality, he wants to ascertain the way by which man can attain the highest value which is within his reach. From the earliest times upto the modern period, both in the east and the west, this practical goal of philosophy has generally been recognised more or less explicitly by all important thinkers. In India, the aim of philosophy is clearly stated to be the attainment of *nirśreyas* or the summum bonum. In ancient Greece, Philosophy, besides indicating love of wisdom, also meant an art of life, based on the knowledge of reality. On account of this practical bias, the name philosophy has come to mean that type of general knowledge about reality in relation to human life which yields a conviction for the proper direction of life so as to achieve the greatest peace and happiness which may be possible for man. In these days of philosophical analysis, we often forget this original practical aim of philosophy. Whether practical knowledge of this kind is possible is a different matter. But the person who philosophises without having this aim clearly before his mind does not know what he is about and is likely only to beat about the bush.

Thus philosophy has its origin in a fundamental practical need of self-conscious man; and it is by reference to this need that the historian of philosophy has to ascertain the scope of his subject. Perhaps art and religion, too, try to satisfy the same fundamental need of man, in their own ways. So the historian of philosophy has to collect his data even from these, so far as they are concerned with the vision of reality as connected with value. Still a history of philosophy is not that of art or of religion. Art and religion have to do not so much with knowing as with our imagination and emotion. Supposing that the highest art and religion have the same final aim to be achieved as philosophy, still the last can be distinguished from the first two, as the cognitive way to this common goal. Perhaps in the case of many temperaments seeking this highest goal, the ways of art, religion and philosophy can all be combined with advantage. Even so, their ways would remain different and capable of being distinguished; hence it should not be difficult to separate philosophical views from those that specifically belong to art and religion.

It may be more difficult to separate philosophical views from those that are scientific, since both are the result of a theoretic pursuit. Both the scientist and the philosopher try to ascertain the truth about reality, irrespective of whether that truth turn out to fulfil our expectation about it or not. Dispassionate con-

cern for objective truth should guide every intellectual quest, whether it be actuated by the pure motive of only knowing the truth or the motive of utilising this objective truth for the satisfaction of some practical and emotional urge. Now although scientific research has often been actuated by some practical end, still the pure motive of scientific activity is, perhaps, only the attainment of truth and nothing more. But philosophy is in this respect, akin to practical rather than pure science, to the sort of work which is done by men like Edison and Marconi. Of course, in spite of this ultimate practical motive, philosophy, in carrying out its immediate objective of ascertaining truth, must follow the impersonal and dispassionate method of all theoretical pursuit.

But how to distinguish philosophy from practical science? This is to be done by their different practical ends. While the aim of practical science is to secure whatever is usually considered to be valuable, the aim of philosophy is to secure the highest value which is possible for man.

On account of its intimate relation with religion, it is sometimes thought that philosophy has no independent function to perform, that the only useful work that it can do is as the handmaid of religion, that its function is merely to support, by argument, the dogmas of religion. But even the attempt to support religious dogma by reason implies the belief that philosophy can function independently as a source of ultimate truth. For what the man of faith accepts on the ground of revelation, philosophy attempts to secure by the rational criticism of experience.

We have already said that the scope of the history of philosophy is determined by that fundamental practical need of self-conscious man in which philosophy has its origin. A little consideration would further show that the history of philosophy is philosophy itself. Collingwood maintains that the past which the historian studies is not a dead past but one which is in some sense living in the present, that history is the re-enactment in the mind of the historian of past experience. Whether this view of Collingwood about the nature of history in general be true or not, it appears that it is at least true of the history of philosophy. That is, the right type of history of philosophy should be a re-thinking, on the part of a historian of philosophy, of the philosophical thoughts of the thinkers of the past. Since all philosophising has the common aim of knowing ultimate reality as connected with value, the history of philosophy gets, in this common aim, an

integral unity which is absent in a mere collection of various views about reality given by various thinkers of the past. This means that to do the work of a historian of philosophy is tantamount to the act of philosophising itself.

In Europe, histories of philosophy having such an integral unity have been attempted only in the modern age. In India, however, even from the time of the middle ages we get compendiums which are clearly philosophical in character, giving summary statements of the principal philosophical views of the different schools of philosophy, although they lack in historical perspective, which is a common defect with all ancient literature of India in general. Perhaps the reason is that the Indian systems of philosophy have, for their theorisings, the common avowed object of suggesting some means of attaining salvation or permanent freedom from the suffering which life in the world involves.

It must, however, be granted that the attempt to formulate clearly the conception of history of philosophy was first made in Europe, and that by Hegel. It was he who for the first time drew attention to the important point that the history of philosophy should not be a mere miscellany of very various opinions upheld by certain clever men. Hegel also made the highly significant suggestion that in the philosophical thoughts of different ages, the categories of reason, i.e., the fundamental ways in which mankind has judged, reacted to, and felt, reality have gradually attained clearness and distinctness. Of course, the conscious purpose which individual philosophers kept before themselves has not been the same. Still with the help of Hegel's suggestion we can see that the history of philosophy should principally be an account of the various ways in which man has, in different ages, been trying consciously and rationally to formulate his views about the nature of the world and the value of man's life within it. It is evident that the history of philosophy, if it keeps in view this main aim of all philosophical theorising, can be a very useful discipline especially for students of philosophy.

Hegel's suggested principle for interpreting the history of philosophy goes far beyond this. He also maintains the highly controversial and perhaps wrong view that the order in which these categories appear in history necessarily correspond with the logical order in which they would appear in the fully thought-out rational system of philosophy. He, in fact, holds that the succession of the principal philosophical notions in history is the same as that of the categories in his Logic. This implies that the history

of philosophy is in a sense identical with philosophy itself. Collingwood, in our days, tried even to go beyond this Hegelian position by identifying philosophy not only with the history of philosophy but with history as such. I shall not attempt here any detailed examination of these views, but I shall only briefly indicate the element of truth which they seem to contain.

The hypothesis that the historical process of philosophical thought essentially constitutes the dialectical elaboration of thought itself as presented in Hegel's Logic would appear, to any unprejudiced student of history, to be an error. The process of thinking in history, although it is partly controlled by rational considerations, also depends upon man's peculiar needs and urges which are incidental to his being placed in a peculiar cultural atmosphere, a peculiar politico-economic structure of society, in which the work of philosophising is done. Hegel himself admitted this determining condition of philosophy, although he at the same time maintained a strict correspondence between the historical and the logical order of the movement of thought. Moreover, the emergence of a new philosophical idea often depends upon such accidental factors as the congenital temperament, the peculiarity of education and the sudden intuition of a philosophical genius. Nor do these a-logical and accidental factors influence the growth of philosophy always in the right direction. Indeed, it is also difficult to conceive the development of philosophical thoughts through the ages to be a single, if broad, current, fed by different streams of thought. On the contrary, we have to picture it as consisting of very many single currents which, though they often cross, intersect and mix with one another, still, on the whole, maintain their separate courses.

This is not to be understood as denying the importance of the logical factor in the development of thought in history. The logical factor is indeed very important. For in the first place, all systems do, in their own ways, try to reach the ideal of a truly logical system. Secondly, a new system is often only a fuller logical development of a contemporary, or an immediately preceding, one.

A student of history of philosophy, therefore, should try to ascertain the a-logical and accidental factors influencing the development of thought as well as the logical factor. But his main interest would lie in the second. The historian of philosophy attempts to discover the first in order to understand rightly the exact

significance of the principal concepts which are employed in a particular system. But this he does, in order afterwards to examine them critically and determine how far they can be logically or rationally justified. Evidently the importance of the second aspect is greater. The significant reading of the history of philosophy must be a critical understanding of it, actuated by a concern to evaluate, to ascertain what is worth accepting and to know the grounds for such evaluation. It would appear that critical evaluation of this kind requires, at least implicitly, also some kind of positive construction from the standpoint of which the evaluation is made. The maximum value from studying history of philosophy can be derived only if we try to understand, to criticise and also to construct. Perhaps it can even be said truly that one cannot even understand previous philosophers in a philosophically significant way, without criticism and construction. To do the work of a historian of philosophy in the proper sense of the word, therefore, necessarily includes, if it is not quite the same as, the function of philosophising itself.

Not only this. The converse also would seem to be true. No philosophical construction can be carried on without a proper historical study of former philosophies. For the would-be philosopher always finds himself in an intellectual atmosphere in which several philosophical ideas are already present organised in a more or less systematic fashion—there can be, for him, no occasion for attempting any new construction unless he detects some flaws in these existing philosophical ideas, unless he finds reason to criticise them. But his criticism of them would be very inadequate, if he is not aware of their exact meaning by reference to the non-rational and rational conditions of their origin and growth, of their defence and criticism by former philosophers, especially who lived and thought when, or immediately after, they were first adumbrated and formulated. In other words, his criticism of existing philosophical notions should be based on his knowledge of the history of philosophy. What I am suggesting is not merely that the study of history of philosophy is a very good preparation for any fresh act of philosophising. I would further suggest that philosophical thinking must necessarily take place in terms of previous philosophical thoughts; and that the work of fresh philosophising is necessarily bound to be the sounder, the more consciously it is carried on by constant reference to the great philosophies that have been formulated till now. "To philosophise is to study the history of

philosophy philosophically";¹ but then by this, one should not understand "the study of histories of philosophy; that is history of philosophy at second-hand. It is critical understanding of great philosophical works";² nor should one take the statement that to philosophise is to study the history of philosophy philosophically is a formal definition of philosophy. It only indicates a necessary connection between philosophy and the study of history of philosophy.

The connection is necessary, because the philosopher has, at any rate, to reflect on his own experience; and, as Collingwood points out, everybody's experience of today is imbued through and through by his own past experiences, and these again by the experiences of his predecessors; so that the reflection of one's own thought is the reflection also of the thoughts of one's predecessors. If this is the case, a clear and proper understanding of the thoughts of our predecessors would be a necessary pre-requisite and accompaniment of the correct and effective reflection of even one's own thought. By saying this, I am not implying that all philosophical problems have been perfectly formulated and answered for all time to come and that modern man has merely to re-think what former philosophers have thought. In fact, exact re-thinking of the same philosophical problem is perhaps not quite possible, for the simple reason that genuine thinking is never a mechanical process which could, as it were, be duplicated. Even the same person formulates and solves what may be roughly called the same problem in slightly different ways at different periods of his life. What I am urging is that even the most original geniuses among philosophers have to think out their problems and solutions by conscious reference to the thoughts of other persons whether they be their contemporaries or predecessors.

I am, therefore, inclined to think that the element of truth in Hegel's doctrine of the identity of philosophy and the history of philosophy lies in their necessary connection: on the one hand, genuine study of the history of philosophy is not possible without more or less explicit philosophising; and on the other, genuine philosophising is not possible without more or less explicit knowledge of the history of philosophy.

1. 'The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel' by M. B. Foster, p. vii.

2. Ibid., p. viii.

If philosophy is thus necessarily connected with the history of philosophy, it is patent that a knowledge of the latter is absolutely necessary for every student of philosophy. Moreover, a history of philosophy written from such a point of view is bound to contain a systematic account of how most of the present-day conceptions which are employed in ordinary life, and in scientific, artistic, ethical and religious thought originated and developed. This means that a knowledge of the history of philosophy of this type is necessary for all enlightened cultural activity and hence also for education in general.

Especially at present when people are losing faith in philosophy, the proper study of the history of philosophy can play an important role in keeping alive the interest of civilised man in the pursuit of philosophy. It goes without saying that just at the present moment the prestige of science is greater than that of any other cultural activity; and among academic philosophers themselves there are persons who are trying to demonstrate that science alone can give all the knowledge of reality which is possible and that philosophy as a theoretic pursuit is absolutely useless. There are, however, many others who have not lost faith in philosophy, even though they are not vouchsafed any very clear vision of the truth. The best that such persons can do to keep the flame of philosophic thinking burning, in such adverse time, is to study the history of philosophy with greater zeal and care. Of course, the study of the history of philosophy cannot be a substitute for philosophy itself, since except for professional historians, an interest in the history of a subject generally depends upon an interest in the subject. If philosophy ceases to interest us, it will not be long before its history will begin to do so. But, then, if our concept of the history of philosophy is right, its study would at the same time promote the activity of philosophising also.

If philosophy is to live, original thinking in philosophy must, of course, continue. But original thinking must necessarily be done in terms of the thoughts of former ages, the thoughts to which the would-be philosopher can be said to have been born. These are, as it were, the constant source of his inspiration. If this source dries up, the stream itself is bound to dry up. This is perhaps the principal reason why modern India has produced almost no first-rate philosopher. During the period of our subjection to British rule, new ideas from the West have indeed been imported into our country. But this has had, with all its liberalising influence, also a very depressing effect on our indi-

genous thinking and scholarship, just as the importation of certain goods of British manufacture had almost killed the corresponding arts and crafts of India. We lost direct contact with our own philosophies of the past and also lost the capacity of serious philosophical thinking. Of course, our interest in Indian philosophy has of late been revived; and we have also become keenly conscious of our failure to make any significant contribution to the philosophical movement. But our interest in Indian philosophy still remains mostly a matter of mere sentiment and so is not very effective. Such sentimental interest may perhaps be quite harmless in itself. But if our interest is not properly educated and exercised in fruitful activity, it is likely to make us intellectually lazy, narrow and vain. Among the teachers of philosophy in our colleges and universities, there are not many who can understand by their own unaided effort the original works of our ancient philosophy. Most of us have to depend, for their knowledge of Indian philosophy, on the few English compendiums on the subject which are available. But none of the histories of Indian philosophy that have so far been written either in English or in any of our provincial languages can stand comparison with the standard histories of European philosophy, especially those that have been written by the great continental scholars. Before we can hope to make even slight progress toward the attainment of such high standard in this sphere, it will be necessary for us to do a lot of field work, i.e., careful and minute research. A large number of scholars must undertake the task of carefully studying all the available works on the different systems and reconstructing their philosophical content with reference, as far as possible, to the social, political, economic and religious state of the time when they were written. It is only in this way that the ground will be prepared for the writing of a history of Indian philosophy that may be compared with the great systematic histories of European philosophy. And it is also by rehabilitating ourselves in this way in our indigenous thought that we shall be able to prepare the ground and atmosphere in which alone original philosophical contribution may be possible. Not otherwise. Of course, to be an original and creative thinker is given only to geniuses; and geniuses are rare at all times. But every one who is in the field of philosophy can certainly do this humble but important work of preparing the ground for them.

It will, however, be a mistake to think that at the present stage of human civilisation when men of different countries and culture

have come close to one another, there can be any adequate study of philosophy by confining oneself within the four corners of the thought of one's own country. It need hardly be mentioned that no serious and fruitful thinking today is possible in any field whatever, without an intimate knowledge of Western thought. We must continue our study of European philosophy. Really speaking, we should do it more seriously and earnestly than at present. For the West is the leader of modern thought in every sphere of knowledge.

One may think, because of its sceptical note, that modern European philosophy has nothing valuable to offer. Scepticism, indeed, plays a large role in the philosophy of modern Europe. In fact, this is what differentiates, there, the modern spirit from the medieval ideal of faith in scripture and authority. Now-a-days, the attempt to win an argument by quoting authorities is almost unthinkable; conclusions in philosophy are put forward and accepted, more or less tentatively; and the claim to finality is deprecated. This indeed is the state of affairs. But a philosopher should hardly fight shy of this fact. This is also not derogatory to philosophy. For the attitude of not accepting anything merely on faith as final truth, without examining it thoroughly on grounds of reason, is but the philosophic attitude in its maturity. Besides, tentative acceptance of a view which leaves the mind open to correction has a high spiritual value in that it prevents all sorts of dogmatic narrowness and blindness in the matter of ultimate questions of value.

Of course, it has also its dark side. Neither the student of philosophy nor those who look upon the philosopher for guidance can find satisfaction in mere uncertainty. Hence the philosopher, while continuing to struggle against blind dogmatism (a struggle in which he has attained a measure of success), must also at the same time make a more determined effort to attain positive conclusions, howsoever tentative, in regard to the perennial problems with which philosophy has been dealing since the very beginning of cultural life in human history. I believe that philosophy alone, by its constant and determined effort, can, in its own way, give to modern man that integrated sense of value, which he today so badly needs.

In this important work, the study of the history of philosophy, in the sense of the works of modern and ancient philosophers of both East and West, is not only useful but also indispensable.

The Problem of Peace

Presidential Address

SECTION: ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

by

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The burning question of Ethics and Social Philosophy today is: How to live and let live? Though this has been the basic problem of morality and religion in all ages, it has assumed a tremendous significance in our own times.

The two world-wars of the present century with their devastating effects have set people athinking. Great thinkers apprehend the extinction of human civilisation or even of the human race in the event of another global war. The atomic weapons spell disaster to humanity. They threaten the very existence of homo sapiens. Man seems to be doomed to destruction by his own inventions. This reminds us of the mythological story of Bhasmāsura.

Man with all his scientific knowledge and power has reached the edge of a precipice. Either he has to retrace his steps or he perishes. It is therefore the duty of all sane persons to cry a halt and try to prevent mankind from a universal Harakiri.

There is now a general consensus of opinion in favour of perpetual peace. It is being felt more acutely than ever that if we want to survive, we must change to our old ways. Unite or perish—is the grim situation we are facing. We have to take note of the hard fact that in this nuclear age, the only alternative to co-existence is co-extinction.

For the last few years, the problem of peaceful co-existence has been receiving wider and more serious attention. The best brains of the different nations are trying to tackle the problem: How to prevent war once for all? The result has been the growth of an enormous literature on the subject.

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It is now admitted on all hands that the modern crisis is due to a great disparity between the head and the heart. There has been a gigantic growth of intellect, but a dwarfing of affections. Man has developed a fine insight into the workings of Nature, but he has become myopic regarding the fundamental values that sustain humanity. The increase of power over physical forces has been accompanied by a decrease of fellow-feeling. The modern age possesses encyclopaedic knowledge, but little wisdom. As regards means, we are highly equipped, but as regards ends, we are groping in the dark. The atom-bomb is like a sword in the hand of a child. The vital need of today therefore is a new moral awakening, a social renaissance.

Various means are prescribed to bring peace and happiness on the earth. The treatments prescribed seem to be based on conflicting ideologies. For example, we may take the following pairs of theses and antitheses:

(i) According to some, science is letting loose unprecedented forces of destruction which jeopardise our very existence on this planet; hence we must part company with science. According to others, our present miseries are due not to scientific inventions, but to our misapplication of them.

(ii) According to some, this machine age has mechanised and dehumanised Man; hence let us go back to the bullock cart and the spinning wheel. According to others the future prosperity of the world depends upon further industrial expansion with labour-saving machinery which will bring richer amenities of life within the easy reach of all.

(iii) According to some, religion divides men into hostile camps; it has tinged the pages of history with blood; hence it is high time that we should give a decent burial to it. According to others, the present chaos is due to irreligion and what the world needs today is a universal religion that can bind together entire humanity with a common tie of spiritual affinity.

(iv) According to some, man should be viewed as an end in himself and not as a mere means, and there should be less of state-control and more of personal liberty. According to others, as mankind has to be moulded into a new pattern of classless society, there should be more of state-authority and regimentation.

These antinomies, if we may so call them, tend to pull us in opposite directions, and like Yudhisthira of the Mahabharat, we are confronted with the question: Which is the right way? Along

what path should the present man go if he wants to survive in future ?

The various lines of thought that have been and can be suggested with a view to chalk out a path of peace for humanity are considered below:

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One proposal of the peace-advocates is disarmament of nations. It is desirable that the mad race for armaments is brought to an end, sooner than later. It will be a good day if steel is used to manufacture only constructive tools and implements. But even if we throw the entire armoury of the human race into the Pacific Ocean, does it solve the problem of Peace? As they say, men will continue to fight with their teeth and nails, if they have no weapons. The banning of atom-bombs and hydrogen-bombs by itself cannot ensure peace unless we banish anger and hatred which are the deeper causes of war. Military disarmament therefore can be effective only if it is accompanied by a moral re-armament.

Another formula of pacifist ethics is the concept of Internationalism. Nationalism which was deemed as a self-sufficient principle, commanding absolute allegiance and undivided loyalty, has outlived its use and must give way to an inter-national outlook. The concept of state sovereignty with its parochial patriotism and political jingoism is now an anachronism, and must find its place in a common graveyard with tribalism, feudalism and provincialism. The interests of the different nations are so closely interlinked, that none can continue a separate isolated existence of its own. The creed of today is universal Humanism or cosmopolitanism, a broad-based liberal view of man transcending geographical barriers or state-boundaries which are merely contingent and arbitrary. In short the old national outlook must be supplanted by a new rational outlook.

With a view to prevent world-war, some thinkers envisage the picture of a world-government. Kant in his 'Perpetual Peace' (18th century) and Dante in his 'Monarchia' (14th century) visualised such a prospect. The idea can be traced back to earlier periods. It will be indeed a golden age in human history if all men turn themselves into citizens of one single state on earth with one common language, one common script, one common culture, one common religion and one common code. But this seems to be a mere Utopia, at least for the near future. Even

one central federal government with sufficient control over the constituent states appears to be only a remote possibility.

A more practical proposition is the consolidation of an international organisation with adequate physical and moral sanctions to check aggression of any nation or group of nations. The efforts made by the League of Nations in the past and by the U.N.O. at present are beginnings in the direction of settling international disputes by arbitration and intelligent persuasion rather than by bayonets.

There seems to be a difficulty in the way of international arbitration. How to enforce the decision on a belligerent nation? If by force of arms, that will mean one war to prevent another and this will defeat the very purpose of peace. Some thinkers are therefore in favour of an economic blockade of a delinquent nation to make it conform to the international discipline.

To achieve peace, we must march in the direction of unity. Though absolute unity seems to be an unattainable ideal, we can try to strengthen forces of cohesion and solidarity. Nations should try to understand each other and to emphasise points of agreement rather than those of difference. International organisations in the fields of trade and industry, art and culture, science and philosophy, games and sports will mitigate the social distance between races. Conditions should be created for free travel, free domicile, free trade and free exchange of ideas. There should be increased contacts between nations by way of co-participation in benevolent projects. The humanitarian forces should prove stronger than territorial loyalties. The good men and women of the world should join hands and lead the world in the direction of unity, concord and harmony.

International relations should be governed by the same principles of morality as obtain in family life or in social life. The moral obligations incumbent on persons are also binding on nations. Private virtues can never be public vices and vice versa. Charity which begins at home should not end there. Honesty is the best policy not only in the domestic sphere but also in the inter-national sphere. The old Machiavellian principle that 'Nothing is wrong in war' should be substituted by 'Everything is wrong in war', for the whole process of war amounts to man-slaughter on a mass scale. The actions of states or of those who administer them should be judged in terms of the universal code of ethics. International

morality is not different from personal or social morality. Just as a good man sacrifices his own selfish interests for the greater good of others, so also states ought to help their neighbours out of sheer magnanimity rather than for the sake of commercial or political gains. Lust, hate and greed are the triple gateways to hell not only for persons but also for nations. The jealousies, suspicions and animosities that strain relations in a family also estrange nations. The wide-spread tension in the present world can be relieved by developing the soft virtues of Maitrī (friendship) Karuṇā (sympathy) and Muditā (feeling joy in others' joy). If such sympathetic patterns of behaviour are cultivated en masse, the world will be a much better place to live in.

If nations want to live in peace and amity, they must attune themselves to the new ideal of humanity. What is needed today is a new consciousness of man as man. The universal aspect of humanity should be recognised. The divine in man should be respected. One of the oldest and most universal beliefs of mankind is the belief in a sacred order which manifests itself in all that is noble in human life and thought. This belief which is disappearing fast from this frustrated age should be strengthened and re-established. Premium should be put not on the values of the cash nexus, but upon the intrinsic spiritual values which are the precious prerogatives of humanity.

The deep-rooted pugnacious tendencies should be redirected into channels where they can feed upon non-human agencies like death, disease, poverty, ignorance and suffering which are eternal enemies of mankind. The anti-social drives of hatred, anger etc. should be mobilised against such things as the germs of tuberculosis or pernicious insects. The urge for conquest should be satisfied by trying to conquer the natural catastrophes, flood, famine etc. The hitherto unexplored regions of Nature can provide ample scope for adventure and thrill. We can display our heroics by waging a scientific war against dirt, filth, flies and epidemics. In these ways, we can turn our destructive energies into creative forces of social value.

The ancient philosophic literature of India is full of messages of Peaceful Co-existence. Long before Bentham and Mill propounded their theory of the greatest good of the greatest number, Buddhistic monasteries were echoing with the slogans of Bahu Jana Hitāya, Bahu Jana Sukhāya. The Sarvodaya movement of today is only a re-echo of the ancient motto of our land :

Sarve bhavantu sukhinah
 Sarve santu nirāmayāḥ
 Sarve bhadraṇi pashyantu
 Mā kashchit dukkhabhāg bhavet

(All may become happy; all may live well; all may realise the good; let no one in the world come to grief).

The universal brotherhood that is preached today was long ago enunciated in the following Sloka :

Ayam nijah paro veti
 Gaṇaṇa laghuchetasām
 Udār charitānām tu
 Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

(‘Mine and ‘his’ are petty considerations of the narrow-minded. The liberal-minded regard the entire human population on earth as their own kith and kin).

Long before Marx and others pronounced the principles of equality and fraternity, the Vedas proclaimed lofty ideals of corporate existence:

“Move together, deliberate together,
 know each other’s mind. Make your
 thoughts, hearts and minds alike”.

—*Rigveda* 8.49.4

“Let your drinks and foods be distributed
 evenly. Let you have a common prayer, a common
 gathering, a common sacrifice”.

—*Atharva Veda* 3.30.6

“I make you think and feel alike and free
 from aversion. Love each other as a cow
 loves her new-born calf”.

—*Atharva Veda* 3.30.1

“Those who possess a sense of equality for all are dear
 to me and their prosperity
 is durable”.

—*Yajurveda* 19.46

The ancient wisdom embodied in the Upanishads can still serve as a beacon light to the fumbling humanity. The realisation of the truth that all souls are essentially sparks of the same divinity provides the philosophic foundation of unity.

The modern world can well adopt the old vedic prayer:

Saha no avatu, Saha no bhunaktu, Saha
Viryam Karavāvahai.

(May God protect us together; May He make us flourish together; May we put forth our energies together).

The five-fold virtues of Ahimsa, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacharya and Aparigraha, commonly taught by Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism can be profitably practised by the different nations of the world today at least in these limited senses:

1. Ahimsa—No aggression. 2. Satya—No false propaganda. 3. Asteya—No misappropriation of another's property. 4. Brahmacharya—No over-population. 5. Aparigraha—No excessive hoarding of arms.

It is gratifying to see that the war-weary nations have evolved a formula that can save them from the present holocaust. It is the principle of Pancha Sila with five-fold vows.

(i) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. (ii) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs. (iii) Non-aggression. (iv) Equality and mutual benefit. (v) Peaceful Co-existence.

This Pancha Sila is the principle of Non-violence and peaceful compromise extended to international relations. If we want to meet the Atomic challenge, this principle, which suggests an immediate way out of the impasse, should receive greater attention in contemporary world-politics and may be recognised as an international canon of morality, so long as the world continues to be politically constituted as it is today.

We can hope for a day when the innate goodness of man with his immense potentialities will change the moral map of the universe, and the stories of national rivalry will become a closed chapter in human history. If the milk of human kindness and the honey of human love begin to flow so abundantly as to sweeten all our relations, social, economic and political, the earth will turn into a veritable paradise.

A critic may point out here that the world does not suffer from a dearth of noble principles. The question is how to convert such precepts into practice when occasions for tension arise.

There is considerable force in the criticism. But India has already shown a way in this direction. The non-violent Satyagraha preached and practised by Mahatma Gandhi is a monumental example of how the principles of truth and love can ultimately triumph over the most formidable forces of a mighty empire. Another glaring illustration of peaceful revolution is the Bhoodan Yajna of Vinoba Bhave who has demonstrated how an economic reconstruction of a vast magnitude can be brought about effectively by a change of heart. The world is looking to these historic experiments of India with great interest and hope.

If the vast bulk of mankind resolve to settle their disputes by methods other than the law of the jungle, we shall be embarking upon a new phase of human civilisation. What is needed is the stabilisation of a world-opinion in favour of peace, the establishment of a peace-mentality.

Om Shāntiḥ, Shāntiḥ, Shāntiḥ

Part II
SYMPOSIA

Symposium I

Thought and Action

I

by

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In common parlance the words 'Thought' and 'Action' are used quite normally to describe certain parts of our experience. We are well-understood by our listeners when we use such expressions as the following :—

1. Mr. X is a thoughtful person.
2. Many thoughts come to my mind about this matter.
3. Mr. X is a man of much action.

But the philosopher asks the questions, 'What is thought?' and 'What is action?'. The philosopher who raises these questions uses these expressions quite intelligently as everybody else does in his day to day affairs of life. So it is obvious that he does not raise these questions because he does not know how to operate with these symbols or because he fails to understand what is meant by the statements which contain these expressions. He appears to be desiring to give the correct logical analysis of the sentences which contain these expressions. He is not worried to know how people use these words. But he appears to be anxious to elucidate the logical behaviour of these words. The ability to use an expression intelligently is quite different from the ability to demonstrate the rules governing the logical behaviour of the expression. It is not the former but the latter which has the full promise of an interesting occupation for him.

My object in this paper is to show that the Philosopher starts by observing certain peculiarities in the use of these expressions. His ontological questions like, "What is thought?" and "What is action?", are formal questions put in a material mode of speech. His ontological questions are at first intended to direct our attention to certain peculiarities in the logical behaviour of these words.

But to avoid the charge of pursuing a triviality he deliberately adopts the misleading method of using the ontological mode of speech for what are outrightly formal questions. He then enters upon a Career of linguistic innovation by way of working upon one general assumption about the meaningful employment of all kinds of substantives and adjectives. Having done all these he then looks at the world through this changed system of concepts. His ontological mode of speech fits well to his programme of enjoying a strange look of the world through a system of changed concepts. His conception of Reality is this changed look of the world through this deliberately changed, re-arranged and re-classified system of concepts. He does not intend that his linguistic recommendations should be seriously accepted for the purpose of describing the world; for he never makes the claim that his proposed system of discourse will do this job better. He creates this innovation merely for the pleasure of contemplation. He speaks with the vulgar and thinks with the cultured.

Thus his metaphysical theory about Reality does not make any factual claim about what actually exists in the world or about how language is actually used. A linguistic innovation meant for the pleasure of contemplation is neither true nor false. It can only excite the feeling, 'Could this be true? If so, what a wonderful place the world would be for men to live in?'. A Metaphysical theory based upon prior ontological questionings like, 'What is thought? What is action? What is Mind? Is matter real?', is temperamentally gratifying but factually empty. The metaphysician is fully aware at the beginning that he is simply performing some verbal tricks. But his ontological mode of speech systematically deceives his audience from the beginning. And after some time the magician is himself taken in by his tricks. He forgets that he was playing a verbal trick. If a person first pretends to be ill in order to dupe his doctor, he becomes more and more careful and may feel, because of his success at some stage, that he is really ill. The illusion is not simply consciously enjoyed but is also subsequently seriously believed.

Let me illustrate my remarks. The proposition, "I have many thoughts in my mind", looks to be of the same logical type as, "I have many N.P. in my suitcase". So also the proposition, "Many thoughts come to my mind", looks to have the same logical form as, "Many guests come to my house at Puri". The philosopher who raises the question, "What is thought?", is drawing our attention to this close similarity in form. He then tacitly works upon the

assumption that since the symbol 'NP' refers to Naye Paise and the symbols 'House' and 'Guests' refer to house and guests, the symbol 'thoughts' must be referring to something. To an anticipated objection that Naya Paisa, house and guests are all publicly observable entities whereas the Philosopher's supposed thought-existents are not publicly observable, he replies by saying that thoughts are invisible intangible entities existing in the deeper regions of Reality; though not publicly observable yet available for a kind of private intellectual scrutiny, namely, introspection. Here the Philosopher feels flattered to announce his knowledge of things which the ordinary mortals cannot attain. He also assures his audience that they can know these strange shadowy entities if they can employ the special method of the Philosopher. He makes the capacity for employing the method definitive of higher intellectual capacities. He announces gravely that any intelligent man, if he cultivates his power of pure introspection sufficiently, must be able to know that thoughts are existents, though of a different character than the objects of sense perception. Physical objects of sense-perception are transient and variable in nature. But pure thoughts enjoy a sort of eternal existence. Here the word "sufficiently" is definitively used. How long one has to cultivate one's power of introspection so as to deserve the title of 'having cultivated it sufficiently'? The reply is, till he sees thoughts as existent entities. The objector cannot make bold to say that he has scrutinised his mind sufficiently and yet has not been able to come across these shadowy and strange entities. That would put him to shame and deprive him of the title 'intelligent'.

But inspite of the taboo imposed and threat held out by the philosopher some declare that there are no such data of introspection inhabiting the stream of consciousness at any moment in the sense in which my pen is in my pocket at the present moment.

Here, the Philosopher adopts the trick of shifting the ground. He says that thoughts and wills are assumed to exist on epistemological grounds. And why can we not assert the existence of unobservable entities! Do we not assert that there are mountains on the other side of the moon even though no-body has observed them?

But it is obvious that the Philosopher's defence is weak. The statement about the mountains on the other side of the moon asserts the existence of things observable on principle, though not yet observed, whereas the statement about thoughts asserts the

existence of entities not observable on principle. Secondly, statements about intellectual capacities at higher level can be explained without supposing the existence of these strange entities or shadowy processes. 'Mr. X knows Algebra very well', does not assert that Mr. X always is consciously entertaining the different statements of quadratic equations. The statement asserts that Mr. X can solve correctly, if and when, problems of Algebra are set to him. 'Knows' here is dispositional rather than episodic in meaning. The test we apply for establishing the statement that Mr. X knows Algebra very well is to put questions to him and see how promptly and correctly he answers these questions. The test never consists in trying to ascertain whether in the subterranean regions of his mind Mr. X is consciously maintaining all the algebraic statements that he is capable of making in all the different situations in life. And such attempts are useless because by definition Mr. X's thoughts are exclusively private to him and as such, are eternally screened off from every body else's scrutiny.*

Again it has been argued that unless we assume the occurrence of thought-processes, we cannot explain such statements as, 'Mr. X is consciously making the statement, he is fully aware of what he is saying. Mr. X is deliberately or intentionally saying this'. It is argued by many epistemologists that the statements assert the occurrence of two acts, one in the publicly observable field and another in the individual's exclusively private field of consciousness. It is further maintained that the two acts are never numerically identical and that what occurs in the mind is the cause of what happens in the physical world.

But here again, it is obvious that the logic of these expressions has been wrongly elucidated and these statements have been badly translated. Because in trying to establish whether the statement is deliberately made or not we do not look for these supposed episodes as their causes. We ask the speaker whether he means what he says and we also study his other utterances and further reactions to this situation and other similar situations. The question, "Whether the statement is deliberately made", never seeks a causal explanation. Speaking something intentionally is not performing two operations. It is performing only one operation, though of a different sort than the one performed, when something is said unintentionally.

* This part is mainly adopted from Ryle's 'Concept of Mind'.

Similarly, 'thinking', 'judging', 'abstracting', 'inferring', are not autobiographical in meaning. They do not mean occurrences in the stream of consciousness of the individuals. We do many things by way of looking for evidences before we pass a judgment or a verdict. But these operations themselves do not constitute the verdict itself. To borrow a metaphor from Mr. Ryle, travelling is not reaching the destination. Once the destination is reached travelling is over. Similarly, building a road is not the road itself. There are judgments or verdicts but not judging as a mental occurrence. Again the judgment that is written out is not the expression of another internal occurrence. The words, 'judgment', 'abstract idea', 'inference' 'conclusion', are useful for describing the various parts of a published theory. They do not express a process of cognising an abstract idea or seeing the conscious duplicate of the implication of meaning of a sentence.

In the field of Ethics the moral Philosopher makes the plea that we cannot give an adequate interpretation of statements like—Mr. X did it deliberately or willfully—, unless we suppose that his action has been caused by some executive act of his will. This interpretation is said to be particularly necessary to save men from being regarded as machines having no freedom of will. If men have no freedom of will and if their actions are due to the same mechanical laws as explain the happenings in the physical world, men will not deserve any praise or blame for what they do.

But here again we have to distinguish between the common use and the philosophical use of the phrase 'deliberately doing a thing!' In the common usage, the words 'deliberately doing' refer to an action which is wrongly done but which could have been done rightly. In common parlance, we do not say that a man deliberately did an act rightly, and that the man could have done the job wrongly in the sense that one could carefully commit a mistake and had the training for it. It is the philosopher who makes this extended use.

The question whether somebody deserves to be blamed for an action does not seek a causal explanation in the mystical way. It does not seek the information whether or not there did occur any will-occurrence. It seeks the information whether the man was acting under no compulsion and whether he had the requisite practice and training to get the work right. Similarly, we praise a man for an action if he has continued doing it under too many odds and has not given up under difficulties and inspite of temptations to the contrary. Here again the question does not make

any reference to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the mystical and unknowable operation of the will.

Thus, we see that whether it is in logic or epistemology or ethics, the Philosopher is playing a verbal game. He is cutting away some very familiar words from the context of their usual employment and is giving them a use which they normally do not have. He then draws some metaphysical consequences which present a strange look of the world. He creates the illusion of a proof though all that he actually does is the creation of a linguistic innovation by means of reclassifying some commonplace words, giving them an extended meaning and putting them under categories to which they do not usually belong.

I am inclined to believe that the philosopher does this deliberately and consciously for the pleasure of contemplation though his ontological mode of speech misleads others. Thereby he achieves two ends. He enjoys his own game and gets the applause from the audience that his creation is grand and sublime. The latter achievement is possible just because like a magician, he does not let the audience know what he is doing. I can give no better grounds for what I believe here than to quote the exact statement of Sankara in this matter. In B.S. 2.1.14. Sankara says that an isolated sentence has all kinds of implications. It is grammatically complete but not absolutely complete in sense. Its implications are logically interminable, though in actual speech activity we are satisfied after following up a few implications since our interest is a practical one. Theoretically speaking or speaking from the standpoint of philosophy which is concerned with completeness of meaning in an absolute sense, we must admit that any sentence is syntactically incomplete. Meaning is a whole and discourse is a system. If we follow up the implications of a sentence which is about any particular empirical object, it will develop into an entire system of meaningful sentences about all things of the world. But a sentence which asserts the substantial identity of all things is syntactically complete in the fullest sense. Its meaning is self-complete and it does not give rise to any further expectancy because nothing is left out in relation to which further informations could be sought, about the immediate subject of discourse. Sankara says that this is his final proof for the assertion that plurality is false and unity of all things is the highest truth.

This seems to me to be the best Exposition by Sankara of his otherwise elusive views. Here he clearly states that a Philosopher

is not concerned with discovering any new facts about the world either by direct observation or by inference from facts of observation. His business is that of analysing the peculiarity of meaning of various sentences that we employ in describing the world. A Philosopher's proof is not concerned with establishing the existence of any transcendental Deity. His proofs are no more than statements about linguistic facts. If the casual reader is misled it is because he expects the philosopher to provide him with what the philosopher cannot provide. Sankara repeatedly tells us that the existence of a transcendental Deity cannot be proved in the usual sense of proof, because inference is valid only in empirical matters and a transcendental Deity by definition is beyond any such proof. The Philosopher is busy in detecting linguistic peculiarities which are quite absorbing for him. That Sankara is fully aware of the fact that he is concerned with matters which are entirely verbal in character is obvious from the following. To an anticipated objection that this kind of intellectual pursuit is useless he replies that it is the only occupation of the Philosopher and the enlightenment he obtains from this kind of analysis cannot be sublated by any other knowledge. His exact words are, "Nor, again, can such knowledge be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or erroneousness, because, firstly it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated". Sankara does not speak of liberation in any mystical sense of being attainable in a world beyond. He identifies it with the state of enlightenment resulting from meditations on the meaning of 'meaning' in the absolute sense. But all that Sankara is asserting here is the tautology that the system of all the true propositions is self-complete in the sense that it includes all the true propositions. But by his ontological mode of speech he creates the illusion that the absolute oneness of all things has been proved.

Philosophically the most important and the most interesting reflections of Sankara are his statements about the absolutely unreal, the empirically unreal, the empirically real and the absolutely real. His examples in this connection are:—(1) the son of the barren mother, the hare's horn, the green tree and the absolute which like a mass of salt, is absolute consciousness and absolute existence. Here he is only calling our attention to the linguistic fact that a self-contradictory expression like, 'the son of the barren mother', cannot be meaningfully employed to describe any part of our experience, since here there is no compatibility in

meaning between its different parts. By his second example he is only directing our attention to the fact that a false statement is not self-contradictory in character. His third and the fourth examples are intended to inform us that an empirically true proposition is never logically certain, whereas a logically certain proposition is factually empty. By his assertion that our objects of waking experience are empirically but not absolutely real, Sankara is only asserting the fact that statements of matters of fact can never on principle be raised to the type of logically necessary propositions. You may perpetually proceed in getting them more and more confirmed by observation. But at no stage will they become logically necessary in character. Similarly his statement that Brahman alone is absolutely real, which is nothing but pure existence and Pure Consciousness, points out that the tautological statements like, 'If I experience, then I experience' and 'If anything exists, then it exists', are absolutely certain but factually empty. This is picturesquely put in the ontological mode of speech that the Absolute stands apart from the world of practical experience and that changes occur only in the empirical world, but the Absolute is changeless.

But these linguistic utterances, however interesting and absorbing they might have been for Sankara, have invariably proved misleading to his critics and admirers alike who have been systematically duped because of the ontological cast. Both his critics and admirers have been busy in solving a number of pseudo-problems born out of the misunderstanding of Sankara's verbal utterances made in the ontological form of speech. How is Maya related to the Absolute and whether Maya represents an ultimate principle of inexplicability are entirely mistaken questions under the philosophical programme of Sankara.

I have described the game of philosophy. I have not participated in the game but have tried to follow it in order to be able to know its principles. Before I conclude my metaphysics of the metaphysics of thought and action, I must speak a few words about the Philosopher's use of the word 'Reality'. The word 'Reality' is selective in function and valuational in meaning. Sankara is absolutely right when he says that the mirage is as much a fact of experience as the sands. We call the sands real because it is more stable and as such, is a dependable factor in the matter of the practical conduct of life. But he is not right when he concludes that it is not absolutely real. For, if the word 'real' means 'practically dependable', and it is the only legitimate meaning which has

been given to the word, and therefore only the objects of the experiential world are real in this sense, Sankara is surely changing the meaning of the word without notifying his intention when he says that the world is an illusion (Jagat Mithya). This is a trick which all the philosophers play.

The seemingly grave and profound utterances of both Bradley and Sankara to the effect that ultimate Reality is indescribable and ungraspable by finite thought indicate the points of climax of their linguistic game. At this stage both the magicians and the audience are taken in by their tricks. Sankara and Bradley start by analysing the commonsense way of talking. We say, "the cow is red". The problem for both is how to interpret the sentence. The word 'Cow' has both a syntactical and semantic function. Since it is semantically of the same type as 'red', they wish to re-classify it with the adjective and yet to keep the sentence in the subject-predicate form. They split the two functions of the word and classify it in respect of its meaning function with the adjective, and assign its syntactical function to an X. The sentence now reads, "X is a cow and is red". X is the pure substratum in which the qualities of being a cow and being red inhere. Since X has no descriptive function at all, it is indescribable and ungraspable by finite thought. In this language there are no substantive words at all except one blank X. It is the 'that' of Bradley of which we only know the 'what'. This is misleadingly stated as Reality is one, indescribable by discursive thought, and all things of the world enjoy a mere adjectival status. But it may be asked, if the philosopher knows what he is doing, why does he complain that we cannot know Reality? It is because it satisfies him to live in a world of mystery. The common man has no difficulties in using and understanding the sentence. The Philosopher wishes to exaggerate the similarity of substantive words and adjective words, and deprives the former of their formal role or the referring role in the sentence; he next assigns this formal role to a meaningless symbol and then asks the question, "What this symbol means?" It does not mean anything. Yet it is most necessary, otherwise we cannot talk. It is Sankara's 'that' by which we speak but which itself does not speak, and Bradley's 'other' demanding analysis. But the magicians have forgotten that the symbol does not have any meaning for finite thought because it has not been given any.

I thus conclude my description of the linguistic game of the Philosopher which begins with ontological questions and ends with

a sense of enjoyable self-surrender that finite intellect cannot know the nature of Ultimate Reality.

To elucidate my remarks I may be permitted to go back to the question of 'relation between thought and action' and examine the actual answers offered by the philosophers in this context. If the question is discussed on empirical level, the obvious answer is that some of our actions are measured and calculated while others are not, and there are definite tests for deciding whether a particular action of a particular agent belongs to the first category or to the second.

But the philosopher is not interested in the factual aspect of the question, and his answers are of general character based upon his particular metaphysical views. Answers given by different philosophers are of three different types:—

1. The Monistic answer:

(a) Ultimate Reality is of the nature of thought. Thought is foundational in nature—Hegelian.

(b) Ultimate Reality is of the nature of the will-to-be. Thought is a by-product acquired in course of the evolutionary process and is utilised in the service of the will-force. According to some in this group, Ultimate Reality is pictured as a vital force or the *Élan Vital*.

2. The dualistic and the pluralistic answer:—

Thought and action are absolutely distinct. It is the pure subject which thinks and what acts is the person.

3. The Ethical answer : —

Some moral philosophers proclaim that reason is of supreme authority in human constitution and that all our actions should be subjected to the dictates of reason.

The Monistic answer is either false or self-contradictory. It is obviously false if it maintains that all our actions are calculated, measured and pre-planned, or that all kinds of theorising are useful and serviceable to the whole of mankind.

It is self-contradictory if it maintains, under cover of vagueness of meaning of the two distinct words in some particular context, that both the words have identical meaning and thought is action and action is thought.

The second answer is blatantly tautological when it asserts, 'thought is thought and action is action'.

The third answer is a piece of advice, and an advice is neither true nor false. The metaphysician is here unwittingly surrendering his pretentious claim that he is engaged in discovering the ultimate truths about reality. Further, the metaphysician cannot exclusively claim the prerogative to be the sole adviser of all people under all possible circumstances.

Thought and Action

II

by

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1. Two questions, different from each other, are suggested by the title of the present symposium. First, how is the distinction between thought and action to be drawn? Next, how are the two related as they certainly are? A satisfactory discussion of the second question requires that we have already some clear idea of the answer to the first question. We therefore have to start with the first.

2. Before proceeding with this, let us however take note of some ambiguities in the use of the term 'action' and clarify our position with regard to them. There is, to start with, a distinction between moral action and non-moral action, and any satisfactory philosophy of action must take this distinction into account. Further, we are to exclude all non-human actions, examples of which are bodily (physiological) actions and reactions as well as natural processes (those implied, e.g., in such statements as "the river erodes the bank" etc.). Both moral and non-moral actions are here contrasted with non-human actions. We shall consider only such actions as are accompanied by some one's consciousness of being the doer.

2.1. The distinction between moral and non-moral action is not however exhaustive, for there are other types of human action that do not fall within either of the two. There are for example religious and aesthetic (creative and appreciative) activities. Karl Jaspers suggests a classification of human actions that appears to be sufficiently comprehensive—the classification into those that are *conditioned* and those that are *unconditioned*. Even if it may be difficult to justify the names given to these two groups of human actions, it seems, in any case, to be obvious that there subsists a *radical* difference between the two groups of actions. They are not merely different kinds of actions; they are also *as actions* different. Unconditioned are the moral, aesthetic and religious actions and, may be, many more.

3. The distinction between thought and action is sought to be obliterated in various ways. One of those is only too common. Thought, it is said, is nothing but thinking, and thinking is a mental action, generally the same as any other action. First, this view misses the essence of thinking as such, for this essence lies not in thought's being a temporal mental act, but in something else which we are to seek. Secondly, for the purpose of specifying the topic of this symposium, we prefer to exclude from consideration that thin sense in which thought is an action.

3. 1. The pragmatist's contention is different. He is not insisting on the triviality that thinking is a mental act, but is rather pointing towards the *practical* character of all so-called *theoretical* activity. All so-called theory serves the purpose of practice. The distinction between the theoretical and the practical is a distinction that falls *within the practical*. Thought is practical in a twofold sense; it arises out of a practical *situation*, and again it is a tool, an instrument, to get over that situation.

Much of it may be granted. It may be granted that much of our thinking in daily life arises *out of* some practical situation, and further that much of it aims at solving some practical problem. But at the same time we are also to grant that much of our thinking, in fact, the so-called higher, abstract or pure thinking is free from the urgency of any practical situation. Certainly, such pure thinking is also involved in problems and seeks to get out of them; but all problems are not practical. There are theoretical problems and theoretical situations, the like of which concerns us when we philosophize. But we may even say more. Even in those cases where we think out of, or rather in, some practical situation, the essence of thinking is radically different from that of practice or action. The fact that thought can, and in fact does, attain to freedom from practical relevance proves its *essential* freedom. Thought and action are essentially distinct. That they are nevertheless in some cases found associated with each other has to be explained otherwise than by any sort of false reductionism.

3. 2. Heidegger goes beyond the pragmatists, although it seems at first as if he is giving nothing other than a pragmatist account of thinking. Both intuition and thought are, for Heidegger,¹ derivative from that primitive understanding which

1. Martin Heidegger-*Sein und Zeit* (Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 7th edn, 1953) p. 147.

characterises human existence. This primitive understanding (which is not only a kind of knowledge, but a fundamental factor of human existence²) is anticipatory and projective in character. Heidegger rejects the conception of a pure subject. Human existence again is not a present fact or thing, but an everpresent possibility of existing. This possibility involves anticipation of and projection into the future. This "being ahead of oneself", this anticipation and projection, constitutes that primitive understanding which has always a feeling-tone, as it were.³ The cool and contemplative theoretical thinking (leading to science and philosophy) as well as practical action,—both are derivative from this primitive human existing.

Heidegger is not deriving theory from practice, nor is he pleading for the primacy of practice over theory.⁴ Here he avoids the error of the pragmatists. He is only insisting on the primacy of human *existence*. Thinking (scientific or philosophic) is, for Heidegger, a mode of existence.⁵ It is therefore derivative from the basic existential categories. While we need not, in our present context, pursue this philosophy further, we may safely say that Heidegger is dissatisfied with the dichotomy of theory and practice and that he seeks to overcome this dualism not by reducing the one to the other but by deriving them from a higher, a more original unity. This too is reductionism, but this type of reductionism is philosophically more satisfying, since it has the courage of looking squarely at the initial dichotomy. It shall be our attempt in the present paper to explore some means of overcoming the dualism between thought and action, but we could do that only by a phenomenological receptivity to the facts as they present themselves to us, and not by trying rival metaphysical hypotheses.

4. It is often said that thought is rational and specifically human, while action is irrational. This opinion is so erroneous that it cannot even be adequately formulated, and although it may be considered superfluous to mention such an opinion, there are

2. Martin Heidegger—Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, 2nd edn. 1951) p. 210.

3. Sein und Zeit, p. 142: "Verstehen ist immer gestimmtes".

4. Ibid, p. 193: "Das Phänomen drückt daher keineswegs einen Vorrang des 'praktischen', Verhaltens vor dem theoretischen aus.....'Theorie' und 'Praxis' sind Seinsmöglichkeiten eines Seienden, dessen Sein als Sorge bestimmt werden muss."

5. Ibid, p. 357.

not a few sensible persons who think along this line. The truth however is the contrary. For just as man alone can think, so also man alone can act.⁶ Both thought and action originate in the essential constitution of man. It is a sheer misunderstanding of the true nature of human action to take it as nothing but a succession of real spatio-temporal events. It is as much a mistake to take human existence as a natural fact as to interpret his actions as natural processes. Man is as much a thinking being as an acting one. While on the one hand, he is a *subject*, he is also on the other a *person*.

4.1. We have therefore to seek for the distinction between thought and action elsewhere. Two fundamental questions to be asked here are: first *who* thinks and *who* acts? Secondly, *what* is *given* in thought, and *what* is *given* in action?

An answer to the first question has been suggested above. The *who* of thinking is the *subject*. The *who* of action is the *person*. The relation between thought and action may thereby be illuminated through the question: how are the subject and the person related to each other?

About thought, it is often rightly said that it is no private affair of an individual, but an objective process (thinking) or an objective product (thought). In thinking, I am no more this or that individual person but a universal subject, capable of stepping out of the privacy of my individuality and participating in what is common to all. Hence the essential communicability of thought, as contrasted with the utter privacy of sensations, feelings, etc.. The *who* of thinking is therefore not this or that individual, but a subject that is universal.

Whereas it is the universal *subject* who thinks, it is the individual *person* who acts. It is not only the *who* of action that is individual, but all action takes place within a determinate situation. The person in fact is not a thing or substance who acts but could have ceased from acting. On the contrary, the person is essentially constituted by his actions; he is what Max Scheler named an 'act-centre'. Every action affects or modifies the personality of the person, though not all in the same degree. And, conversely, no action is intelligible without reference to the

6. Martin Heidegger—Was heisst Denken? (Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1954) p. 51.

individual person who acts and the determinate situation within which the action takes place. Further, an action requires not merely the doer and the situation but also other persons.

4.2. In thus drawing the distinction we are no doubt describing ideal limiting cases, whereas in fact we have to accept compromise. That is to say, the *who* of thinking, the subject, does not always attain to complete universality. In such cases, one thinks no doubt, but thinking is motivated, as one says. Action determines thinking. The person pretends to think. The ideal of thought however is to eliminate the person, so that the subject is reduced to a pure zero, a passive witness, 'Zuschauer'.

To describe limiting cases is however no fault, for it is only through this that one can raise essential distinctions into clear relief. Factual interweaving need not prejudice us against essential distinctions.

4.3. Whereas thought *may* in fact be practically motivated but is essentially (or, ideally aims at being) universal, action is in fact individual but may ideally aim at universality (as in moral action).

The universality which is thought's and the universality which action may aim at are *radically distinct* from each other. The subject who thinks is universal inasmuch as it is zero, empty of contents, a bare witness. The person who acts aims at universality by enriching himself in content, by stripping off elements that jar, by attaining to inner self-consistency as well as outer harmony (with other persons etc.).

5. The second of the two questions suggested above is: what is *given* in thought, and what is *given* in action? The entire idea of givenness may be challenged in the present context. It may be said that nothing is given in thought, for thought only constructs. Similarly, it may be argued that nothing is given in action; that action only brings about some change, modifies the state of things. As against such contentions we shall here insist on the possibility of considering both thought and action as two different *modes of disclosure*. Both are modes of givenness in spite of the great diversity subsisting between them.

5.1. That thought is a mode of givenness has been denied by those who insist on the constructive and interpretative function of thinking. What is given is the particular, the sense-impression; thought imposes its conceptual scheme on the impressions.

interprets them, and welds them into judgments. This is the view of thinking in vogue since Kant. It makes thought subjective; what is universal and necessary in our thinking is explained as universal form, subjective though. The apriori is held to be both subjective and formal, any objective and material apriori being ruled out *ab initio*. Thought becomes wholly discursive, an endless process of mediation. Within the limits of sense-experience it yields constructed appearances; outside of this limit it creates illusions; nowhere does it have the capacity of giving reality.

As against this we advocate here a theory that claims affiliation to the classical Platonist-Aristotelian theory of thinking. Thought on this theory *gives* Ideas, Concepts, Eidos, Essences. Thought does not construct them, but recognises them. Thought gains thereby an ontological significance. It reveals the ideal factors and structures inhering in real events and processes. Thought discloses Being as Essence.

5.2. That however, action could be considered as a mode of disclosure is less often recognised. It is one of the services of Martin Heidegger to have insisted on this aspect of action.⁷ Both Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann have also recognised some sort of cognitive value of actions.

Max Scheler⁸ brings this out in the following way: Thought gives the essential 'what'; sense-perception gives the accidental (the here-now) 'what'; action gives the real 'that'. It is through action and the accompanying feelings of concern and care that we get *involved* in real situation; in trying to modify this real situation we experience resistance and obstruction; in trying to overcome such resistance and obstruction we are presented with real existence. Thought cannot reach this existence; its intuitions are confined to the sphere of ideality. Nor does sense-perception originally give real existence; it presents only the accidental qualities.

Thought can dissociate itself from real existence. Sense-perception can be studied in its essence through phantasies and imagination (Husserl). But action is so tied to the real situation that to study it in isolation is to miss it altogether.

7. John Wild—The Challenge of Existentialism (1955), p. 98.

8. Max Scheler—Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (München, 1947), p. 11.

5.3. We have mentioned in 2.1. various kinds of actions. It may be pointed out that each of these kinds of actions has an essential reference to real existence and presents real existence in some aspect or other. The real world is not exhausted by things like tables, chairs, houses and trees, but consists of such diverse entities as the human person, societies of persons etc... Action brings us face to face with their existence; we can contemplate only their essences dissociated from their existence.

6. We have tried to bring out the essential distinction between thought and action in two ways: (a) The subject thinks, whereas the person acts. The former in its purity is universal, because it is empty of all contents, a passive witness; the latter is an individual that aims at universality by enriching and harmonising its own individuality. (b) Thought gives essences, Ideas, Eidos,—the ideal structures inhering in the constitution of the real; thinking is free when such idealities are inspected in themselves, bound when they are sought to be discovered within reality. In the latter case, action helps thinking. Action, on the other hand, discloses real existence in all its diversity.

That thought and action, essentially distinct though, are yet factually interwoven may be explained by two reasons amongst others: first, the subject and the person, and secondly, essences and reality, are factually interwoven. The problem of the relation between thought and action may therefore be pushed back to two more original problems: the problems of the relations between the subject and the person, and between the essences and reality.⁹ We need not carry out this immense task in this paper. It is enough if a line of approach to the topic of our symposium has been suggested.

7. Another line of approach which again could not be worked out here is a study of the time-structure of the two, thought and action. Thought, it could be shown, is backward-looking. Although the essences that are given in thought are timeless, nevertheless thought discloses them only in what has been, in what is past. It is significant that the German term "Wesen" (=essence) is connected with the past perfect of "sein" (=to be), i.e.

9. The former is ably dealt with in Nicolai Hartmann's "Das Problem des geistigen Seins" (Berlin and Leipzig, 1933); the latter is discussed in ample detail in the present author's "Nicolai Hartmann and A. N. Whitehead: A Study in Recent Platonism" (Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1957).

"gewesen". Hegel makes this clearer when he defines "essence" as "das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Sein".¹⁰ The timeless essence is recognised, recollected (Plato's amnesia). Action on the other hand, it could be argued, is anticipatory; it is forward-looking. It plans and calculates. It seeks to get out of the present, to build the future. The pragmatists read into thought what holds good of action. This they do when they take our *ideas* as tools, as plans of action, as programmatic and methodical in significance. Here Hegel is right, and the pragmatists wrong.

10. Hegel--Die Wissenschaft der Logik (Phil. Bibliothek edn. 1951), Vol. II, p. 3.

Thought and Action

III

by

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'Knowledge is virtue', said Socrates, one of the wisest philosophers. Is this view true, or, should we accept the great maxim of the Holy Book 'Knowledge increaseth sorrow, ignorance is bliss'? For Socrates, knowledge was really virtue—anybody who has the knowledge of what justice is, cannot do any wrong. Thought and action were identical for him, and it would be a golden maxim to follow, in order to be happy, if the world were full of Socrateses. But then, perhaps even with the drinking of hemlock, Socrates failed to attain the bitter truth which Solomon, the other wise man, so deeply and correctly realised—that knowledge can give us only unhappiness! In this manner another saying of Socrates's—'one thing only I know, and that is I know nothing'—becomes ironically true of him. Indeed he knew not how vile the world could be, and therein lay the cause of the pure, unalloyed bliss in his heart. With that sense of bliss and calmness he could wish even the jailor well while receiving the hemlock from his hands, and right thinking and right doing could indeed become one and the same thing so far as he himself was concerned.

But the relation between thought and action, the old problem, still remains a problem for all unsocrates and, therefore, practically for the whole world, for how many Socrateses have really been born in it? A problem, ever present, therefore, in human society, for the majority of mankind, is how to relate thought and action, whether in opposition, or, in identification, or, in cooperation! Socrates thought he had solved it and so could die peacefully. His friends, on the other hand, had arranged an escape for him because they could not take an equally calm view of the matter. In this way, everyone has thought, in his turn, that he has solved this problem with the help of his own special theory about thought and action. We often find philosophers condemning men of action, and men of action the philosophers. Whether this mutual

condemnation is justifiable or not can perhaps be determined by judging the influence of thought and action on human happiness. For man, there cannot be any greater goal than his own happiness, his progress, his good. But what is man's happiness, and how should he progress in his life to achieve it? Some answer for both the socratics and the unsocratics, i.e., for both the extraordinary and the common men, can be expected to be glimpsed at by tracing and reviewing the ideas regarding thought and action of some of the most important thinkers of the world. My attempt, therefore, would be to suggest a way of relating thought and action to each other, by referring to the opinions and instructions of some of the world's greatest men about avoiding unhappiness and tragedy in human life.

The philosophers before Socrates had sought for knowledge about Nature, for Socrates the greatest interest was man himself. Who was the fittest man to make human society most happy? According to Socrates, he who had been able to identify intelligence with goodness, wisdom with virtue, was the best and the wisest man to guide the society, because without thought there would be absolute chaos. The good of society depends on an unhampered exercise of thoughts of the finest minds. Socrates was a philosopher, but it was he who saved the life of Alcibiades in battle. This sort of combination of thought and action where thought or knowledge was always good in kind, was ideal, thought Socrates, to produce the happiness of mankind.

But how a man could reach the stage of the wisest and the best, was the problem for Plato, for he was sophisticated enough to see that this world was not as simple as Socrates could conceive it. It was not so easy to turn the world into a simple paradise overnight with the mere presence of the wisest men as Socrates took it to be, because men have certain evil traits too in their character, such as greed, love of luxury, ambition, jealousy and so on. And the conflict between noble thoughts and these in a man's soul is indeed a hard one! In order that man's thought or knowledge may lead to the best actions by overcoming these evil propensities and thus produce the best society, a thorough and detailed training is necessary for each individual. This training is not to be achieved through meditation alone, but through actual experience of and contact with all kinds of realities in the world. By this test it will be determined who is to be the soldier, who the tradesman, and who the ruler of the society. Plato believed that

fundamentally man is a combination of three elements,—thinking, feeling and action. But it is always to be found that one of these three elements is predominant in an individual. So it is his duty and it is good for him to adjust in a correct manner the other two elements to the predominant one. The idea of such an adjustment naturally leads to that of the distribution of labour in society.

Thought or knowledge, though not predominant in all the individuals, is, for Plato, the best of all the above three elements. That is why he says, "Ruin comes when the trader, whose heart is lifted up by wealth, becomes ruler, . . . Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and the princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and wisdom and political leadership meet in the same man, . . . cities will never cease from ill, nor the human race." Therefore the philosopher's task is the most difficult one, for he has to overcome all the lower elements in his nature by the exercise of his thought-power. His thought or knowledge should not be influenced by greed, jealousy and other harmful though natural qualities, and it is only through this sort of strict discipline and self-control that he achieves the claim to be regarded as the best and the wisest. For Plato, then, it is wrong for a man to try to control actions by thought if thought in him is not strong enough to do so. But then there should not be any antagonism between the predominating will for action and thought. For virtue is, according to Plato, the effective co-ordination of the three elements in one's personality. And this effective co-ordination would result, if the individual acts according to his best abilities. Hence thought and action are to be adjusted to each other, in the individual, according to their predominance. But since man is different from animals by virtue of his thought, it is undoubtedly the supreme quality in man. So if each individual acts according to his best abilities, and philosophers whose wisdom is rooted in the concrete experience of life and whose actions, therefore, are bound to be guided by knowledge, rule the society, the result will inevitably be the happiness of the individual as well as of the society.

But then how to bind the individuals to one another, in practice, in spite of their greed, jealousy, hatred and other detrimental qualities? This would be possible, according to Plato, through religion. The faith in God would bind individuals with moral obligations which are essential for both individual and collective happiness. Aristotle, being much more of a realist than

Plato, did not attach importance to a superhuman being like God, though he certainly thought of a superman, with reference to the practical problem of achieving happiness in the individual as well as in the society. He chooses, rather, to give us some practical instructions. Nothing in excess is good for man. Everywhere in the field of man's activity, he should, therefore, find out the golden mean to be followed. And this golden mean is to be found in the middle of any two extreme qualities, between Hamlet's excessive indecisiveness and Quixote's excessive impulsiveness. To be able to follow this golden mean in every sphere of life, a long habit and continued practice are necessary. But in order that a man should be able to stick to the golden mean, a fair degree of worldly good is also necessary. Poverty should be overcome and there should not be too much of possessions. The individuals of the society can enjoy the worldly good to their best if they can develop a feeling of friendship amongst them. "When men are friends, justice is unnecessary; but when men are just, friendship is still a boon."¹ But, in friendship, the sense of equality should much more be predominant than the sense of gratitude or kindness. For all these practical instructions, Aristotle is not devoid of the ideal. The excellence of man is his power of thought. And since it is by his reason that he rules over other animals, the life of reason is the most important virtue or excellence for him. So over and above the external goods and friendly relations amongst individuals, the essence of achieving the highest happiness lies within us, that is, clear and perfect knowledge of man and the world. "The operation of the intellect.... aims at no end beyond itself, and finds in itself the pleasure which stimulates it to further operation; and since the attributes of self-sufficiency, unweariedness, and capacity for rest, plainly belong to this occupation, in it must lie perfect happiness."²

So far we have thought of the individual self or the social self—'the sensitive', 'the appetitive', 'the feeling', 'the desiring', and 'the thinking' self³ with reference to its earthly life. Ancient Indian

1. See Aristotle's *Ethics*. viii and ix.

2. *Ibid.* x 7; and see the passage describing Aristotle's ideal man in his *Ethics* iv. 3.

3. See James's *Principles of Psychology*; Ward's *Psychological Principles* and other books on Psychology for the psychological treatment of the nature of the self.

thinkers aimed at the knowledge of the real self beyond the empirical self, and they, in general, thought that the empirical self's happiness is a matter of illusion. It is the realisation of the nature of the real self in which real happiness or rather perfect bliss of the self lies. So the meaning of human happiness is altogether different in ancient Indian thought. The greatest happiness of mankind is to be found in self-realisation.

According to the Sāṅkhya system, for example, there are two realities, the *Puruṣa*, and the *Prakṛti*,—the Self⁴ and the world. The former is pure consciousness, the latter pure activity. It is due to the contact of the Self with the *Prakṛti*, that the different objects are evolved. Self-realisation implies the knowledge of the transcendence of the Self of all its earthly connections, its bodily and mental changes. Man suffers pain and unhappiness because the Self in him identifies itself with its earthly existence, i.e., its body and mind. When it can detach itself from its mind-body complex, it realises that it is neither the mind nor the body but is the reality beyond them, and then there is self-realisation. With such realisation the Self ceases to be affected by the body. "Just as the dancing girl ceases to dance after having entertained the spectators, so *Prakṛti* ceases to act and evolve the world after manifesting her nature to the Self".⁵ But this self-realisation is not merely an intellectual understanding of the reality. It is a direct realisation, in the form of intuition perhaps, though there is always a long course of spiritual training necessary as a preliminary to it. So thought or knowledge of the reality is not being absolutely separated from or contrasted with action.⁶ And what action is to be followed for the knowledge of the reality and to achieve the highest happiness or perfect bliss has been described in detail by the Yoga system.

The Sāṅkhya, of course, recommends certain practical methods of study, reasoning and constant meditation on the nature of truth or reality, but the Yoga lays its whole stress on the practical methods of purification for the attainment of self-realisation. Man's suffering is due to the identification of his Self with the modi-

4. The plurality of selves has been admitted by thinkers following the Sāṅkhya system.

5. Cf. *Kārikā* and *Kaumudī*. 59, 65-66.

6. The contact of *Puruṣa* (pure consciousness of thought) with *Prakṛti*, however, remains a puzzle in the Sāṅkhya system.

fications of his mind (*citta-vritti*). So the main purpose of the Yoga is to stop the modifications of the mind which alone can ultimately lead to the bliss of self-realisation. The famous eight-fold means of the Yoga, which very much stresses the exercise of action in the Yogin's life, makes the Yoga system recommend the absolute and urgent necessity of relating action to knowledge by conceiving the former to be the absolute preliminary to the latter. By the exercise of the eight-fold means the Yogin can attain some extraordinary powers, but it is self-realisation and never the achievement of those powers that is the ultimate aim of a true Yogin.

We are taught in the Vedanta philosophy 'That thou art'. The knowledge of this unqualified identity between the individual Self and Brahman is the final goal of man according to Śaṅkara. But this knowledge remains concealed by the soul's *avidyā* (ignorance) or '*māyā*', i.e. associating itself with the body (both subtle and gross). This ignorance of the soul is its bondage, and is due to its Karma. Liberation means, therefore, the removal of soul's bondage to the chain of Karma. The greatest happiness or bliss of the Self would be to realise the nature of Brahman or the Self by removing its ignorance which makes it identify itself with its body and the mind. Śaṅkara says that for the attainment of this highest knowledge or for the removal of the ignorance, the study of Vedanta is necessary. The four-fold culture of the mind, i.e., to acquire the power to discriminate the eternal from the non-eternal, to give up desires for enjoyment, to have control of the mind so as to develop the qualities of detachment, concentration, etc., and sincere desire for liberation, is absolutely necessary as the preliminary to the study of Vedanta, the thought element being very predominant in all the elements of the four-fold culture. The study of Vedanta also implies three thinking processes, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nidhyāsana*. The repeated meditation on the truths learned from the study of Vedanta is necessary to remove ignorance absolutely. Ignorance thus being removed, the seeker after liberation is told 'that thou art'. Steadfast contemplation on this truth leads to direct self-realisation, the summum bonum of human life. Śaṅkara's main emphasis, therefore, is on the knowledge of the reality to achieve the highest happiness of human life. But it is also to be noted that according to Śaṅkara, detached work is not incompatible with liberation. As a matter of fact, the detached work of the liberated soul may prove to be an ideal for the people who have not attained liberation, and the latter can also prepare them-

selves for liberation by practising work without attachment. Rāmānuja has not only emphasised more the action element in connection with the correct performance of the rituals enjoined by the Vedas as preliminary to the knowledge of reality, but has also suggested its co-operation with knowledge. The study of Vedānta and concentration on the truth learned from the study are necessary for the actual self-realisation.

But in the Buddha, perhaps, we find the maximum co-operation of knowledge with action. The Buddha's silence regarding the knowledge of the ten abstract 'indeterminable questions' has led to some controversy as to the question—what happens to the liberated soul after death? But his own life, we find, was a wonderful combination of action with knowledge, and will ever remain the best ideal for all mankind; and so we realise that his silence about the metaphysical truths itself implies the deepest knowledge about the greatest truths of the world. For, all his life and instructions are based on the soundest knowledge which he himself directly and positively realised through observation of actual facts of life and through meditation for years on them. His philosophy or wisdom being most practical and positive may easily attract the spontaneous attention of the largest mass of mankind. The Buddha's nirvāṇa throws real light on the question of removing pain and suffering from the world as well as on their root-cause, without any reference to heaven or the eternal world of the souls or to the Absolute. And this is, perhaps, what mankind in general should aim at in order to achieve the maximum happiness they can hope for under the present conditions of their lives. The eight-fold noble path (aṣṭāṅgika-mārga) recommended by the Buddha has much more direct appeal to the natural sense of morality and the natural reason of the common man than the more mechanical eight-fold means of the Yoga system. His teachings carry the idea that the real knowledge is the inevitable result of right conduct; and this, being a very simple and practical truth can, perhaps, be most widely realised by mankind.

In Plotinus, however, we find the ideal for the philosophers. The heart of the neo-Platonic saint, in his moral isolation, could hardly be touched by sorrow for the sins of others or pity for the world. The summum bonum of life, according to Plotinus, was the realisation of the oneness between the individual and the reality in a mystic experience (or intuition) through contemplation. This gives us an idea of the 'invulnerable'

character of the neo-Platonic saint which is very different indeed from that of the common run of mankind, for he is always aiming at meditation and is completely detached from the actions and affairs of the world. But though it is true that there cannot be many Plotinuses, or for the matter of that many Buddhas, yet Plotinus, though not much concerned directly with the codes of conduct or actions of human life, does not specifically deny their importance even in the life of a neo-Platonic saint, and so does not stand as an absolutely impossible ideal for ordinary men. Abstinence from food, celibacy, chastity, in short, 'flight from the world' were indeed considered to be the important conditions of the life of a new-Platonic saint, but it is to be noted that sexual love, being in fact a desire of the Soul for the beautiful, was not entirely condemned by Plotinus. As a matter of fact, according to him, the lover has received a call to the philosophic life. "Plotinus says that three classes of men have their feet on the ladder—the philosopher, the friend of Muses, and the lover".⁷ Of course for him perfect bliss is not to be found in love for visible beauties, as they themselves do not really possess spiritual beauty. So Plotinus recommends certain stages of action as preparation for the contemplation of the truth leading to the mystic experience of the unity between the individual and the reality. *Practice of political virtues* is the first stage in the path to the final goal of the neo-Platonic saint. Then comes *purification*—i.e., the control of the lower self by the higher so as to attain the image of the Spirit in the individual soul. This purification is necessary because the philosopher is not to be disturbed by common calamities and sorrows. And this leads to the stage of *enlightenment* making *contemplation* possible. This, of course, implies that the philosophic life, according to Plotinus, is the best and the morally highest, but this philosophic life, for him, is both preceded and followed by activities. Practice of political virtues, purification, etc., would precede contemplation, but contemplation would mean nothing if it does not automatically lead to action. "Contemplation is activity which transcends the action which it directs. 'If the creative force remains in itself while it creates, it must be contemplation.' Creation is contemplation; for it is the consummation of contemplation, which remains contemplation and does nothing else, but

⁷ *The Philosophy of Plotinus* by W. R. Inge. Vol. II. 3rd edition, Pp. 188-189.

creates by virtue of being contemplation".⁸ But Plotinus's emphasis is certainly on contemplation and not on action, and that is why it appeals to the intellectuals or the philosophers but not to mankind in general.

Modern man may very well despise Plotinus's philosophy, because he himself is mainly concerned with personal and social happiness and nothing beyond that, whereas Plotinus would certainly despise not only egoistic epicureanism but also altruistic epicureanism, as they do not refer to 'anything beyond the promotion of human comfort and diminution of suffering'. For Plotinus all virtues are in a sense a preparation for contemplation, while the modern man would regard contemplation, even if it leads to the intuitive experience of the unity between the Spirit and the individual being, to be useless, if it does not help the cause of practical and material benefit and development. Scientific discoveries and modern education have made men so very ambitious as to make them forget everything beyond this world, even the Supreme Divine source of it in whose contemplation they could rest in peace when completely exhausted with the enjoyment of the goods of the present-day scientific civilisation. Commerce, industry, city-life have become the main vehicles of modern civilisation, giving rise to excess of wealth and its consequent greed and luxury, the most potent factors for the destruction of man and his world, to the mechanisation of every art turning artisans and handicraftsmen to 'hands' only, to the creation of dehumanised institutions and social organisations, and to the breeding of the germs of innumerable diseases causing sudden destruction of human life. So Will Durant asks, "Can morality survive when it is based only on education and is divorced from supernatural belief? Is the modern school a sufficient substitute for the church and the home? Does it spread science without wisdom, knowledge without intelligence, cleverness without conscience?"⁹ Russell condemns Solomon because he saw nothing new in the course and action of creation. Perhaps Solomon would have been happy to hear "on the wireless the speech of Queen Sheba to her subjects on her return from his dominions",¹⁰ to know through the press "what the newspaper

8. Ibid. p. 180 'Christ was the greatest contemplation that ever lived, yet He was ever at the service of men, and never did His ineffable and perpetual contemplation diminish His activity, or His exterior activity.'

9 *The Pleasures of Philosophy* by Will Durant. New York, 1953 p. 268.

10. *Conquest of Happiness* by Russell. A Signet Key Book. 3rd prntg. 1955. p. 22.

said about the beauty of his architecture, the comforts of his harem, and the discomfitures of rival sages in argument with him."¹¹

But do these new products of science, really make the modern man happy? With the increase of wealth along with the discovery of a thousand new things in modern civilisation, the fundamental nature of man has unfortunately not been changed. It is true that man remains happy in simple life, though there may not be anything glorious and sparkling about it. The more complex human society becomes, the more problems it will have to face, the inevitable result of which is increase of unhappiness. Surplus in every field, the result of scientific civilisation will make man lose the co-ordination of the three fundamental elements (thinking, feeling and action) in his nature, leading inevitably to unhappiness. Man can always be happy if he can retain some harmony in his nature, it does not matter much what his circumstances or surroundings are! To turn a man into a machine is surely the greatest blunder of modern civilisation. Man is fundamentally a spiritual being, and that we should never forget. Because we believe in every science as it gives us so much power and control over the objects it is concerned with, we desire to turn the study of mind into a science, robbing it of its spiritual nature, and leaving only mechanical behaviour to it in the expectation that "the rat learning the psychologist's mazes may help mankind to solve the international problems of the atomic age."¹² But is it not true that with the increase of scientific knowledge the scope of human unhappiness has vastly been enlarged? Man does not know what to do with his glories which are heaped one upon the other to be destroyed¹³ very soon, and having lost all spiritual hankerings and aspirations at the same time, he does not know also what to cling to, and thus turns into a cynic with a sense of absolute restlessness and despair. Perhaps it is true that the sophisticated man can get rid of this restlessness and despair if he concentrates all his thoughts on the contemplation of God or his life beyond this material existence. Constant mechanical action due to the multiplications of the problems that are arising in the modern scientific world should give way to the spiritual contemplation of the Divine

11. *Ibid.* P 22.

12. *Psychology* by R. S. Woodworth and D. G. Marquis, London. 1952 p. 492.

13. Cf. Shelly's "Ozymandias of Egypt".

before it ends in the utter exhaustion of the powers and energies of man.

Again modern human society would prove the validity of the great saying, 'knowledge increaseth sorrow'—we know too much, that is our trouble! We know what is in the sky, what are in the lands, in the oceans, in the animal and human lives! We know how the body works, what happens in the depths of the mind, but alas! we know not how to preserve the world, the animals, the body and the mind against the course of nature, the blows of Fate and accidents! We think too much and complicate our lives in such a manner that we destroy them. This also is the result of the lack of co-ordination in our nature—thought not harmonising with action and feeling. Too much exercise of thought, the greatest scope of which is being supplied by the knowledge of modern science and civilisation, makes every intellectual man a little 'Hamlet' in his own way. Too much factual and scientific knowledge together with philosophic wisdom induces the intellectuals to imagine a world which ultimately transcends the actual world of which they are parts, and this causes them to be misfits amidst the realities of their surroundings. Their case is similar to that of Hamlet as described by H. B. Charlton who diagnoses his tragedy not in his fine moral susceptibilities and sensitiveness making him delay the murder of his uncle, not in his feeling of insufficiency of the evidence for his uncle's crime, not in his suspicion about the reactions of the Danes if he would murder his uncle, not in his Oedipus complex, not even in the fact that he thinks too much or too often, but in the fact that "his way of thinking frustrates the object of thought. It is the kind of distortion to which cerebration is liable when it is fired by a temperamental emotionalism and guided by an easily excited imagination. The emotion thrusts one factor of the thinker's experience into especial prominence, and the imagination freely builds a speculative universe in which this prominence is a fundamental pillar. Hence, the business of thinking overreaches itself¹⁴.... In the main, this way of thinking constructs a cosmic picture which only serves to give apparent validity to what the feeling of the person and of the moment makes most immediately significant.¹⁵...

14. *Shakespearean Tragedy* by H. B. Charlton. Cambridge. 1949. p. 93.

15. *Ibid.* p. 94.

This flair of Hamlet's for abstract thinking is perpetually liable to make him momentarily indifferent to the concrete world about him".¹⁶ And this distortion of reality is due to the lack of harmony between thought, feeling and action-power of his personality. "Speculation....developes sensitivity of perception and destroys decision of action. Thought adventuring in a labyrinth of analysis, discovers behind society the individual."¹⁷ Thus when man thinks too much of himself or in himself losing all contact with the facts of his own surroundings, he loses all sense of happiness, becoming a victim of anxiety or fear or vanity-complex.

So the consequences of civilisation through the advance of science and philosophy have been on the one hand the creation of mechanised action making man ignore spiritual and ethical contemplation, and on the other, the increase in man's knowledge making him realise his helplessness in the field of action. Both lead to the maladjustment of thought and action.

But does this mean that we should wind up all our scientific adventures, stop rationalising and lead simple animal lives so as to avoid giving rise to unhappiness? Not by any means. We have progressed enough to realise that science alone will not give us the ability to preserve all our scientific achievements, or enable us to protect what we have from destruction for long. Action would not help us to overcome the unhappiness due to the futility of the things of the world. The eternal cycle of birth, growth and death will go on for ever—and even if it were possible for us to have all the things we desire in this world and to exist for ever, some people might still wonder whether there was anything worthwhile after all in eternity. So we should not lament too much the futility of things, nor hanker after eternity. Men should remain satisfied with the gifts of science in carrying on their actions, duties and enjoyment in life, but should not depend so much on them as to become absolutely mechanised in all their actions and enjoyments. Sometimes one should be left alone to think on the real significance of what one is doing. Because after all without reflection man would forget his spirituality—the essence of his real being. And at those times when he can no longer depend on science and his own rationality, let him rely on God to secure stability in his feeling. For the ordinary man there is no other way of being happy

16. Ibid. p. 99.

17. *Philosophy and the Social Problem* by Will Durant, p. 7.

than to achieve a fair amount of co-ordination of the three main elements of human life. Too much of either introvert or extrovert attitude would inevitably lead to unhappiness in an ordinary life. Ambiversion is golden for the common man, and that is why Aristotle, the Buddha and all really wise people have thought of the golden mean. Man would be in a position to be able to follow this golden mean in order to achieve happiness in his life, if he were taught to take interest both in himself and in what is outside himself, with a fundamental attitude of disinterestedness and detachment which he can hope to attain only through the exercise of thought and rationality. When the common man learns to adjust himself to this great paradoxical truth of life, he will not have any cause to have fears about creating unhappiness in his life. Human life as well as everything else in this world is futile indeed, but it is, by no means, devoid of worth or value. Man, therefore, should try to make the best of his life here, by combining pleasure, sympathy and love with detachment and disinterestedness. Let him love, enjoy and act as much as possible, but know and remember at the same time the futility of everything. In this way alone, the common men, the unsocratics, might expect to fulfil and make real the maxim, 'knowledge is virtue', the co-ordination of thought with action, and thus achieve the possible maximum happiness in their lives. "There is nothing bizzarely new in this conception; and indeed we shall do well to suspect, in philosophy, any doctrine which plumes itself on novelty. Truth changes her garments frequently, but under the new habit she remains always the same".¹⁸ Let Socrates and Buddhas appear again and again in this world to remind the others of the greatest truths of life, which, otherwise, are constantly in danger of being lost to view. And do not these supermen while thinking and knowing too much, themselves actually act as well as inspire the rest of human beings to act?

18. *The Story of Philosophy* by Will Durant. Pocket Book, Inc. New York, 1954. p. 40.

Thought and Action

IV

by

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The problem of the interrelations between thought and action did not arise accidentally. The interest taken in it by the philosophical circles of the world and notably by the present session of the Congress is quite natural. In advancing this problem, philosophers have one end in view: they want to help humanity to solve the burning questions of modern times and to find paths leading to the further progress of society.

In analysing the life of people in the present and in the past, one cannot fail to notice that many human actions did not lead up to the desired results, and that they were not in conformity with the aims which the people pursued in resorting to these actions. In some of them this gave rise to disillusionment in the importance of practical activity, to an urge of escaping from it and of putting barriers between themselves and life. On the other hand, we can observe how the process of thinking leads some people away into such heights from which there is no path leading to effective practical activity. Unreasonable activity and inactive mind are things that can both be found in life. However, neither of these is a necessity,—on the contrary, according to their essence and nature, the actions of people should be combined with a reasonable understanding of reality.

Without explaining the complexity of interrelations between thought and action, it is impossible to understand why there is sometimes disharmony between thought and reality, why the noblest, loftiest ideas find no realization in life, and what should be done that mankind throughout the world might live and work in conformity with the humane ideas set forth by the most brilliant minds.

The problem of the relations existing between thought and practical action (the theoretical and practical activity of people)

is most important in philosophy. Its correct solution largely determines the depth of the posing and solving of other philosophical questions of various nature: gnoseological (understanding of the paths along which objective truth may be reached), sociological (the study of the role played by social consciousness in the development of society, the relation between the subjective and the objective factors in history), ethical (investigation of the relation between moral conduct, moral standards and moral conviction) etc.

Before tackling the question about the interrelation between thought and practical action, it is necessary to define the contents of the concepts of "practical action" and "thought" (mental process).

Both practical action and thought are the results of interaction between subject and object. By "subject" we mean neither an individual taken separately, nor human will and conscience, but man in his social existence.

When comparing man and animal we cannot fail to notice that thought and language are the distinctive features of man. But the mere statement of this fact is not sufficient for the understanding of the essence of man, for both thought and language are in themselves the result of labour, which has led to the formation of man with his thought and language.

The specific feature of man, singling him out of the entire surrounding animal world, consists in his ability to maintain and reproduce by labour the conditions necessary for his existence. Man does not treat nature passively, but actively transforms it. Society cannot exist outside of this active practical impact of man on nature; practical action is a vital necessity for people.

Practical action (or practice) is such an interaction between subject and object which in result affects the latter. Practical activity is aimed at the transformation of reality; it forms the basis, the foundation of human life. Practice mainly consists in the productive activity of people (production of material values, food, clothing, dwellings, instruments of labour). Practice also includes other kinds of social activities leading to changes in the surrounding reality, (the fight waged by people for the transformation of social relations, educational activities, health service, cultural work, etc.).

Practice is not an idea of a special kind (practical idea) as Hegel had supposed it to be, but the sensual, material activity of people. The essence of man does not consist in his feeling and suffering or in using the products of nature ready for him, as L. Feuerbach had imagined, but in the fact that through his practical activities he produces such phenomena which do not naturally exist in a ready condition. Man acquires knowledge concerning the surrounding world to the same degree in which he transforms it.

The success of practical activity largely depends on our precise knowledge with regard to the laws governing the motion in those phenomena of reality which we wish to change and to make subservient to us. Here action is directly linked with thought.

Thought is a special form of human activity, a form of interaction between subject and object, in which the object is not actually changed, but is only reflected in the conscious mind of the subject. Man can draw up the most ideal plans for transforming reality, but however splendid and useful these plans may be, reality remains the same as before if nothing but plans are drawn.

As a product of highly organised matter—the brain,—thought belongs to the spiritual, theoretical and not practical sphere of human activity. It is a purposeful process. By means of thought man acquires knowledge of the surrounding world, and any kind of knowledge is a reflection of reality, that is, its contents are formed by the processes going on in the objective world. In correct reflection the object and its individual aspects are taken, such as they exist in reality.

The main task and function of thought is to give an accurate, adequate and complete reflection of the outer world. The conception of thought as a reflection of the outer world, the recognition of its ability to give us an objective and true picture of this world, such is the premise of the materialist world outlook. Marxist philosophy is the modern form of materialism,—dialectical materialism.

The characteristic feature of thought as a reflection of reality and its difference from living sensual meditation (experimental knowledge of the world) consists in the fact that it reflects the phenomena of the world in the form of abstractions and not as sensual concrete images. In thought we deviate from the immediacy of the object, (and in this sense we are removed from it);

but we reveal the essence of the object, (and in this sense we are closer to it). Therefore the truth contained in thought has a deeper and more concrete meaning than that contained in the forms of sensual contemplation. Concreteness is the beginning of knowledge and its ultimate point. The process of knowledge moves from sensual and concrete concepts (sensation, perception) to the abstract ones (the establishment of the individual properties and aspects distinguishing the phenomena of reality), and then returns to the concrete concepts regarding them as unity in variety, a concreteness which is no longer sensual but belongs to the process of thought. By the combination of various abstractions, thought enables us to obtain knowledge of concreteness in all its complexity.

In the process of thinking a human being is helped by all his previous knowledge fixed in definite forms and categories. These forms become the points of departure for the further development and deepening of knowledge.

In the present, as well as in the past, many schools and trends of philosophy have tried to divorce thought from practical action. Thought is considered apart from practical activity. Thus thought is represented as an absolutely autonomous, independent activity, developing exclusively on the basis of immanent causes. Practical activity is not regarded as the foundation of all the spiritual faculties of man, including thought. But how and why does thought reflect the outer world (nature and social life)? This question can naturally be only answered by those who understand the decisive, determining meaning that practice has for thought.

The theoretical activity of people has sprung up as a feature, an aspect of practice. Thought has been brought into being and has sprung up as a result of the requirements created by the practical and notably the productive activities of people. Even before the process of work begins, man speculatively contemplates its finished product and therefore thought is a necessary element in labour activities. Practice determines the aim, direction and tasks of the thinking process. The requirements of practice, notably the needs of production, indicate the direction in which scientific thought should develop, in order to satisfy the needs created by human practical activities. This thesis is proved by the entire history of science. Various branches of science have emerged

from the requirements of practice. Astronomy was brought into being by the requirements of trade and navigation; physics sprang up and developed to satisfy the needs of the growing production technique (the steam age giving rise to the teaching of heat, the transition to electric engines causing the development of the electricity theory, etc.); the development of chemistry is connected with the requirements of mining and production technology; biological science satisfies the needs of agricultural production and medicine; social sciences generalize the practice of society's development and help man in his progress towards further progress in the fields of production and culture.

History shows that the separation of theoretical thought from the requirements of practical action can lead to stagnation in science and consequently, in technique, as the development of the latter depends on the progress of scientific knowledge.

It has already been mentioned above that thinking is a purposeful activity pursuing a certain aim. The purposes of thinking are not purely subjective and arbitrary, they cannot be deduced from either any supernatural principle or from the process of thinking itself. The purposeful quality of human thought has its origin in the outer world, and receives its objective importance through practice.

Certain trends in philosophy prefer speculative thinking plunged in its own depths to active thought turned to practice. They consider that the practical direction taken by thought and its purposeful nature tend to debase its dignity. In reality the very opposite is the case, for it is practice that lends thought its clarity of purpose and leads it along the path of objective truth.

However we shall not be able to disclose the relations between thought and practical action in all their complexity if we limit ourselves to stressing one side only,—that is the fact that practice is the foundation of thought and the criterion of its truth. Thought does not confine itself to the mere registration of the results yielded by practice. Arising from the generalization of practical actions, it actively influences them and opens up far-reaching prospects for the development of trade, culture etc. The basic social function of thought consists precisely in determining the directions in which all the various aspects of social life can develop further. Consequently the unity of thought and practical action presupposes

their mutual influence on each other, but practice retaining its determining role.

The critics of dialectical materialism misrepresent the situation, alleging that materialism disclaims the active quality of thought assimilating it with physical, chemical or biological movement, that this philosophy acknowledges nothing but the importance of material practical interests, denying the role of ideals, the service of good and beauty. It goes without saying that such an opinion gives a distorted idea of the situation. It is true that pre-Marxian materialism underestimated the creative role of thought. Some representatives of old materialism regarded thought as the passive product of matter, while idealism stressed the active character of thought. Dialectical materialism on the contrary, considering thought the function of the brain, reveals its activity and relative independence, by no means denying lofty incentives and fine ideals, and not reducing the motives of human conduct to the pursuit of personal material interests alone. It is precisely from the standpoint of dialectical materialism that it becomes possible to understand the role of ideas in the development of society, and to realize the necessity of applying to practice the lofty ideals to which all progressive humanity is aspiring. It is on the basis of modern materialism that genuine humanitarianism springs up, indicating the ways in which the relations of people among themselves can be made truly human.

Thought is relatively independent in its development: it has its own specific laws, distinguishing this form of human activity from the others. To ignore the relative independence in the development of thought would mean dooming ourselves beforehand to incomprehension for the essence of its relations to practical activity.

The relative independence of thought is expressed in the fact that not every scientific theory directly originates from the immediate requirements of practice. Scientific theories can also arise from the interior logic in the development of the thinking process itself. No one can say that the theory of reflexes in physiology, the theory of relativity in physics or quantum mechanics, non-Euclidian geometry, etc., have resulted from the immediate requirements of agricultural or industrial production. Representing things in such a manner would mean running counter to the real facts of history, simplifying and vulgarizing the laws governing the development of scientific knowledge and its relations to practical

action. These theories were prepared by the entire course taken by the preceding development of science, they were the logical sequel to previous scientific research. The forms of social consciousness, such as philosophy, morals, religion, etc., also possess relative independence; there is continuity in their development, and the social consciousness of a certain period appears in the first place as a sequel to the ideas of the preceding period.

However, the existence of this interior logic in the development of theoretical thought cannot serve as an argument in favour of the absolute independence of thought from the requirements of practice, or of the independence of the forms of social consciousness from social existence. The independence of thought is relative, for any scientific theory is ultimately deeply rooted in the requirements of practice and promotes its further development. Thus it would be unthinkable to imagine modern atomic technique without quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity. The interaction of thought and practical activity occurs in approximately the following manner: on the basis of the generalized results achieved by practice, thought formulates a certain principle; taking these and other previously obtained principles as its point of departure, thought achieves new results by force of its internal logic, for thought is an active, creative process aimed at the obtaining of new knowledge. The new results obtained are used by people in their practice (leading to the improvement of production technique and to other changes in social life). The further development of practice serves as a basis for a further development in thought, which arrives at new results, finding application in the practical actions of the people. These results are again generalized in thought, and so on. Thus the interaction of thought and practice leads to a continuous process of developing and improving one and the other.

The internal logic contained in the development of thought is only relatively independent: its laws are also ultimately based on practical action. A definite given type of movement of thought is correct and leads to objectively truthful knowledge of the outer world, because the laws governing this movement of thought reflect the objective world and have sprung up in the process of the principal activities of people. This applies to every logical law governing thought.

The relative independence in the development of scientific theories and forms of social consciousness has both positive and

negative aspects. Its positive aspect consists in the fact that without it thought could not possibly have any active influence on practical activities. Thought would be incapable of opening up remote prospects for the development of society, its production, science and culture, if it were incapable of somewhat detaching itself from the immediate practice of today,—if, by force of its internal logic, it did not lead to such results which do not follow immediately from the generalization of available human practice. As a matter of principle, scientific foresight would be impossible without human thought being able to go further than the modern condition of practice. In this connection a certain deviation of thought from reality is necessary and is of positive importance. It also accounts for the fact that there always are such progressive ideas and theories in the world, for whose practical implementation conditions have not yet matured.

However, this ability of human thought is at the same time the gnoseological basis for its errors. The thought of individual people deviates so far from reality that its vital connection with the requirements of practical action is lost and it becomes meaningless and scholastic. The flying of thought, leading it away from reality, is only necessary in the measure in which it promotes a deeper knowledge of the phenomena of reality with the object of effective practical influence upon them. Beyond these boundaries the deviation of thought from reality gives rise to most harmful errors leading up to a rift between thought and practical activities.

The unity of thought and action presupposes their contradiction. This contradiction is a source of development for one and the other. Leaving practical action behind, thought raises it to its own level; the requirements of developing practice stimulate thought to continuous development, so that it might not only keep pace with practice, but precede it, lighting up the path of progress.

If the contradiction between thought and action leads to a loss of their unity, and their inherent connection, it becomes a conflict, a rift between them. Thought, shrunk into itself, loses its importance and its basic social function,—that of serving the requirements of practical activity,—it decays, and this has a negative influence on the development of all aspects in the social life of people. This disharmony is aggravated by the fact that within society itself there are such social forces which are interested in this departure of thought from reality and the problems of practical action. We sometimes come across circumstances under

which the discrepancy between thought and the requirements of practice is artificially fomented leading to absurdities. Then the situation gives rise to unfounded thought remote from life.

The understanding of the unity between thought and practical action is of great importance for gnoseology and in particular for the solution of questions concerning the criterion for the truth of thought. Scientific solution to the problem of finding the criterion of truth will make it possible to ultimately liberate man from disbelief in the force and power of his reason. This distrust with regard to reason is based on the premise that there is no reliable criterion of truth in existence. Philosophers have sought this criterion within the process of thought itself, in its clarity and distinction. But thought cannot form a criterion of truth for itself. This criterion has to be sought for in an activity different from that of thinking. Marxism has proved that the criterion determining the truth of thought lies within the sphere of practical activity. It is by practice that people prove the truth and objectiveness of their thought. For instance, the objective truth of the scientific picture which modern physics gives of the world is proved by such practical human actions as the application of the energy hidden in the atom, to the obtaining of electricity, or the use of radioactive isotopes in industry, agriculture and medicine, etc. Thought springs up from the requirements of practical human activities, and therefore it is quite legitimate that practice should establish truth or falsity of thought.

Practice as the criterion for the truth of our knowledge is superior to both sensual contemplation and abstract thought, it combines the qualities of both. Sensual contemplation possesses the quality of spontaneous reality, for it reflects the object as it is in all its immediacy. Yet it does not and cannot prove the necessity of its connections whose existence it reveals. This proof is supplied by thought which achieves a knowledge of the object in its necessity and universality. Yet in doing so thought loses immediate connection with reality, becoming detached from it to a certain extent, and this sometimes leads to errors. The reason why human social practice can act as the criterion for the truth of thought and prevent it from flying away into the field of groundless speculations, day-dreams and fantasies, lies in the fact that practice combines immediate reality and authenticity (being a sensual and material activity), with necessity and universality, for it is in this practice that man materialises his ideas. Practical

action is a material implementation of notions, and therefore it can ultimately grasp and hold the objective truth of thought. Any scientific experiment may serve as an example of this, because it always appears as a material, sensual embodiment of some theoretical construction (hypothesis), whose truth it intended to prove. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism have found their complete confirmation in the practical activities of the million-strong human masses which in many countries have changed social relations in conformity with these ideas establishing a system whose necessity had been theoretically predicted a long time ago. When people engage in practical activities in conformity with some definite ideas and obtain a result which has been foreseen by theory beforehand, this means that the truth of the theory in question has been proved.

Practice not merely converts into reality concepts or theories previously formed, establishing their truth or falsity, but also serves as a basis for their further development. The practical implementation of ideas always corrects and develops them. The development of knowledge on the basis of practice is a continuous process.

The criterion of practice is both absolute and relative. It is absolute because it proves the objective truth of thought,—it is relative because at a certain definite stage of history it is incapable of fully confirming or disproving all the existing theoretical constructions. Thought leaves practice behind and runs ahead of it, and therefore in every branch of scientific knowledge there always are many hypotheses that have neither been confirmed nor disproved, and it is future practice that will ultimately pass judgement on them. Therefore it is only in the process of its own development that practice may serve as a criterion for the truth of developing thought.

The absolute quality possessed by the criterion of practice makes it possible to distinguish knowledge following the path of objective truth, from false concepts and fantastic constructions. The continuous development of practice does not let our knowledge become something fixed and absolute.

The assertion that practical action is the criterion for the truth of thought should by no means be understood as a necessity for man to check every thought by comparing it with the results of action. In this case the progress of scientific knowledge would be very considerably impeded or would even become altogether

impossible. People can also determine the truth of their ideas by establishing their conformity or non-conformity with other scientific principles whose truth has been earlier proved. Such a check-up of ideas is carried out by logic which has created the theory of one judgement ensuing from another.

There is a widespread opinion that logic can only establish the formal correctness of judgments (their conformity or non-conformity to other judgements) but not their truth (the objective contents of a judgement). It is true that the establishment of the formal correctness of the judgements alone is not sufficient to prove their truth, but under definite conditions formal correctness may lead to truth. Notably, if the judgements forming our point of departure are correct, and if we correctly apply to them the laws governing thought, the process of deduction results in an objectively truthful judgement. The truth of the points of departure and that of the logical laws of continuity is ultimately also determined by practice.

The process of deduction is founded both on principles whose correctness was proved before, and on admissions that have not yet been proved. By means of deductions people ideally reproduce the processes which are inaccessible to observation and immediate practice. The scientists become convinced of the truth of the reproduced picture when they succeed in proving some links in the complex chain of reasoning by practical actions (for instance, experimentally).

On the basis of a superficial analogy, many foreign scholars have come to the conception that there is no difference between Marxism and pragmatism in the solution of the problems pertaining to the interrelation of thought and practice, and that Marxism subjects truth to the immediate requirements of politics in the same way as this is done by pragmatism. Such a concept of Marxism is only possible as the result of a misunderstanding or a biased attitude toward Marxist philosophy.

The Marxist conception of practice as the criterion of truth is basically different from the pragmatist interpretation. For pragmatism objective truth does not exist: every person can recognize any principle either as being true or false, depending on the possibility or impossibility of extracting some use from it for himself. Pragmatism leads to subjectivism which undermines the foundations of science and its internal logic. Practice, as Marxism shows,

cannot be reduced to utilitarian usefulness, and truth is not determined by the satisfaction of the subject. This or that principle is not true because it is useful to someone, but reversely, it is useful for mankind because it is true (because it correctly reflects reality). If this or that principle is objectively true, it will sooner or later help man in his fight against the elemental forces in nature and society. Part of the people, belonging to a society divided into social groups (classes) with incompatible interests, extract advantages for themselves from certain false principles distorting the genuine relations in nature and society. In our modern world there exists a propaganda of false ideas, which bring great harm to mankind. The philosophy of pragmatism, which reduces truth to the comfort and usefulness achieved by individual people, justifies the spreading in the world of false ideas, which serve the selfish interests of individual groups and not those of mankind, peace and progress. Truth cannot be sacrificed for use or comfort of individuals or for the sake of certain political considerations. Thought is only scientific when it is objectively true. The practical importance of thought depends on the precision and depth with which it reflects reality. Scientific conceptions closely related to pragmatism, and considering that in scientific research truth could be sacrificed to the practical requirements of today's policy, have been subjected to criticism in the Soviet Union, as not being in conformity with the Marxist method. Thus, for instance, in history the viewpoint of the Pokrovsky school, which considered history as policy facing the past, has been rejected. Any modernisation of the process of history, the desire to present history in a darker light or to improve on it, runs counter to the task of science, and consequently to that of practice, for our actions can only help mankind in its progressive movement when they are based on a correct understanding of reality.

Truth is incompatible with the selfish interests of individuals or groups of people, but it does not conflict with the interests of nations, of the progressive forces of society fighting for the establishment of a just social system safeguarding the all-round development of personality. Therefore genuinely scientific theories combine the objectively true reflection of the processes occurring in real life, with revolutionary efficiency and the practical purpose of applying the theories to reality.

Unity of thought and practical action is necessary for the liberation of people from the power of elemental forces in nature and

society. Man is only actually free when he acts on the basis of the laws which he has come to know. Knowledge is the necessary prerequisite for the attainment of freedom, but knowledge alone is not sufficient, as there must also be practical action on its basis. Thus for instance, the social problems facing the modern world cannot be solved by mere theoretical activity, moral self-improvement, etc. To make freedom triumph in the world, to do away with the exploitation of one man by another, of one nation by another, to overcome forever the danger of destructive war bringing sorrow and poverty to the working people, it is completely insufficient to have people engage in theoretical activities alone and to have them call on each other for moral self-improvement. What is necessary is an energetic activity of the people, their resolution not to tolerate social evil any longer. Great social changes always come as a result of the practical revolutionary activity of the people. The best and noblest ideas remain merely ideas if they are not assimilated by the masses of the people, and people do not act in conformity with them. Therefore to have progressive ideas put into practice it is necessary to widely propagate them among the people. The reactionary forces of society seek to induce the masses to actions contradictory to humane ideas (for instance, war). The task of all progressive people in the world consists in not letting this happen and in directing the actions of the people's masses towards the creation of great material and cultural values, making the life of people free, materially prosperous and beautiful.

Neither should philosophical thought keep aloof of the practical tasks of modern times. It is destined to serve the peoples in their fight for liberation. Progressive philosophical trends have always been closely connected with the essential needs in the life of people. This is characteristic both of Western and Eastern philosophy. The French philosophy of the 18th century and the Russian thinkers of the 19th century were concerned in solving the problems which people came to face in the course of their life. As Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan truly remarks, "Indian philosophy is interested in the life of people, and not in spheres beyond the clouds. It takes its source in life and after passing through various philosophical schools returns to life again. The great works of Indian philosophy do not possess that academic character which is so strongly displayed in later criticism and comments."

The greatest philosophers in the world have always realised the genuine affinity between life and philosophy. To them philo-

sophy was a method for the social and spiritual transformation of life. Marxism continues these best of philosophical traditions. At the very beginning of his activity Karl Mark rightly determined that the task of philosophy consisted not only in the explanation of the world, but also in indicating the ways for its transformation. The same tasks are facing modern philosophy which must come still closer to the requirements of life. In this connection Soviet Philosophers cannot fail to subscribe to the following words of J. Nehru which he addressed to the 1950 session of the Indian Philosophical Congress :

"I hope that philosophers will come into contact with the vital problems facing our life today. In our times there are very few conditions left to permit looking at life from an ivory tower."

Symposium II

Law and Ethics

I

by

PROFESSOR A. R. WADIA

During the long history of humanity the desire for stability has been the main social motivation. The end of social preservation has been achieved through three chief agencies; custom, law and morality. In the life of primitive societies there has been no clear demarcation between these three. The customary has all the sanctity of the legal and the moral. In the last resort the primitives tend to look upon all social injunctions as commands of the divine will, however crude their conception of the divine may be. Every custom has the halo of antiquity behind it and will brook no breach of it. Let it not be forgotten that when we deal with primitive societies we are dealing with a period when there was no written language, when the tribal chief, with or without the support of a tribal council, as the custodian of social well-being was also the custodian of ancient customs. Any breach of them would rouse the anger of gods and bring calamity to the tribe, and so the customary was the legal and the legal was the moral. The three concepts were merged into one. This mentality lingered on into the neolithic age and even into the historic periods with their written languages and inscribed tablets as in ancient Rome, in ancient Judaea, and in the code of Hamurabbi of Babylon. It was only with the growth of civilisation as manifested in the growth of thought that the concepts of the customary, the legal and the moral came to be differentiated. The moral was the expression of the divine will, the legal of the chief or of the state as a political entity, while the customary came to be looked upon as desirable but not absolutely essential for social life. As civilisation has grown customs that merely smoothen social intercourse have come to be looked upon as a class by themselves. Modes of salutation, modes of eating and drinking, modes of dress are merely conventional and do not carry any moral sanctions. Observing them or not observing them becomes merely a matter of good manners and good breeding without exposing any one to the charge of being immoral or irreligious.

In every society certain types of actions come to be looked upon as so injurious to social well-being that they come to be forbidden and any breach of such injunction comes to be visited with punishment. This marks the differentiation of law as the expression of social will. At first it takes the form of negative commands: "Thou shalt not" as in the case of the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament. It marks the beginning of the Criminal Law. It seeks to protect the life and property and honour of persons that constitute a particular society. Criminal Law in its essence is prohibitory, its essential aim is to see that certain undesirable actions are not performed. Thus looked at, criminal law represents the minimum morality. Morality requires that a man should not murder another, or attack another, should not steal, should not tell a lie, should not deceive. If all abided by these moral requirements society would run smoothly and efficiently, but unfortunately human beings are apt to take up an anti-social attitude and pose the age-old question: Am I my brother's keeper? They are apt to deviate from the moral requirements of a healthy society and the social forces have to come down with a heavy hand on all who jeopardise social life with their anti-social actions. As a general statement this holds true in every society, but when it comes to the question: what actions are to be considered so deleterious as to be prohibited, we find a surprising variety of answers, which could be explained only in terms of the moral ideas of the societies concerned and the general vogue of a particular type of anti-social actions. To the Christian or a Muslim, a Hindu or a Buddhist, human life is so precious that infanticide would definitely come within the range of criminal law. Yet to a Spartan bent upon developing a society of men with perfect brawn the exposure of a sickly or deformed child appeared to be perfectly moral and so outside the pale of criminal law. Similarly to the half-starving Todas of the Nilgiris strangling even a healthy infant was not looked upon as immoral and so was not illegal. There are many civilised societies to-day that look upon abortion as a crime, and yet it has become a live question whether abortion should not be permitted whether as a means of preserving a woman's life or her honour in cases of rape, or even as a normal means of limiting the size of the family in these days of rising prices and falling death rate.

Thus it is that criminal law continues to keep changing in response to the changing conscience of the society, and the needs

of a changing society. Polyandry so suited to poverty-stricken nomadic societies became outmoded when agriculture was discovered and it became possible for masses of men to settle down on particular territories. With a regular food supply and with an economy that required more hands working on farms polygamy was found to be advantageous, and all the old cultures of India and China, Judaea and Babylon fostered the principle of "Marry and multiply". To-day in our industrial age large families have become a problem and all over the world the cry is for a monogamous marriage, and the Romeo that marries a second wife without taking the precaution of divorcing his first wife will soon find himself behind the bars of a prison.

If law takes its birth in criminal law, the changing society soon finds it necessary to develop a civil law as well to regulate inheritance, commercial dealings, agricultural holdings, and a thousand and one other details of a complex society. They are just laws to regulate social dealings. They offer a convenience to regulate life without involving the opprobrium of criminal law.

In early societies it was a well recognised principle that laws should be few and simple and clear. But with the growing complexities of life laws have tended to be many. They have developed their own peculiar jargon of legal phraseology, more confusing than enlightening. This has necessitated a distinct profession which has flourished on the human proclivities to break laws and the human foibles to exploit laws in their own interests. By the end of the 18th century laws in all European countries had become so complex that on the Continent, Code Napoleon brought some order into a mass of confusing laws. In England too a great jurist like Jeremy Bentham arose to protest against the plethora of laws that centuries of legal practice had piled up. He brought to bear upon the whole jungle of laws a very simple principle which has had a great influence on the jurisprudence of the last century and a half. That principle was the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Like all simple principles it is capable of varied interpretations. Bentham chose to interpret it as that government is the best which governs the least. Believing in human initiative and with a naive faith in the capacity of an average human being to look after his own interests he developed the principle of *laissez faire* as the central principle of his jurisprudence. It helped in the reform of criminal law. It led to a repeal of a number of old land laws.

It led to the introduction of free trade which was hailed as the major triumph of the new philosophy of Bentham. It certainly served the purpose of a thorough-going house cleaning. But the basic assumptions of Bentham went wrong and during the forty years, 1830 to 1870, a state of affairs came into existence in England which did no credit to the English reputation for justice and fair play. In the new economic world of industrialism Bentham's psychology and jurisprudence led only to an open exploitation of men, women and children. It led to the protests of Carlyle against economics as a dismal science of profit and loss, and of Ruskin against the fouling of air and human decencies, and of William Morris against the drabness of standardised machine-produced articles. More than anything Thomas Hood's Song of the Shirt exposed the moral poverty of industrialism.

The birth of socialism became inevitable. The rise of trade unionism focussed the rising tide of the war of labour against capital. The principle of laissez faire became inevitably discredited and Bentham's legal superstructure was toppling down. But this did not mean the falsification of his central principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It only brought out the need for a new interpretation of this principle. Socialism can justifiably claim that if it has aimed at the downfall of capitalism and of capitalists it has been in the interest of the many, in fact of the greatest number, for the poor are not merely there, they are always in the majority. It is the reaffirmation of the basic principle that society exists not for a class or particular classes, but for all, that it exists, in Aristotelian phraseology, not merely for life but for the best life, and it follows that this best life meant the best life for all, even though Aristotle did not follow to the extreme limit his own teaching, for his recognition and justification of slavery was a denial of his own philosophy.

All this goes to show that every legal system in the last resort is governed by the ethical ideas governing a society at any one time. So long as slavery was allowed to exist, the greatest happiness of the greatest number meant the happiness of the so-called free citizens. So long as the society emphasised the needs of production the greatest happiness meant the happiness of the producers. But once it came to be recognised that capitalists would be nowhere without the full and willing co-operation of the poor labourers, it was inevitable that the greatest happiness could mean only the happiness of the masses. But in the midst of class-war it has not

been possible to overlook the basic realities of life: the importance of raw material and the capital required to buy it, and the capital required in building up factories—whether the capital comes from the coffers of the State or from the pockets of private citizens—and then again comes the importance of the brains that can run a factory, the entrepreneur. Nobody can deny the moral fervour that was at the basis of Karl Marx's *Capital*: his will to see the exploited masses get their due and their rehabilitation as decent human beings enjoying the comforts that industrialism has brought into existence. But he went wrong when he tried to reduce all human beings to the level of workers and workers only. The idealism of Lenin had to give place to the realism of Stalin, and the communism of Russian Soviet is not the communism of Karl Marx with his fundamental distrust of the State and his dream to see humanity flourishing in small communes.

The key to the evolution of all human societies is to be found in the dynamic power of its moral ideals, and the success of these ideals is to be measured in the terms of laws that seek to give the moral ideals a local habitation and a name. It is but in the fitness of things that the moral ideals are always in advance, something looming on the horizon, inspiring the upward march of humanity. To transform these ideals into realities has been the great tragedies and the greatest triumphs of the human soul. Socrates had to die before Greece was prepared to accept the immorality of her gods and goddesses and to do away with the bigotry of priests. Christ had to be crucified and his followers had to be the play things to amuse the Roman masses before the world came to accept the simple principle of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. Mahomed had to fly from his kith and kin before he could unify Arabia and establish a new religion. There has never been an upward trend in human ideals without a great struggle. Byron's lines have again and again proved true:

“He who ascends to mountain tops shall find
The topmost cliffs most wrapt in clouds and snow.
He who surpasses or subdues mankind
Must look upon the hates of those below”.

A Human society, by its very nature, is a changing institution. There is nothing in it which does not change. It is an illusion that moral ideals do not change. They too change, and law always makes frantic attempts to adapt itself to the changing moral ideals.

How even a religion changes is beautifully illustrated by the Old Testament itself. Starting as a nationalistic religion with an emphasis on the Israelites as the chosen people of God, it portrays God as The God of Wrath, as a jealous God : "Vengeance is mine", saith the Lord. He wants sacrifices, bloody and burnt, and is apt to take offence at any omission of what is required of the faithful. But as the chosen people suffer defeat after defeat they are softened and their conception also undergoes a corresponding change. God is no more emphasised as the Lord of Hosts. By the time of Isaiah God is pictured as the God of Love, and by the time of Micah it is made clear that God does not want burnt offerings, but what He wants is righteousness and a contrite heart. The centre of gravity still continues to be focussed on the superiority of the Jewish race, but even this limitation is transcended when the greatest of the Jews, Jesus Christ, gives up this claim and proclaims God to be the God of all alike, whether Jews or Gentiles. It may be that the political triumphs of the white Europeans and Americans have bred a sense of the superiority of the whites, but the purely Christian sense of the white Christians has recognised the logic of facts which led to the emancipation of the Negro slaves in America or a Schweitzer braving the rigours of equatorial Africa to serve the Negroes as the children of God as much as the whites.

Within Hinduism too we notice the same evolution. Varnashrama Dharma may take its stand on the eternal superiority of the Brahmins over the other castes, but the higher religious consciousness of the Hindus has always through the ages been striving to rise above caste feelings. Buddha and Mahavir head the list of rebels against caste, and the mystics of India—Kabir and Chaitanya in the north, Eknath and Tukaram in the west, Nanda in the south, to pick out but a few names from the hosts of mystics that have worshipped Vishnu or Shiva—voice the higher religious consciousness of the Hindus. It may be that the great mystic souls of India did not succeed in undermining caste and ended only in adding a few more sects to the lists of castes. But they did succeed in keeping alive a higher thought century after century, and to-day we see the fruition of their fond dreams. It may be that political considerations rather than purely ethical or religious motives have at last swayed public opinion in India and given a fillip to the crusade of Gandhiji against untouchability. His ethical idealism, even though tinged with politics, has forced the pace of legislation, and untouchability has become a criminal offence in

the eyes of law. Untouchability may still be subsisting and it does subsist, even as murders are still committed and prohibition laws are still broken. All the same law has taken a bold stride forward to achieve an ethical ideal.

Contemporary politics offers other examples where the changing moral ideology has brought new laws into existence. Take for example the contemporary attitude to property. In the political philosophy of the 18th century the right to property was as important as the right to life or the right to liberty. A hundred years ago the right to make property and hold on to it was conceived as a part and parcel of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Even then the idea was emerging that private property was the result of exploitation and was just simple theft. Official communism has accepted this dictum, and private property in land and means of production has been abolished in theory, if not completely in practice. Even the so-called capitalistic countries like U.S.A. and U.K. have made encroachments on private property which would have been condemned as loot a hundred years ago. The principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is pliable enough to admit of a new interpretation that in the interests of the starving or semi-starving millions it is justifiable for the State to impose a high income tax, death duties and even wealth tax, which is equivalent to confiscation of private property. It is the duty of the modern State to set the pace for a higher standard of life among all sections of the people, and if this higher standard implies heavy cuts on the private incomes of the few wealthy, these cuts are moral and so can become legal. This is a position to which no economist objects to-day and has become the basis of a political structure which inevitably aims at higher amenities of life for all rather than luxury for a few and hard life for the majority. Law slowly but steadily follows in the footsteps of the changing ethical concepts.

Let us take another example: the public attitude to the criminal. Not so long ago he was looked upon as a danger to society; respectable people looked upon him as an outcaste: once a criminal, always a criminal. Law was stringent and was prepared to see that the criminal was segregated and his life made as uncomfortable as possible. Then arose a school of criminologists who looked upon criminals as victims of a vicious heredity and so entitled to commiseration rather than an angry persecution. Others argued that all crime is bred by an evil environment and so it is much

more essential that the environment be improved rather than that the criminal be punished. Still others argued that a criminal is after all a human being, a victim of circumstances, more sinned against than sinning, and so his humanity should never be overlooked. From this standpoint jails should be looked upon as reformatories rather than as houses of correction. All these new ideas have slowly permeated the public consciousness and the jails of to-day are clean and tidy, the prisoners are well fed, well clothed and well looked after. They are taught crafts which could wean them from crime in the days of their freedom regained. They enjoy amenities of a club life. Some states give them access even to their wives. The old ideas of high walls are being slowly replaced by ideas of open spaces where prisoners can work on parole. A criminal reclaimed is a citizen gained is a new ethical slogan, and law is quite prepared to give it a fair trial with an open mind. It may fail to achieve its end in a few cases, but if it works in other cases law would be happy to vindicate the ethical implications and potentialities of a prisoner's life.

Not so long ago whipping was a normal mode of punishing a criminal. To-day it has been challenged as being barbaric, inconsistent with human dignity, and whipping has come to be abolished in many countries, India included. Human life is sacred and so too is the life of a criminal even if he be a murderer. What right has the State to take his life? And so in several countries capital punishment has come to be abolished, and there is a periodic cry even in England and India that this last vestige of barbarism should disappear from our penal codes. All this seemingly moral fervour is not without difficulties. Has a criminal like the notorious Dr. Crippen, who did away with wife after wife with a diabolical artistry, any right to be considered a human being and given a right to be treated as a human being? Has a criminal found guilty of having raped a young woman and ruined her life any right to escape whipping on the score of his being a human being? Obviously questions of this type are complicated and do not admit a straight answer, but they do bear witness to a certain moral earnestness which is not prepared to overlook the right of even criminals.

Till barely a century ago every one took for granted the existence of the poor as an ineradicable part of human societies. Even the great founders of religions took them for granted and made charity a pathway to heaven. But charity at its best tends

to breed a sense of superiority in the giver with but rare exceptions, and a sense of inferiority, often tinged with bitterness, in the receiver. It never struck even the most refined to ask "but must the poor exist? Is it not possible to eradicate poverty?" It has not yet been given to humanity to see the annihilation of poverty, but it has been the privilege of our generation to be conscious of the possibility of eliminating poverty. Small states like Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark have developed a pattern of life where extreme wealth and dire poverty do not necessarily co-exist. Even larger countries like the U.S.A. and U.K. are out to wage a war against poverty, and communistic countries like Russia and China are out to annihilate the very word *poverty*. This is another example of an ethical ideal imposing a duty on the law makers to catch up the ethical ideal. And our states as the makers of laws have accepted the challenge, and the world as a whole, even through differing ideologies, is out to establish a new world, if not exactly fit for heroes to live in, at least fit enough for the general run of men and women, who are prepared to work and want their right to work accepted as their birth right. Perhaps we are living in an age when the Biblical promise to the righteous is likely to be realised: be righteous and everything else shall be added unto you. Moral ideals which once had all the chilliness of stars in the unfathomable depths of space have now come to develop all the warmth of feelings that they shall not only always be in advance, but will force the lingering pace of laws to advance further and further as the pathways to moral progress.

Law and Ethics

II

by

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I

Man's passion for a good life has been a passion for a just one. "The Good" and "The Just" have arisen alike from man's nature as a social and rational being, and have operated concurrently, evolving excellence and harmony in human affairs. Neither, by itself is self-sufficient. Morality is the content and, according to one school at least, the aim of law. Laws perish without it. The minimum ethic, however, is maintained by law. Though concurrent, these two modes of social control have adopted distinctive modes of operation. Morality prepares the way and comes first in the order of things. It aims at developing the individual to excellence and helps him attain the supreme good—the good for all time. Its duties are left for voluntary compliance and imply no correlative rights or powers in others and carry no sanctions. It lies in the region of "Influence", outside the domain of "power". The inducing factors are a desire for "Esteem" or the inherent "moral sense" itself, viz. the "compulsion to feel right." In the case of moral conduct, it is motive alone that matters. Law, however, is mainly concerned with objective conduct in relation to society; law is not "right" alone: neither is it "might" alone. It is the two together mixed to a shape in the form of a principle, which operates with certainty, uniformity and impartiality, guiding the good, threatening the wicked and predicting official action that would follow in case of default. It is addressed in the voice of the State and enforced by its physical power by the imposition of the needed penalties or other detriment. Law has for its goal not the achievement of "absolute good" but the needed or "relative good", justice for the time and the place—not "absolute justice" or "justice in itself". Despite this difference in their mode and channel of operation, the two sciences share but one life and carry but one stream. They are likened to two intersecting circles tending to overlap, morality however remaining the wider of the

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two. Ethics is the source and validation of law. It works outside the body of law and also guides and shapes it from within. It is at once the motive and the end, "immanent and transcendent." It engenders the rule as administered by the law and operating from within as "judicial discretion" in the mind of the Judge, keeps the letter and form of the law from defeating justice and offending against morality.

II

The civil law is a body of rules and principles adopted and recognised by a state or people in the administration of justice within its precincts and enforced by its physical force. These principles are usually enunciated by the Legislature in the form of an authoritative technique and operate, as mentioned above, as guides, threats and bases of prediction of the detriment to follow. In modern history the civil law has become associated with a politically organised society which enforces it in and through a judicial and administrative process. The rules and principles of law contain and set out standards for the regulation of relations between citizens in a state and aim at the evolution of standards which a perfect citizen would set to himself in his dealings with others. There are, however, other rules and principles which are recognised and applied by the states themselves in the regulation of relationships between themselves. These principles concern concepts like statehood and the personality of states, recognition, sovereignty, jurisdiction, intervention, nationality and the like; others, too numerous to be catalogued, which condition and determine the fundamentals of civil law. This body of rules and principles constitutes what is called the 'law of nations'. While some amongst the rules and principles prescribed by a community for observance amongst its members are local and peculiar to itself, a bulk of them is common to all mankind. Men living in different surroundings evolve different ideologies and cultures, but they act together as one body and evolve norms and standards which are universally valid. The Roman lawyers called this body of law *jus gentium*: *jus gentium* is not what was found uniformly practised amongst nations. Common practice may be wrong. Many times it was so. The practice of slavery may be cited as an instance in point. *Jus gentium* was a moral and philosophic concept. It included principles prescribed by natural reason. *Jus gentium* was truly grounded in *jus naturae* and contained principles of a paramount character, modelled on the manifest laws of nature.

It was primarily the law of reason, a faculty by which all mankind feel akin, and commanded universal affiliation. The flux and change in the vast temporal and spatial dimensions of nature were understood by a recurrence of certainties and uniformities. The affairs of mankind can similarly be understood in a regime of principle—certain, uniform and impartial. In a true sense it was said, there was only one law, a transcendental one of which all others, the national, the international and the autonomous are but branches and derivative forms. This supreme law is both subjective and objective. It discloses the will of a supreme being which can never be disobeyed except upon the direst of consequences and is strangely wise and ethical in its warnings. The life processes in and outside ourselves reflect the essence and attributes of this being. They appear as the good, the true and the beautiful around us, and operate as aspirations inside us, as at once an ideal and an impulsion. The content of the mind inside is attracted and acted upon by the magic core outside in a nameless Rythm—called “Rta” by the Hindu sages, the parent of all “rectitude”, and apprehended as the equal, the uniform and the just.

III

To the Buddhist and to the Jaina it was an indescribable order in which “exist” the Is and Is not scheme of things. A moral sense was its nature and essence. The moral should be the legal. From it were evolved humanism, non-violence and the rule of reciprocity, the basic background of all religions and moral thought. This concept is essentially one of a non-man-made law, good for all time, binding on the ruler and the ruled alike, equal and impartial. To the Greek, this law appeared as “Equitas” or equality—the *lex eterna* at once—the source and touchstone of all other law. From it flowed the triple liberties “Isa Nomia” (freedom of thought), “Isa Gorla” (freedom of speech) and “Isa Timia” (freedom of opportunity)—liberties sacred to the Greek, in the absence of which no governance could at all be viewed as civilized. To the Christian Fathers this law was the “*lex divinum*”, the cardinal virtues of which were charity, brotherhood and equality. In Hindu Jurisprudence (Brahadaranyaka Upanishad, Adhyaya I, IV Brahmana, Stanza 14), law is dealt with as an attribute of divinity, God substance itself, and is a transcendental authority above all other authority meant to control, and controlling the arbitrary exercise of power by even the mightiest of rulers. The world is one unit, and law is the instrument by which the strong

and the greedy are restrained from appropriating to themselves what by natural right belongs to others. It guarantees to the meek their inheritance in the earth and rights to equal treatment and protection. None should ever suppress or destroy established laws or usages of other communities or countries or impair their integrity (Vishnu, Chapter III Yag. 1, 342-343). Pacific settlement of disputes is to be preferred. Warfare should be confined to combatants only and to the use only of weapons other than poison, fire and disease. There prevailed a code in the old days for a just and honourable human treatment of prisoners of war. (Manu. Ch. VII. 109). This perhaps in the earliest extant exposition of the doctrine of control of the arbitrary power of rulers by non-human laws, of a legal monism over political pluralism and of the equality and the equal protection of laws and non-discrimination. The sanctity of the individual and of institutions as ends in themselves and not as means, as subjects and not merely objects, of law governing groups and nations alike irrespective of the actual system of government to which one is subject, the theory of the inalienable rights of man and of his fundamental freedoms, the welfare and the solidarity and social service idea implied in the suggestion that laws stand by the people and that reciprocally people should stand by the laws, substantially follow from this concept of the law. This view emphasizes the circumstance that if laws have to survive, they should function within the limits set by the ethical sense of the entire family of nations and strive to give it shape and expression. The function of law was to translate the doctrine of human brotherhood into actuality. Individuals and groups held rights of self-realisation and co-existence in the framework of a natural law with, of course, a varying content.

This moral and social philosophy which is the heritage of this country is embodied in its Constitution—its fundamental law. The preamble to the Constitution declares the applicability of the moral and natural law. Part III sets out the great and fundamental freedoms, and guarantees their equal protection in the case of every person through the Supreme Court and the High Courts—Articles 14 to 18 contain the Equality clause. Part IV lays down the Directive Principles of state policy. They are the sources of law—principles of natural justice—to be drawn upon whenever necessary or convenient and never to be offended against. Provision is made by way of check guarding against arbitrary exercise of power from any quarter and for decentralisation. Cultures and ideologies of groups are protected and can co-exist. The concept

of a family of nations co-existing and adhering to recognized principles is emphasized. The above are the Articles of Faith of a civil religion and constitute the summation of all that was said and urged in the great Charter—the Petition of Rights of the English, the French and the American Declarations, and in all the Articles and Conventions contained in “universal” international pacts.

IV

It happens to be an accident of European history that the state which at the genesis merely held and contained the law, eventually claimed the right to make it and to be the source of law. Sovereignty, the attribute solely belonging to law, came to be appropriated by the state which merely administered it. There was nothing naturally right. Right became a creature of the state and was construed as no more than a power or capacity which the state at its pleasure or convenience accorded to and reposed in the citizen and recognised as eligible for protection by its physical force. There could be no right as such against the state. The state and all that is meant by it, interposed itself between the law and its spontaneous moral content and sought to regulate the relationship between the two. This cleavage between law and morality was the cardinal characteristic of Augustinian Jurisprudence. Laws of morality are not law properly so-called; likewise is natural law not law at all. This view gained ground for reasons of convenience and political expediency despite the circumstance that natural law and the moral law are the original of which the civil law and all other law remain but limitations or derivative forms. Nothing amounted to law unless it was a command addressed by a political superior not obeying another superior, absolute, unlimited and indivisible, to a political inferior, habitually obeying such superior, and capable of being enforced by threat of force or application of detriment. Law called the ‘Law of Nations’ is not law at all. Its rules and principles lack this genesis, shape and sanction. They acquire an obligatory character by consent and remain the creatures of consent. At best, they constitute a morality or opinion. International law is the annihilation of jurisprudence as a science. States claimed legal and political sovereignty severally. Political pluralism became at the same time a legal pluralism. Ethics met law through the State and by its consent and for its own purpose. Each nation is a law-making sovereign and no nation is bound by laws made by another. Sovereignty of

nations is exclusive and presumably even hostile. International relationships and intercourse are possible only on foot of consent by nations, express or implied. In theory, consent is capable of being withdrawn at pleasure. Use of force for settlement of disputes is and must needs be a matter of national policy. Conflicts are settled by treaty, the result of adjustment of relations by show of force. Treaties endure till ability or power arises to repudiate them. Wars and treaties have followed in succession without any prospect of their end in sight. It is said that wars occur only if the parties to it have reason to believe that they have a chance of victory and of the enjoyment of the fruits of victory, and that in this age of the atom power, the use of weapons of mass destruction being available to the parties concerned, they, far from being sure of victory, may all be sure of total annihilation, and that therefore the stock-piling itself of atom weapons is and should be a guarantee of peace in perpetuity. In this negative form, it is argued, force has triumphed in favour of peace. But nothing would prevent recurrence of wars with conventional weapons. Stock-piling involves the risk of an explosion and total destruction, perpetually staring humanity as a nightmare. It may become an actuality in consequence of some ill-conceived conduct on the part of a thoughtless politician into whose hands misfortune may place political power. Again at what cost to fellow-beings is this stock-piling of armaments secured, and where and when does the race stop. What about the cold war that this means? Cold wars are many times worse than shooting wars. Plainly the method of force has led only to the doctrine of greater force and has solved nothing and has only brought bankruptcy, moral and material. The Augustinian view of law justifying the force approach is responsible for many of the ailments of humanity. It has at length turned away from this concept of the law which has obtained no redress for us. This view of law is untrue to history and the phenomena of sociology. It has resulted in nothing but the fantastic fiction of "national sovereignty", illimitable and unlimited, which cannot and does not exist in the world of nature and morality. People rebel and rulers disappear if their commands offend morality and their laws tilt against ethics. Laws are obeyed because in such obedience lies the intrinsic satisfaction of the moral sense, the sense of being right.

V

The moral sense is ultimately a sense that equality be established, that people in like circumstances be treated alike without dis-

crimination and that justice be done. The triumph of justice is the pillar on which the moral life of the community rests. Justice can triumph if laws are "equal", if all have opportunities of shaping the laws, and if laws are equally accessible to and enforceable against all without fear or favour. Democratic types of government claim to make such laws. In a democracy, however, the majority party has the power to make and control the laws. How, if one section of the community can make and control the laws, may a democracy be said to be a just or moral type of government? How may the laws made and enforced by a majority be predicated to be just and equal? The essence of the democratic process is not that the majority make or control its laws. The opinion of the majority which is a view as to matters of value happens to be the "most acceptable" and, therefore, practicable and easy of effectuation and is allowed to prevail. But the crucial circumstance to be noticed is that the acceptance of the view of the majority is only provisional and subject to the right, indeed a duty, on the part of the minority, by persuasion and argument to alter, annual or modify the judgment of the majority. The opinion of the majority would ever remain "least hostile" and always the "next best" and never ultimate. Laws made without opportunities to minorities of being heard cannot be said to be equal or proper. The majority are not the people; nor are the minority. The community is a corporation. It includes the past, the present and the future. Its voice echoes values and interests not always fully understood, unless it be through leaders of the stature of the Buddha, The Christ or a Mahatma Gandhi—leaders for all time and capable of enunciating principles eternally valid. The views of the majority and the minority interact, and guided by the wisdom of the leaders, new standards and new norms approximating to the "general will" and welfare of the community are gradually and automatically evolved. All the peoples of the world are legally and morally one body. The democratic process being in its very nature universal, all the democracies function together and would eventually evolve a working federation for all mankind, a framework under which different communities live in peace and work out their destinies. It should be a federation of the nature of a co-operative law-making body strong enough to bring about disarmament, eschew weapons of mass destruction and foster arrangements for the economic uplift of all mankind. The obligatory jurisdiction of one law in some essentials enforceable through World Tribunals would be the chief ingredient of this federation. Equally essential would be the circumstance that to

each group must be conceded its right to develop its own system and ideology. The postulate of a regime of one law for mankind in matters touching the essential freedoms and fundamentals of existence, necessarily involves the abandonment of the use of force for settlement of disputes as a matter of national policy. War should be a sanction, a "bellum justum"; otherwise a delict. Concepts like a war of aggression, crime against humanity and the like would acquire a clear content and meaning. Indeed all the essentials of the 'Law of Nations' would stand re-arranged in a clear and distinct framework. The religions of the world have over generations evolved the equality clause and have each expressed it in different ways. The golden rule of co-existence and co-operation is prescribed alike for the individual and the community at large. This universal co-operative process ought to be the law-making deity for all the democracies of the world. To values and norms compatible with the co-existence and development of different cultures and capable of international acceptance and enforcement, the due measure of sovereignty should be accorded in preference to nation-grounded virtues, and a new science of jurisprudence built.

VI

This is the attempt that the United Nations Organization has set to itself to achieve. The Charter is adequate in its declarations of principles as to equality, justice and the enthronement of the moral law. But its achievements and purpose have substantially failed. The machinery "enacted" and provided is unequal, undemocratic and inconsistent with principle. It lacks universality and violates equality. In consequence, its bodies and organizations have themselves become the seats of opposing loyalties, factions and rivalries. Their deliberations have resulted in mutual accusation, embitterment and suspicion. Amendments, particularly touching the "Domestic Jurisdiction" clause and those concerning the distribution of powers, are necessary and portions of the Charter have to be rewritten with a view unfailingly to effectuate the universal values of equality and non-discrimination in vital fields of human endeavour. The execution of this work must, of course, be left to the wise and the learned, and to the skilled statesmen.

Law and Ethics

III

by

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1. *The nature of Law and of Morals*

The use of the word 'Law' in the natural and the social sciences has been generally distinguished by saying that in the natural sciences we have a *description* of behaviour, while in the Social Sciences we have a *prescription* for conduct. Sometimes this distinction has been identified with another, viz. that between natural Laws and normative laws. Natural laws deal with facts and are statements describing regularities of nature. Normative laws are rules that forbid or demand certain modes of conduct. They guide our choice between alternative courses of actions. There is another difficulty in the case of the social sciences. As the facts about human nature are so complex, it is difficult to discover uniformities of behaviour and even more difficult to describe them accurately. It is very difficult, indeed, to describe laws dealing with human motivations whether in Psychology, Sociology or Economics. But in Ethics, there is another complication on account of the normative character of the Science. The laws of Psychology or Sociology may be called purely descriptive, even though the description may be vague and uniformities more or less probable; when we come to ethical laws, the difficulty becomes insuperable, on account of the introduction of "*ought*" or a value-judgment. The Science of Jurisprudence, dealing as it does, with laws of human conduct, stands on the borderland of *Social Science*, with its purely descriptive emphasis, and *Social Philosophy*, with its normative leanings. It is true that some moral philosophers have tried to blur the distinction between natural and normative laws by suggesting that what is *morally* right or good belongs essentially to the nature of things. Thus Natural Law is differentiated from Conventional or Customary Law. Karl Popper, in his recent work, has tried to throw some light on this use of the word '*Natural*' which is likely to be mis-leading. If we think of nature exclusively in the sense of physical regularity, as Popper does, the values, norms or standards are not to be found in nature. "Nature consists of facts and regularities, and it is in itself neither

moral nor immoral. It is we who impose our standards upon nature, and who introduce in this way morals into the natural world, inspite of the fact that we are part of this world". (The Open Society, Vol. I, p. 52). It is true that standards are not to be found in nature, if nature means the physical universe. But if human beings, with their sense of values, are also parts of the world of nature, then there is a sense in talking of certain *natural values* or *standard norms*, as different from conventional or artificial norms. This must, however, not lead to the blurring of the important distinction between *non-value facts* and *value-facts*. Yet to say that there is nothing natural in morality, apart from social convention, is to go too far in the direction of the Dichotomy of facts and values.

There is another ethical thinker of considerable importance in the contemporary philosophical world, who is also inclined to reduce moral principles to sociological or psychological explanations of conduct. Hare in his book "*The Language of Morals*", seems to advocate a theory of morality which would reduce Ethics to Sociology or Psychology. When I subscribe to a principle, I take a decision; but whence comes the authority of the principle itself? To say that it has authority because my forefathers have subscribed to it and because it has been bred in me by years of education, is to reduce morality to sociology; to say because I cannot break it without compunction or remorse, is to reduce it to psychology. As Hare puts it, "Though principles are in the end built upon decisions of principles, the building is the work of many generations....." ".....for both common moral notions and my own intuitions are the legacy of tradition and apart from the fact that there are so many different traditions in the world—traditions cannot be started without someone doing what I now feel called upon to do". (The language of Morals, pp. 76, 77).

II. *Theories of Law:*

In the above paragraphs we have tried to show some difficulties which we have to face boldly before clarifying our conceptions about morality. When some jurists assert that "*Law represents the principle of order in society and, therefore, it must be based on ethical considerations*", what we venture to suggest is that, if we base Law on Ethics, which itself is hopelessly involved and entangled in a mass of psychological and sociological matters of fact, contingent and relative to time and other arbitrary factors,

we are not providing a safe and strong foundation for jurisprudence. Before we venture to make any constructive suggestions, it would be useful, therefore, to take into consideration the various theories of law, which have held the field in the past and which have been rejected by modern jurists in favour of the ethical theory.

(a) *Force theories of Law:*

(i) The most important group of theories of law is that which is based on physical force as an essential element in all law. This group can be sub-divided into the *command* theory and the *sanction* theory.

In England, Thomas Hobbes and John Austin are the two classical exponents of the *Command theory*. In his lectures, first published in 1832, under the title '*The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*', John Austin gave classic expression to this view. The key to the science of jurisprudence, according to Austin, is the word *Command*, because every law is a species of command. He defined law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him". There is an obvious defect in this theory of law, which is compared to medicine, and thus presupposes an evil to be prevented or remedied. Law is a necessary evil, and force is necessary to compel obedience. If a sovereign cannot enforce his commands, he ceases to be sovereign. As Hobbes said long ago: "In matter of government when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps". The great virtue of the command theory was, in the words of Sir William Markby, that "Austin by establishing the distinction between law and morals—laid the foundation for a science of law". (*Elements of Law*, 1905).

(ii) In recent years, most jurists have given up the command theory in favour of a "*Pure Theory of Law*" made famous throughout the world by Professor Kelsen. (*General Theory of Law and State*, 1949). In place of the word '*Command*' this theory substitutes the word '*sanction*' as the key to the science of jurisprudence. The most serious objection to the Pure Theory of Law, in the words of Prof. Goodhart, is that "it keeps us from seeing the essential difference between a *coercive* order and an *obligatory* order. We are led to regard the two words as synonymous". (*The Nature of Law and Morals*, p. 17).

(b). *Obligation Theory of Law:*

Turning to the *obligation* theory of law after rejecting both the command and the sanction theories, we have to mention Sir Frederick Pollock who is the original founder of this theory: "Law is enforced by the State because it is law; it is not law merely because the State enforces it". A rule of law is "a rule conceived as binding". (A First Book of Jurisprudence, 1923). The Key-word in this theory is '*Obligation*'. The Law is to be defined as 'any rule of human conduct which is recognised as being obligatory. It is essential to draw a clear distinction between *obedience* to an order or a rule and recognition that the order or rule is *obligatory*, i.e. that the order or rule ought to be obeyed. In short, we must distinguish between the literal meanings of the two English words '*must*' and '*ought*'. With the introduction of this word "ought", we are already in the field of Ethics. Thus it is clear that if we regard law as a rule which is recognised as obligatory, then the element of force becomes of minor importance: the obligatory nature of these rules is based on other grounds, and one of the most important of these grounds is that of *moral law*. It is widely recognised that the moral sense is one of the dominant forces not only in establishing the efficacy of law, but also in its very existence. Thus the jurist cannot afford to ignore the moral law as irrelevant to his subject, as the basic idea of *obligation* is ethical in its very roots.

III. *Moral Law:*

The Oxford Dictionary defines moral as "concerned with character or disposition, or with the distinctions between right and wrong". The first part of this definition stresses the subjective aspect, the second part with the objectivity of morals. If we emphasize the conscience as the inward monitor, we may say that "morality works from *within* outwards and it is this *internal* character which distinguishes it from the law of the land and the conventions of society". (Winfield, Select Legal Essays, 1953, p. 267).

Again, Rudolph Stammler says: "Law presents itself as an external regulation of human conduct....Ethical Theory is concerned with the question of the content of a man's own will, in whose heart, there must be no opposition of being and seeming". (The Theory of Justice, p. 141). If we push this line of thought to its logical conclusion, each person becomes a law unto himself

in deciding what he believes is right or wrong and so there can be no *objective moral law*.

Mr. Kneale, in his valuable essay on '*Objectivity in Morals*' has advocated the opposite view, and arrives at the conclusion that "moral judgments" are not merely expressions of our own preferences or those of our group, but applications of a law to which all men commit themselves when they claim to be reasonable". (Philosophy 1950, pp 149-163)

If, however, we accept the objectivity theory, the next question arises, where do we find this objective moral law. Is the will of God, Intuition, Instinct, Reason or Social nature of man, the final authority to decide about ethical objectivity? There are a host of theories of the moral law in the field. There is the distinction of the moral and the axiological 'ought' which has to be taken into consideration. Finally, Moral Theories of the *Good* or the *End*, as distinguished from The Law, have got to be discussed. Jurists would not find it easy to arrive at a conclusion which should be practical and effective and exact, in the midst of this welter of confusion in the realm of Ethics. We shall limit ourselves here to the discussion of one of these problems, the problem of the relation of the moral and the axiological 'ought'. It is useful to bring out the significance, of this distinction, as some jurists, when they talk of '*obligation*' or '*ought*', think that they have arrived at a word which is final, unambiguous and not further analyzable. In our search for an objective morality, we however discover that the 'ought' itself presents formidable difficulties under the fire of modern positivistic analysis.

IV. The axiological 'ought':

In his recent work, '*What is Value*', Everett W. Hall has argued that the structure of value can be expressed in a sentence like "A ought to be B". But it may be shown that there are some important differences between *two* uses of the word 'ought' to *two* entirely different fields. The one is the essentially interpersonal situation of man: the other is oriented to aspects and situations which have no direct relevance to persons other than oneself. The latter may be designated as the axiological "ought". It is the former situation which primarily leads to the moral "ought". The moral "ought" is contingent in a double sense. It is contingent, first, on the existence of the other person in relation to whom the "ought" arises and second, on his fulfilment of the role-expecta-

tions, which is the *conditio sine qua non* of the functioning of a social system. Recent studies in social anthropology and sociology have conclusively shown that the interactive behaviour of persons is always oriented to role-expectations which are defined in terms of patterned norms, (e.g. in the recent work of Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*). Stuart Chase's recent survey in his '*Roads to Agreement*' points to the fact that ought-obligatoriness in society presupposes a pre-existent role-pattern which is only to be fulfilled and not explored.

The deep difference between the moral and the axiological "ought" may also be seen in the fact that the two are, in many cases, in essential conflict with each other. When the artist, the intellectual, or the mystic neglects his social or domestic duties, he does so because of the call of a *higher* but conflicting value. "Buddha, leaving his wife and child and kingdom at the dead of night for the sake of a possible realization whose glimpse even he had not yet received, is the eternal symbol of the call of the *supra-moral* and the *supra-sociological* in man's life". The truth-seeker and the artist feel the call and the loyalty to their vision. If there is any conflict between these and the duties of personal or social obligation, there is little doubt in their minds as to their choice, or at least, as to which they ought to choose.

Dr. Nicolai Hartmann calls attention to this fundamental difference by distinguishing between 'stronger' and 'weaker' values. The axiological 'ought' presupposes for its realization, the relative fulfilment of the moral 'ought'. The 'stronger' value, according to Hartmann, is that which does not need for its existence another value. The 'weaker' value necessarily presupposes the 'stronger'. On the other hand, the '*stronger*' value is *always* the '*lower*' in Hartmann's system, while the '*weaker*' is *correspondingly* the '*higher*' in the scale of values. Buddha, to return to our former example, may leave his wife and child and kingdom but only on the precondition that there shall be *others who shall continue to love and live with their wives, bring up their children and maintain the social order by the use of the ordinary sanctions, and rule the state*. There seems little doubt that the intellectual, aesthetic or spiritual value, for which people give up personal and social obligations, is undoubtedly a higher value than the day-to-day fulfilment of customary obligations. The martyr who stakes his life, rather than give up the value whose claim he feels in these different fields, is the clearest symbol of the *secondary* character

of obligations that arise within the field of interpersonal relationships.

This may shock many ethical thinkers who have mainly concentrated on the "*moral*" rather than the "*axiological ought*". The supra-personal and supra-social nature of values seems to have been entirely forgotten in ethical discussion on questions about rights and duties, obligations, sanctions, punishment etc. Even those, who have found in the concept of the "*good life*" the central focus of their ethical thought, have failed to see exactly the claim for a "*good life*". The claim is rather for the *objectifying of a value that is vaguely, but at the same time irresistibly, apprehended*. The life of a Baudelaire, Van Gogh, Dostoevsky, or any other artist, can in no wise be described as a "*good life*"—nor would they in any sense claim that it was a pursuit of such a life. Yet the claim that they prehended *seems to reveal more the nature of values than the so-called leaders of "good life"*. The assumption behind the concept of the "*good life*" seems to be that *there are not different types of "ought", and that even if there are, they are not in essential conflict*. "The essentially anthropocentric character of the concept", in the words of Daya, a young writer of considerable force and insight, "shows that it is derived from the field of the moral "*ought*"—the field of interpersonal relationships whose last term is *society or humanity* and not anything beyond or outside it. *The axiological "ought", on the other hand, is not so socio-or-anthropo-centric*. Rather, it reveals the transcendent nature of the value-claim and *orientates humanity to a trans-human dimension*". (The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. L.III No. 21, pp. 634-640).

V. *The socio-anthropological approach:*

Whatever the consequences for value-theory and value-attitudes this distinction between the moral and the axiological "*ought*" may have and whatever its relevance for ethical thinking, we are here directly concerned with its relevance for the relation between Law and Ethics. The whole question has been discussed by jurists in a sentimental manner. The British jurists who make "*obligatoriness*" a key-word in their jurisprudence seem to base Law on ethical considerations. They go so far as to suggest that the English Law has been evolved out of the moral law. They even feel some sense of superiority because of the *fact* (very laudable, indeed) that the English are naturally and instinctively a very law-abiding people. It is, indeed, their civic sense, their

sense of fair-play and social justice, their respect for the law of the land and their strong common-sense, which is a source of inspiration for many other nations in the Commonwealth. But to go on from this to infer that *the British are a highly evolved people from the ethical point of view* would be to ignore many sociological, psychological and historical factors, which as we have tried to show above, have been emphasized recently by anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists alike. Indeed, the whole question has assumed a new significance in the light of recent researches in primitive culture, tribal organisations and various other psycho-analytic investigations. The relation of Jurisprudence to Ethics has consequently also to be revised by contemporary legal philosophers in the light of fresh knowledge gained in the other social studies, like Philosophy of History, Sociology, Anthropology, Social Psychology, Economics, Politics and Comparative Psychology of primitive cultures. In view of these considerations, we have to conclude that the relation of Law and Morals is not so straightforward and simple, as would appear from the discussions of the 18th and the 19th century jurists. It is true that, generally speaking, law cannot depart far from ethical custom nor lag far behind it. Yet one has only to look at a mass of legal precepts that make up the bulk of legal systems today in order to see that they are anything but authoritative promulgations of *ethical custom*. They are the technical, scientific custom of the *courts and lawyers*. Again, it is true that all the social sciences must be co-workers, and emphatically all must be co-workers with Jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, Ethics, Economics, Politics, Sociology are distinct enough at the core, but shade off into each other. Prof. Roscoe Pound, in his McNair Lectures, delivered in 1923 at the University of North Carolina, pointed out clearly the broad differences between the *historical*, the *analytical* and the *philosophical* views on the question of the relation of Law and Morals. We have to briefly review these *three* points of view, before offering our constructive and purely tentative suggestions.

VI. *Concluding Historical Retrospect:*

Under the influence of Hegel, who dominated Europe for sometime on account of his Encyclopaedic scholarship, acute Dialectical skill and gigantic sweep, Law came to be thought of as an *unfolding or a realizing of the idea of right*. Legal history was a record of how the idea of *right* had realized itself progressively in human experience of the administration of justice. This

historical school kept up for a time the intimate relation of Jurisprudence to Ethics. But before long the ethical interpretation gave way to a political interpretation. The idea of freedom took the place of the idea of right and gradually ethical considerations were banished from jurisprudence. Indeed, as Prof. Roscoe Pound observes, "Sound thinking requires us to perceive that *moral propositions do not become authoritatively established legal precepts* whenever a jurist succeeds in demonstrating to his own satisfaction that they are ethically well taken". (Law and Morals, p. 40). On the other hand, many things are involved in determining how far the legal and the moral may be or should be made to coincide in a particular situation. Legal precepts sometimes are, and perhaps sometimes must be, at variance with the requirements of morals. Analytical Jurisprudence, however, went to the other extreme and broke with Ethics completely. In order to establish Jurisprudence as an autonomous and self-sufficient Science of Law, the analytical jurist contended that Law and morals were distinct and unrelated and that he was concerned only with Law. It was said that morals have to do with thought and feeling, while the law has to do only with actions, that in Ethics we aim at perfecting the individual character of men, while Law seeks only to regulate the relations of individuals with each other and with the State. Such arguments were indeed carried too far by the nineteenth-century jurists; the analytical view provided the anti-thesis of the historical view. A fresh synthesis was thus necessarily called for. Even in regard to application of moral principles and legal precepts, it was said that moral principles are of individual and relative application, to be applied with reference to circumstances and individuals, whereas legal rules are of general and absolute application. The Kantian distinction of the twofold aspect of human action, the *external* manifestation of man's will and the *inner* determination of his will by motives, lent weighty support to this tendency towards a complete Dichotomy of Law and Morals. Even Hegel represents the relation as an antithesis. Morals determine not what is possible but what *ought* to be.

The *philosophical* view again brought about an inter-relation between Law and Ethics by making *Jurisprudence subordinate to Ethics*. Ethics has to do with the *ends* we seek to attain and Law is the *means* of attaining these ends. Government, law and Morals in the sense of ethical custom, are factors towards the attainment of an ideal of civilization. We would venture to

suggest that in any hierarchy of values, it would perhaps be inevitable to place the moral law on a higher level than the legal code. But we must not forget that the *ethical "ought"* is as much a product of our *legal institutions* as the latter are the products of our moral intuitions and moral decisions. Indeed, the only courses open to us, in the light of modern anthropological and sociological researches, is to have a *two-way* traffic. Ethics is as much dependent upon social custom, as solidified by important judicial decisions, as Jurisprudence is dependent upon purely ethical considerations. It would be a reversal to the ancient and outworn modes of thought and expression, if we were to suggest that "*as our moral ideals become more acceptable, the level of our law also rises, so that the higher the system of humanity, the better the system of law.*" To emphasize this line of thinking unduly would be to make Ethics an absolute and finally coherent body of doctrine and to make jurisprudence a handmaid to Ethics. However flattering to philosophers this view may be, we must not give in to this vanity. Neither do we hold Ethics to be ultimate or absolute, nor do we agree with our laws being mere corollaries or deductions from our ethical principles. *There is an organic unity of the whole of the social fabric of man* in which Law and Ethics, History and Politics, Tribal lore and taboos, superstition and faith, Devotion and Reason, Instinct and Emotion, all play an integral part. No member of this social organism should be allowed to raise its head above the others. This paper is a plea for the restoration in Ethics of the *important place which certain contingent matters occupy and which are generally granted a corner seat or treated as outcastes or untouchables.* Morality, in the last resort, we would venture to reaffirm with Bradley, is still *an appearance and not ultimate reality.* The ultimate reality is guided by an axiological "*ought*": there is no escape from an essential *subjectivity in morals*, though this should not be confused with *Relativity.* This is the lesson we have learnt alike from the teachings of the Gita, Socrates and Bradley.

Law and Ethics

IV

by

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The problem of interrelations between ethics and law, the subject of discussion at the 32nd Philosophical All-India Congress, can be considered in various aspects. The questions of the affinities and distinctions of morals and law, of the character, nature and social significance of the very moral and legal standards prevailing in a society may arise. It is impossible to deal with all these problems in a brief communication and we, therefore, shall confine ourselves only to some of them.

On the one hand, it is obvious that morals and law are not identical and on the other, they are interrelated and interact in a certain manner. Their non-identity is obvious as morals are based on public opinion, beliefs or customs, while laws are safeguarded by the whole power of the state. Legal standards are embodied in the laws and regulations of the government, and morals in public opinion.

Being a reflection of life of society, morals and laws are essentially distinct. In a society with antagonistic classes there is a single legal system, an embodiment of the policy of the ruling class, while the existing moral standards are peculiar to each class. The ideological advocates of these societies have a tendency to identify the prevailing moral standards and the morals of all the social strata, and on the other hand to identify the existing law standards and morality in general. But this can be achieved only during those periods when state policy becomes the manifestation of national interests, connected with the struggle for independence, the struggle for peace, and safeguarding of elementary moral standards, etc.

The unity or identity of moral and legal standards can only be achieved, as has been proved by a regime based on social public property, when the interests of the whole people become the guiding star of morals and laws, in the presence of a moral and

legal unity of the nation, when legal and moral standards become the manifestation of moral consciousness of the whole population.

However it does not follow from that that morals and laws coincide in such society and that the time has come to substitute moral standards for laws. What is being condemned by the laws of the Soviet State is also being condemned by our moral standards or public opinion. But not everything condemned by socialist moral standards becomes the object of legal procedure, just the same, as not everything considered as a moral duty comes under the Soviet law. Thus, for instance, participation in socialist competition in order to raise the quality and amount of production is considered a moral duty in our country, but the state does not compel us to take part in the movement, though it supports it, rewarding winners in the competition for the highest achievements in work. The absence of divergence between socialist moral standards and law and the interests of the people has strengthened the authority of the law, to which Soviet people feel it to be their moral duty to abide.

Under socialism the means of production have become public property, and the liquidation of exploitation of man by man has been implemented in the maxim of socialist law: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work". Soviet laws, proclaiming work the honorable duty of the people, fully correspond to moral requirements of the Soviet people, who consider honest work as their highest social duty. This is easy to understand as the results of labour, i.e. its produce, is no longer grabbed by the exploiters, whom we have not got, but is used to satisfy the ever growing material and cultural needs of the whole nation. The worker under socialism cares about the increase of national welfare, because it improves the conditions of his own life and culture. In this lies the harmonic blending of personal and social interests under socialism.

The unity of moral and legal principles under socialism is born from life itself, which is built on the cooperation and mutual aid of people freed from exploitation.

Some western sociologists write fancy stories, insisting that collectivism, the care about social interests as the morality base of Soviet society affects and even suppresses the individual, the individual being lost in the community. These sociologists fail to see that a healthy social individual can only prosper in a commu-

nity, fighting for its prosperity and finding support in it. Outside the community, being separated from and juxtaposing oneself to it the individual becomes anti-social. Therefore all attacks against the collective principle in moral standards are ludicrous, they have been completely refuted by the experience of a socialist society.

The unprecedented development of the creative initiative of the Soviet people, the achievements of industry, agriculture, science and culture find an explanation in the victory of socialist collective principles in our life. A friendly solidarity, mutual help in work, in the solution of problems great and small, respect for human dignity have become the staple features of the morals of the people in our society.

On the base of a further strengthening and development of socialism, wide educational work carried out by state, party and public and cultural organisations, on the base of an active participation of the people in the practical tasks of the building of communism, we are overcoming the survivals of the old order which are sometimes observed in the attitude of some people to their work, family, in everyday life and in some other respects.

An essential shortcoming of many old ethical theories was their lack of a concrete historical approach to moral categories. Attempts to find a universal definition of moral duty, happiness, goodness, honour, courage etc., good for all times and all social classes failed only because their authors ignored the actual interests of the people, the existing social contradictions, peculiar to the process of social life.

The task of science is not to reject the well known ethical categories which give an evaluation of man's life,, but to understand them correctly, to do away with all vague definitions and to be able to discover those aspects of social life from which the common human element in morals springs.

Only the correspondence of man's actions to the requirements of social progress can and must serve as an objective criterion for the differentiation of the moral from the amoral. Therefore, Marxist ethics sets out from the maxim that what helps human society, and thus the individual, to rise, to get rid of exploitation and all forms of oppression, including colonial oppression, all that is linking the peoples in the struggle for a better future is moral.

That means that the moral concepts of justice, goodness etc., cannot exist outside human society and classes, as long as these continue to be. This contention is sometimes distorted by western sociologists who interpret it as a negation of all morality.

But this is as absurd as for instance the fact that racists assume that Negroes in the U.S. or Indians in the Union of South Africa are amoral, only because they refuse to admit the morality of the inhuman, barbarous treatment to which they are subjected.

At the 31st Session of your Philosophical Congress last year much was said about the danger of philosophy being divorced from actual problems. Professor Kabir and a number of other speakers appealed for a close contact between philosophy and life. We fully support this point of view and consider that actual problems, the interests of the people, should be also given top priority in ethics. These noble aspirations have been clearly implemented in the progressive ideas of all countries. Many examples can be found in the social and philosophical progressive theories of the outstanding revolutionary democrats of our country, such as Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyuboff, Herzen, Belinsky and many others. The great Lenin taught us to value and develop the progressive traditions of humanism, to be in the service of the people.

The ideas of subjugating personal interests to social ones, the condemnation of selfishness, appeals to a devoted service to the people are found in many ethical teachings, sometimes in a religious form throughout the history of philosophy and social thought of the great Indian people. An outstanding example is the philosophical poem "Bhagavat Gita", the ethical theories of the outstanding Indian thinkers, Ram Mohan Roy, Tilak, Rabindranath Tagore and others.

The freedom poet of the Indian people, a fighter for social justice, Rabindranath Tagore was, indeed, the mouthpiece of the moral greatness of his people. The main subject of his works is his love for common people, an ardent desire to see them free and happy, a firm belief in the radiant future of the Indian people. With great and sincere admiration the Soviet people view the wise policy of the Indian Government aiming at the solution of the outstanding problems of our time, the struggle to prevent a new world war, friendship among nations, a further development of Indo-Soviet solidarity.

Some philosophers assert that the relation of life and ethics is understood by Marxists in a "pragmatic" manner, something like American pragmatism. This is due to a misunderstanding, for Marxists fully recognise the objective criteria of morality, which is completely refuted by pragmatists, who reduce morality to what is "practically useful" or "profitable" for man. Such an approach can even justify the armament race, as it is of great profit to some imperialist circles. Contrary to pragmatism and to schools related to it, Marxist ethics considers as moral that which serves the interests of social progress, corresponds to the objective historical process, frees the people from exploitation, poverty, puts an end to wars and colonial oppression.

When one speaks of the interrelation between moral and legal standards and the life of the people, one cannot help noticing the deep cleavage between what the people often consider as just and legal and what is desired that the people should consider it to be such. The people naturally get indignant when they are required to follow all moral precepts in order to consolidate a social order that does not coincide with their interests. Some bourgeois philosophers make futile attempts to represent the capitalist social order as just and worthy of respect.

But how can you convince the moral feeling of the people to accept and respect an order under which the yearly dividends and profits of a U.S. big capitalist equal the wages of 12 thousand school teachers, when 8 per cent of the population possess one half of the national wealth of the U.S., or when 2 per cent of British property owners possess 64 per cent of the total national wealth. It is also known that a third of all the profits of industrial and trade firms in Britain get into the hands of the members of the so-called "Club of Fifty Giants", i.e., fifty largest monopolies, and the bulk of the shares of U.S. monopolies is in the hands of 2—3 % of the adult population of the U.S.A.

If we want to keep our feet on scientific ground it is impossible to brush away these problems in ethics and to immerse ourselves into discussion about duty, happiness in the abstract.

Life demands a concrete historical approach to the moral concepts of social duty, justice etc., an approach based on actual conditions. Attempts to run away from social conditions, to ignore reality, lead to serious mistakes which make the differentiation between the moral and the amoral more difficult.

The great progress in the realisation by the people of their moral consciousness taking place in our epoch, the discarding of obsolete notions and concepts of life and one's duties is closely connected with social changes, and are rational phenomena corresponding to actual needs.

The ideas of collectivism and service to social interests are spreading, while selfish striving for personal profit and outdated social forces are dying away.

A correct solution of the problems of ethics and law can be achieved only on the base of a scientific generalisation of social practice and the experience of fight for freedom of the people. Therefore it is wrong to consider the moral and law standards as something that is given to society from outside, from above, or something that has been established by intuition, agreement etc.

The idea of fatalism condemns people to a passive contemplation of social injustice; subjectivism and relativism, advocating arbitrary morality, do not elucidate the problems facing science but on the contrary confuse them. One must point out that the concepts of "Karma Marga" well known in Indian philosophy can, if correctly interpreted, be a good answer to both partisans of contemplation and those of arbitrary subjectivism in ethical problems.

It is sometimes said that the admission that man's actions are conditioned by society, by life, leads to a refutation of conscience and moral values. Those who profess these views directed against a materialist interpretation of morality usually confuse the problems of causality of moral laws in a given society with the problem of their role in life. The determinist principle claiming that man's actions are conditioned and causal does not deny the Mind, ideals, conscience and the evaluation of actions. Lenin has pointed out that a severe and just evaluation is only possible from a determinist point of view.

In discussing ethical problems we became convinced that there is a firm moral base for the unity of all progressive scientists and people in their struggle for a better future for mankind. The broadening and strengthening of this unity in the moral field can only be considered as an important social duty of all honest people.

In our days the struggle for the strengthening of the moral factor in international relations, the fight against those imperia-

list circles which propagate national enmity, prepare aggressive wars, try to intimidate people with A-bombs and other weapons of mass destruction has become of great importance. Moral duty compels us to take all possible measures against the use of atomic energy for aggressive military purposes and to join the campaign against a new world war.

We, Soviet people, hope that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India, as well as many other peaceful states to ban the A- and H-bomb tests and their use against nations, will at last be adopted and the nations will get rid of these destructive and dangerous weapons.

In our days there is no higher moral duty in international relations than the struggle for peace and against the threat of an atomic war. There can be no divergency of opinion on this subject among the humanists of our time, among those to whom mankind is dear, to those who realise the value of each individual life and how much labour it has cost the people to create the existing material riches in life, science, technique and culture.

All the sound forces of mankind in our time, all honest people of the world, irrespective of the class or social group they belong to, their political views and philosophies, will certainly find the necessary means to stop the imperialist warmongers.

The evidence of it is the steadily growing, genuinely humane peace movement in all parts of the world.

The problems of ethic and law have a number of other aspects requiring careful study. But, in spite of their complexity, the scientific data accumulated in this field and the conclusions drawn from them by progressive scientists and scholars all over the world, show that the forces of justice, humanitarianism, friendship between the nations, the forces in the struggle for the freedom and happiness of all working people will win a victory over the dark forces of evil and social injustice.

Each new step in this direction, even the most modest individual contribution to the achievement of this noble task is bringing closer the moment when social injustice will be wiped out from the face of the earth and all mankind will be building life on genuinely humanistic foundations.

The Rhyme of Reason

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND WESTERN POINTS OF VIEW*

by

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I

The view of Logic in contemporary Western thought is undergoing remarkable transformation. We have to reckon with it and examine its credentials before we accept it. Indian philosophers have held a view of logic which had been regarded as valid down the ages by the foremost of Indian philosophers. A fresh evaluation of it is called for in the light of contemporary speculation. A humble attempt has been made here in that direction. The object of the author has been broadly to state the fundamental concepts of Indian Logic, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and to emphasize their role in leading us towards the path of true knowledge.

The key-note of Nyāya view is struck by Vātsyāyana in his formulation that philosophical knowledge is intended to lead us to final beatitude. 'Tatvajñānāt Niśśreyasādhigamah'.

This view of Nyāya is in general the view of Indian thought which maintains that philosophy must help us to rid ourselves of the evils (dukha-nivṛtti) that beset human life and help us in the attainment of what a Western writer describes as 'a moment of exhilaration, peace without boredom'.¹ 'Jñānān mokṣah' says Sankara, the great Vedantin: 'the fruit of knowledge is liberation'. Knowledge enables one to confront the realities of life without flinching and fearlessly. As Berdyaev puts it—"Knowledge means fearlessness and victory over fear; it is bitter and means acceptance of bitterness. Moral knowledge is the most bitter and the most fearless of all, for in it sin and evil are revealed to us along with the meaning and value of life. There is a deadly pain

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1. Gods—Logic & Language: by A. G. N. Flew: p. 206.

in the very distinction of good and evil, of the valuable and the worthless. We cannot rest in the thought that distinction is ultimate. The longing for God in the human heart springs from the fact that we cannot bear to be faced for ever with the distinction between good and evil and the bitterness of choice."²

In India the science of probing into truth or reasoning was known as Tarka Śāstra. It was also called Nyāya Śāstra, Pramāṇa Śāstra or Anvikṣikī, each name bringing out an important aspect of this science. Tarka is discussion. Nyāya is that which helps us to arrive at a judgment. Pramāṇas are criteria of truth. Anvikṣikī is the science of probing into truth. As the commentator of the Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama says, "This is the truth—of the four vital knowledges provided for the good of living beings, (prānabhūtānugrahāya), the fourth is the science of probing into truth, (Ānvikṣikī), the knowledge of logic (Nyāya vidyā). In dealing with its subject-matter, Doubt and the rest form the subjects dealt by this science."³ The purpose of the author here is to lay bare the underlying pattern or rhyme that runs through reason as described in Tarka Śāstra and as characteristic of the general Indian view.

The aim of logic in addition to being a precise definition of terms is the attainment of the knowledge of the real essence of things (tatvajñāna). Gautama states sixteen categories in the very first sūtra of Nyāya Śāstra.⁴ (The sixteen categories, a knowledge of which leads to the attainment of the highest good are—(1) the method of right cognition, (2) the object of right cognition, (3) Doubt, (4) Motive, (5) Example, (6) Theory, (7) Inferential Factors, (8) Cognition, (9) Truth that is demonstrated, (10) Discussion, (11) Disputation, (12) Wrangling, (13) Fallacious Reason, (14) Casuistry, (15) Futile Rejoinder, and (16) Clinchers.⁵ This sūtra compresses epigrammatically the whole purpose of this study

2. The Destiny of Man: by Nicolas Berdyaev.

3. Satyametat: Imāstu catasro vidyāḥ prthak prasthānāḥ prānabhūtānugrahāyopadiśyante; Yāsām caturthiyamānvikṣikī nyāyavidyā: Tasyāḥ prthakprasthānāḥ saṁśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ: Teṣām prthagvacanamāntareṇa adhyātmavidyāmātramiyam syāt, yathopaniṣadaḥ: tasmāt saṁśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ prthak prasthāpyate.

4. Pramāṇa - pramēya - saṁśaya - prayojana - drṣtāntasiddhāntā - avayava - tarka - nirṇaya - vāda - jalpavitanda - hetvābhāsa - chhala - jāti-nigrahasthānānam tatvjñānānniśreyasādhigamaḥ.

5. Nyāyasūtra: Sūtra 1. Translation by Dr. Ganganātha Jha: pp. 3-4.

which is to gain true knowledge which helps towards the removal of the pains of life by enunciating the goal to be attained.) The highest good can be attained only when the right understanding of the real nature of that pain—which is to be discarded,—is known. It is an understanding which does not lead to escapism but enables one to face courageously the facts of life however painful they may prove to be. It helps us to dissipate error and false valuation of facts and helps us to arrive at a true estimate of things. The purpose of all such study is finally to help in the attainment of the highest end of human life (paramapuruṣārtha). Nyāya⁶ aims at realization of these objectives.

‘Therefore the Indian definition of logic is not merely that it is a study of reasoning and thought as it is defined in the West, but also the means of attaining the highest good which according to Gautama and his commentator is the cessation of pain or relief from suffering arising from whatever cause.’

It would be a perfectly apt statement to make that the twin systems of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya constitute the field of the Logico-metaphysical science of India. The term ‘Anvikṣiki’ itself means to observe with an open mind. Anvikṣiki is another name used for Nyāya, the central theme of which is that new knowledge is to be gained by the method of individual observation or personal experience or the observation and experience of those who are more competent than we are. It is also known as Nyāyavistara—literally an extension of the doctrine of Nyāya—the import possibly being that is not merely the analysis of the structure of thought but also gives us an insight into reality which is the object of thought. The term Nyāyadarśana again implies that it is a method of attaining a glimpse of the ultimate truth having known which everything else becomes known, which the system of Nyāya makes available.

The term ‘Tarka’ the etymology of which is ambiguous has come to mean confutation, and in the Nyaya school it is one of the sixteen categories. Its definition is interesting. It is defined as a conjecture for the sake of knowledge of truth in respect to an

6. Ta etāvanto vidyamānārthāḥ; eśhānaviparītajnānarthamihopadeśaḥ; sovamanāvayavena tāntrārtha uddiṣṭo veditavyaḥ; ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tatvajñānānniśreyasādhigamaḥ; taccaitaduttarasūtrēṇānūdyāta iti; heyam tasya nivartakam, hānamātyantikam, tasyopāyodhigantavya ityetaṇi catvāryārthapadāni samyagbudhvā niśreyasamadhigachhati.

unknown object, by the elimination of all contrary suppositions. It is analogous to the method of hypothesis in the inductive logic of the West where a hypothesis that is formed, called conjecture by the Indian logician, to explain an unknown object, is a candidate for verification and is proved and established only when it can be shown that all the rival hypotheses are negated. This is what the Indian logician means when he speaks of the elimination of all contrary suppositions.

From the earliest period of her history, the quest for ultimate truth in India has been the all-absorbing passion of her thinkers who sacrificed their all for this purpose. This quest has resulted in two important methods discovered by them, one stressing the intuitive (*pratibhā*) and the other the ratiocinative ways of reaching the truth (*tarka*). The intuitivistic road ultimately led to the adoption of the doctrine of the Vedānta, as formulated by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma Sūtra*, stressing the doctrine that the Absolute is given in intuition. A reaction against this mystical tendency was implicit in the rationalistic reactions of the *Samkhya*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools of rationalism.

The term '*darśana*' was applied to these systems of Indian philosophy—the term meaning in Sanskrit 'vision' or the vision of Ultimate Reality. It is in this sense that we speak of *tatva darśana* or *ātma darśana*, by which we mean a vision of the truth or the self or *ātman*. The well-known *Shad-darsanas* or six systems of Indian philosophy, namely—(a) The Vedānta, (b) *Purva-mīmamsa*, (c) *Samkhya*, (d) *Yoga*, (e) *Vaiśeṣika*, and (f) *Nyāya*,—were thereafter divided into those that recognized a theistic approach and those which did not. In other words, these systems came to be classified as *Āstika* and *Nāstika*. Pāṇini has cryptically defined the distinction between these terms as follows: "*Asti nāsti diṣṭam matiḥ*,"⁷ i.e., belief in the existence or non-existence (of transcendental realities). Those believing in the validity of non-material values were called *Āstikas* as opposed to the *Nāstikas* who discounted them as unreal as the *Carvakas* do. Later on, this classification of *Āstika* and *Nāstika* came to signify a faith in revelation or lack of it. The Vedantic and Upanishadic teaching always insisted on the truth being realised, that mere logic and discussion, without the aid of revelation, would not by themselves help the intuition of the highest truth. Consider the statement,

7. Pāṇini Sūtras: 4-460,

"Naiṣā tarkaṇa matirāpaneya"⁸ (this knowledge is not obtainable by logic alone) or "Nāyamātma Pravacanena labhyaḥ" (this Self is unobtainable by mere discourse).⁹

The anti-Vedic movement, known as Carvaka or Lokayata, was responsible mainly for the emergence of some schools recognizing *pratyakṣa* (sense-perception) and *anumāna* (inference) as the only two sources of valid knowledge. The importance of sense-perception and inference was however admitted by Yajñyavalkya¹⁰ and even by Bādarāyaṇa. Their system of knowledge presupposes the existence of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems.¹¹ A special place was claimed for logic or the role of reasoning in worldly affairs by the man who formulated the *Arthaśāstra*, Kautilya.¹² While determining the place of *Ānvikṣikī* among the sciences Kautilya says: *Ānvikṣikī* comprises the philosophy of Sankhya, Yoga and Lokayata (Materialism). Further he adds that 'When seen in the light of these sciences, the science of *Ānvikṣikī* is most beneficial to the world, keeps the mind steady and firm in weal and woe alike, and bestows excellence of foresight, speech and action'. He ends by praising *Ānvikṣikī* as "Light to all kinds of knowledge, easy means to accomplish all kinds of acts and receptacle of all kinds of virtues' (Ch. II, *Arthaśāstra*). As *Ānvikṣikī* is another name of Nyāya, Kautilya does not mention it specifically in his list of philosophies which may be regarded as schools of Rationalism. And Vaisesika is inseparable from Nyāya.

The word 'Viśeṣa' from which Vaiśeṣika' is derived, etymologically means 'apart'. It can be translated to mean the individual characteristic or special property that distinguishes a particular thing from all other things. It is the particularity of the particular as distinguished from the universal and common (*sāmānya*). Kaṇāda in his sutra says, "Sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām tatvajñānniśreyasam"¹³ which means that summum bonum can be attained only by a true knowledge of similarities and dissimilarities between things.

8. Kathopanishad: II-9.

9. Kathopanishad: II-23.

10. Yajnyavalkyaśmṛti.

11. Vedānta Sūtras: (II-ii-11-17).

12. *Arthaśāstra*—Trivandrum Edition: pp. 27-28. *Pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām, upayāḥ sarva-karmanām; Āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmānām, śāśvad ānvikṣikī matā.*

13. Kaṇāda Vaiśeṣika Sūtra: 1-1-4.

Nyāya, dealing as it does with logical proof, is concerned with unfolding of implications in immediate or mediate deductive inference. It is preoccupied with syllogistic reasoning, whereas the Vaiśeṣika has as its starting point the analysis of the particular or the individual. Thus these two systems, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, are complementary, the former being the inductive analytic movement, which deals with the ascent of thought from the particulars 'Vaiśeṣa' to the universal or general 'sāmānya', and the latter is the deductive synthetic movement descending from sāmānya (universal) to particular (viśeṣa). Reasoning as a whole is a to and fro movement between particular fact and general principle, and general principle and particular fact.

Both these systems do not stop merely with logic and methodology. They are as much ontological as epistemological. They are really two complete metaphysico-logical systems having their own philosophic disciplines. If the Vaiśeṣika system furnishes the metaphysical background for the Nyāya, the Nyāya system builds up a complete system of epistemology and logic. The one characteristic feature to be noticed here is that Logic is not to be merely an intellectual pastime, but must lead one to final emancipation or Mukti. Because of this, Nyāya—and Vaiśeṣika, which stands close to Nyāya—have secured for themselves a place of importance in Vedic religion and philosophy. Hence has Gokulanatha described Ānvīkṣikī as the Amazonian commander-in-Chief of Sruti, the empress ruling over the domain of knowledge and emancipation.

Gautama or Akṣhapāda as he is otherwise known, fused the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems of rationalistic thought in his five-membered syllogistic expression¹⁴ which hinged on example¹⁵ as the central member. Nyāya according to its exposition by Gautama is chiefly based on the Vaiśeṣika pluralistic realism and atomism. The pramāṇas that constitute the epistemology of Nyāya are Vedic in character.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems originated in the rationalistic thought of the Upanishadic period and became the anti-Vedic Vaiśeṣika and pro-Vedic Nyāya. The method of induction and realistic pluralism of the Viśeṣa was made the basis of the Nyāya deduction by syllogistic reasoning. These two systems have been

14. Prameya—the means of right knowledge (cognition).

15. Udāharaṇa.

treated by their exponents as twin sister systems—they are *samāna tantras*. Their accent is on realism and the rationalistic approach. They are self-contained systems of philosophy striking their roots deep down into pluralistic realism.

The very first sūtra which opens the series of Nyāya sūtras says that the attainment of the highest truth is obtained by the knowledge of the essence of the sixteen categories already enumerated.

These sixteen categories are the means by which true knowledge is obtained—true knowledge leading to that condition of the self where it rids itself of what is undesirable (*aniṣṭa-nivṛtti*) and obtains what is desirable (*iṣṭa-prāpti*).

The means of right knowledge according to these systems—(*pramāṇa*)—are the well-known four¹⁶—

- (1) *Pratyaksha* (sense-perception).
- (2) *Anumāna*—inference.
- (3) *Upamāna*—comparison.
- (4) *Śabda*—verbal testimony.

The objects of right knowledge (*Prameya*) comprise practically the entire realm of human knowledge. This includes the knowledge of the physical body (*śarīra*), its functions, the working of the sense organs (*indriya*), the nature of intelligence (*buddhi*), study of behaviour (*pravṛtti*), disorders pertaining to the function of these (*doṣa*), the study of the self (*ātman*), its destiny and fulfilment (*phala*), the knowledge of the causes of human affliction of all kinds (*duḥkha*) and matters pertaining to survival, transmigration and liberation of the human spirit (*apavarga*).

To arrive at a *Siddhanta* or a well-established theory, starting from a *pratijñā* or hypothesis in all these matters is the goal of philosophic endeavour. The syllogism of this school is a compound of induction and deduction. We start here with a proposition (*pratigñyā*) and get behind to its grounds (*hetu*), distinguish the fact or assimilate it with other facts similar to it (*udāharaṇa*) and proceed to the application (*upanaya*) of the generalisation to the given fact and finally arrive at a conclusion (*nigamaṇa*).

16. *Pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*: Gautama Nyaya-Sutra: 1-1-3.

Śabda in the words of the Nyāya Sūtra is the verbal testimony of a reliable person or *āpta*. An *āpta* is one who speaks the truth as it is found.¹⁷ The recognition accorded to the source of knowledge known as śabda has to be properly understood. It refers to ranges of human experience beyond the ken of the ordinary individual. In spite of their ordinary inaccessibility, these experiences are within the range of possibility of human consciousness. When we rely on them for knowledge of truths not open to perception or inference we are said to rely on Śabda or testimony as preliminary to individual verification and corroboration. But Śabda in itself does not carry authenticity. He who lends authority to it is the *Āpta* who is described as a person who is utterly truthful and who is accustomed to see the truth and to utter the truth as he finds it without distortion or exaggeration. His competence, trustworthiness and truthfulness are then the criteria by which his revelation is to be judged. The rule of Śabdapramāṇa in a field of phenomena which are now within the scope of parapsychology is yet to be fully explored. Its field includes the highest psychic powers which Yoga is said to enable one to acquire. The Self or Ātman is an object of right knowledge (*prameya*) in Nyāya. At the same time it is the abode of desire (*iccha*), aversion (*dveṣa*), effort (*prayatna*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), and knowledge (*jñāna*). To reckon without this is to play Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.

The Self is the knower (the *jnātā*), the enjoyer (the *bhoktā*) and the active agent (the *kartā*). The Self is the seat of all experiences of all kinds. The states of the conscient self are cognition (*jñātṛtva*), affection (*bhoktṛtva*), and conation or striving (*karṭṛtva*) or knowledge, feeling and action. The Self is looked upon as a transcendent entity not to be identified with the bodily organism, the breath of life, sense organs, etc. Experiences unattached to a self or floating are simply inconceivable from this point of view.

The Nyāya system is the science of logical proof. It furnishes a correct method of measuring thought, as the term *pramāṇa* etymologically signifies and thus leads to a philosophical enquiry into the objects and subject of human knowledge. The subject of human knowledge is the Self, the knower, and the objects of

17. *Āptavākyam śabdah: āptastu yatharthavaktā.*

human knowledge are as wide as the whole universe. Nyāya has been very clearly defined by Vātsyāyana as "A critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of the canons of logical proof". It is thus an analysis and criticism of thought. Its precise formulae are the verdure of the plant of knowledge. In its teachings Nyāya enables us to discern the true from the false, to reinforce thinking when still it is in the process of growing. By it, the sapling of thought not yet mature is helped to ripen into flower and fruit.

We should never lose sight of the fact that Nyāya is a rationalistic treatment of the problems of the Spirit. Whenever the mind is agitated for the acquisition of knowledge of anything, there is a topic for the application of logic. The capacity to seek the truth is inherent in human nature; it is not created by logic, though logic enables it to accomplish its aims, Nyāya subjects everything to a critical inquiry. It does not accept traditional teachings and what the senses indicate, without a thorough search for the modes of thought and sources of correct knowledge. Thus only can the ends of life be truly envisaged.

The Nyāya considers also the psychological aspects of attaining knowledge. It treats of the ways by which the mind is carried forward and impelled to produce fresh results. At the same time it makes a careful note of the pitfalls of thinking. It estimates evidence and acts as the science of proof. As furnishing a standard of philosophical thought it examines the fundamental problem of reality. It is directly concerned with the means and indirectly with the nature or contents of knowledge.

Nyāya bears the fruit of a virile though negative doctrine of *apavarga* (final liberation), in that it is defined as absolute deliverance from pain. It finds a logical necessity in the positing of a rationalistic theism—implying a demiurgic, omnipotent, omniscient God or *Īśvara* as the architect of this universe. Udayana in his *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* expended all his dialectical skill in offering intellectual proofs for the existence of God. It also persists in maintaining the subject-object dualism, the knower and the known dualism. It was left however for Vedānta to bridge the gulf between the two. As Professor Hiriyanna points out: "This initial dualism has to be abandoned now, for, according to the final conception of truth at which we have arrived, the knower and the known, though distinguishable, are not separable. Know-

ledge begins by assuming that they are different, but it culminates in the discovery of a latent harmony between them in which the difference is resolved. It is not merely the notions of the subject and object that are thus transmuted: the knowledge also which relates them must be of a higher order than any we are familiar with—whether perceptual or conceptual. But this higher experience which may be described as insight or intuition is not altogether alien to us, for we get a glimpse of it whenever for any reason we rise above the distractions of personal living, it is so faint and fitful as to enable us only to understand what the exact character of the experience will be when the absolute truth is realized. All that we can say is that for one who attains to such experience, through a proper development of this intuitive power, there will be nothing that is not immediately known and that no part of what is so known will appear as external.”¹⁸

We may say that if in the West logic is the scientific study of thought *per se*, in India, it is the scientific study not only of thought *per se*, but of the utilization of that thought for the attainment of liberation. Logic from this point of view studies every mode of thought—scientific, philosophic, religious, etc., linking thus very intimately logic and life.

Contrary to the usual modern western tradition of logic, the Nyāya Śāstra of India deals with the means of true knowledge, about the soul, and the realization of the destiny of man determined in accordance with his essential nature which is very different from that of his animal ancestry. The Indian science of Nyāya is a logico-metaphysical discipline by which the intellect or buddhi is cleansed of its desires, and aversions, passions and pet prejudices, preliminary to insight or illumination or *pratibhā* which lights up his life, as it were, in a flash.

As a well-known writer puts it, “whoever knows Nyāya, knows the *pramāṇa*—is a *pramāṇavit*, a philosopher in the strict sense according to Indian tradition.”¹⁹ Or in Hegelian language, “*The realm of Logic is the realm of truth as it is without husk, in and for itself.* One may therefore express it thus: that this

18. P. 254. Seq. Contemporary Indian Philosophy. Edited by Muirhead & S. Radhakrishnan.

19. Introduction: A Primer of Indian Logic: by Kuppuswamy Sastry. p. iv.

content shows forth God as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of Nature and of a Finite Spirit."²⁰

Logic is thus made to fulfil a greater function in life—according to Indian thought—than it is ever thought of doing in the West. The discipline of mind here in India is a means to the suppleness of the spirit, so that the most delicate nuances and the subtlest varieties in thought could be reflected upon, developed and utilized for the conquest of the highest good—the cessation of pain²¹ and the attainment of bliss.

The science of reasoning, dealing with the means of right cognition and other categories is the lamp of all sciences, the means of knowledge of all things, the basis of all unities. The knowledge of truth and attainment of the highest good dealt with in this logico-metaphysical system in its own unique way is that which leads ultimately to the science of the soul, the witness to all truth. The knowledge of eternal and unchanging truth is the knowledge of the soul, of the highest good that there is, and the attainment of liberation.

Speaking of eternal and unchanging truth, I cannot forbear from adverting to recent trends in the philosophy of science which are tending towards recognizing that the ultimate task of science is the discovery of things which do not change. Kasner and Newman in their work, *Mathematics and the Imagination*, say: "In an apparently dynamic, incessantly changing world, one of perpetual novelty, the search for things which do not change constitutes one of the principal objectives of science. Philosophers since pre-Socratic times, have been rummaging about for the unchanging essence of reality. Today, that is the job of the scientist." Sankara, in a similar view, exhorted that one must be perpetually in quest of the eternal as against the non-eternal—*nityam anityam bhavaya nityam*. Bertrand Russell after a life-long philosophical quest has arrived at the healthy gospel that man can make the best of life only when he can liberate himself from the tyranny of here and now. According to the writers quoted above,

20. *The Wissenschaft der Logic* (Hegel). p. 60.

21. "Seyāmānveekhsiki pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthairvibhajyamānā; pradīpāḥ sarvavidyānāmupāyah sarvakarmāṇām; asrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām viśvayodhese prakīrtitā".

"Tadidam tattvanjñānam niśreyasādhigamārtham veditavyam; iha-vādhyātmavidyāyāmātmāditattvajñānam; niśreyasādhigamōpavargaprāptiḥ".

the discovery of the 'unchanging essence of reality' "is the reward for the courage and industry, for the fine, untrammelled, the poetic, and the imaginative sense common to the mathematician, the poet and the philosopher. It is the fulfilment of the vision of science."²²

We owe it to Vedānta however to have finally fixed the unchanging, the *Nitya* and *Śāśvata* or *Sanātana* reality of Brahman as the goal of all quest (athāto Brahma-jigñāsā). It pointed out the scope and at the same time the limitations of logic as is evidenced typically in the Upanishadic sentence "Naiṣa tarkeṇa mati-rāpaneyā", and the Brahma-sūtra statement "tarkāpratīṣṭhānāt", "śāstrayonitvāt".—"This knowledge is not attainable by mere Logic"; 'unestablishable by unstable logic, because the source of this knowledge is revelation'. Logic as an instrument of interpretation of revelation is never to be rejected. This is the orthodox Vedantic position regarding Logic.

II

One of the most important and interesting of developments that have taken place in the field of logic in the West is that of Logical Empiricism or as it is also called Logical Positivism. It is a reaction against Idealism in Western philosophy; in fact it is an important land-mark in the road of philosophical conflict between the ontological and the semantic views of Logic. To the Semantic view, as that of Logical positivism, terms like intuition, God, soul, immortality and the like are all meaningless for the reason that they are beyond experience or empirical verification. The meaninglessness of metaphysics is the constant theme of the logical positivist. According to Ayer, a prominent representative of this school, metaphysicians indulge in the nonsensical conception that "to every word or phrase that can be the grammatical subject of a sentence, there must somewhere be a real entity corresponding. But as there is no place in the empirical world for many of these 'entities', a special non-empirical world is invented to house them."²³ "The empirical world" of Ayer's conception, we must say, is an arbitrarily truncated world. We can only tell him in the words of Hamlet that 'there are more things in heaven and earth than your philosophy dreams of'. Even the

22. Quoted in *Analysis of Perception* : by J. R. Smythies : p. 123.

23. *Language, Truth and Logic* : p. 35.

expression 'verification' is taken by him in a very narrow sense and precludes ranges of experience which are not ordinarily available to every one. Logical positivism suffers from its serfdom to sense-experience similar to the positivism of the Charvakas in India.

The logical empiricists point to two questions and circumscribe their philosophy within it. They ask "What do you mean" and "How do you mean." To clarify these questions and to find answers to philosophical questions in the light of this view is the logical empiricist contribution. They aim not at constructing an oecumenical view nor a way of life that is envisioned. If by means of a philosophic enquiry they can help to clarify certain political, historical, social and educational concepts by clearer verbal analysis of what they mean, they are more than satisfied. In the words of Carnap, the only intelligible function of philosophy is to analyse "the statements asserted by scientists" and "study their kinds and relations, and analyse terms as components of those statements and theories as ordered systems of those statements".²⁴

Philosophy has tried to explain by verbal magic what science in its exactitude could not. The result is the creation of philosophical riddles made more complex by verbal jugglery. The cure is to define words and terms carefully so that the disease of verbal confusion may be avoided.

Logical analysis distinguishes itself in some respects from its earlier phase of logical empiricism and pragmatism. During the last half a century and more the need for a precise logical language was felt by logicians and scientists. What influenced logical empiricism most was the foundations of mathematical sciences laid by Frege, Russell, Hilbert and others, and the revision of modern physical thought as a result of new postulates laid down by Einstein, Planck, Bohr, and the advent of behaviourist psychology of Watson, Pavlov and others.

These three subjects, mathematics, physics and behaviourist psychology compelled a revision of logical thinking to suit the more modern requirements of these sciences. The use of language has to be revised because as it stands today it serves a multiplicity of functions which by their very nature lead to confusion of

24. Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science.

thought. The scientific and emotive uses of words are hopelessly mixed up. The cognitive or informational functioning of meaning is of prime importance in empirical thinking as opposed to the non-cognitive emotional meanings of words which one comes across in poetry or mythology.

Logical empiricism is then primarily concerned with the cognitive meanings of words. It does not allow a psychological interpretation of a word, save by definition of how we intend to use the term. The definition of a word given in the dictionary is of a naive type unsuited to a scientific purpose. Logical empiricism is interested in pushing itself back to obtain a definition that is basic or primitive. The pushing further to reach such definitions is bound to connect words with facts of outside experience. Each definition has in its termination some objective fact as an indispensable part of it. Logical symbols however are related to definitions only in a formal way through formal rules of consistency. As it is in applied mathematics, so here also the formal structure of thought necessitates a self-transcendence by which it relates itself to experience of reality. Logical analysis therefore cannot help landing itself in postulations and presuppositions as in mathematics or the other sciences—a position which it had started kicking against.

Factual meaningfulness of words is the source of much misunderstanding and debate in the field of logical empiricism. Ayer in his book 'Language, Truth and Logic',²⁵ says, "It is a mark of genuine factual proposition . . . that some experimental propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises etc." It might be here noted that a factually meaningful sentence is one capable of confirmation, or disconfirmation which means that it can be tested indirectly though incompletely.

According to this theory—"Sentences or expressions, we distinguish today: (1) Logically true sentences, also called analytic sentences. (2) Logically false sentences, also called contradictions. These sentences are true or false, respectively, by virtue of their form. Even if descriptive empirical terms are contained in them they function only 'vacuously', and their factual reference is irrelevant to the validity of the sentence. (3) Factually true

25. Language, Truth & Logic: by Mr. Ayer. p. 26.

and (4) factually false sentences whose validity depends upon their correspondence to observed fact. In the majority of instances this correspondence or non-correspondence is only incompletely and indirectly indicated by whatever is immediately observable. Therefore these sentences are usually not *known* to be true or false but are considered to be confirmed or disconfirmed to an extent which may vary considerably with the accumulation of favourable or unfavourable evidence. (5) Emotive expressions without cognitive meaning and the emotive components of otherwise cognitive expressions. Pictorial, figurative, and metaphorical expressions, exclamations, interjections, words of praise or blame, appeals, suggestions, requests, imperatives, commands, questions, and prayers belong to this category. Even in definitions we recognize a motivational element; the resolution or invitation to use a term in a certain way."

Again, "In the light of the preceding distinctions, we may say that an expression is devoid of empirical meaning (i.e., of factual reference) or, briefly, is *factually-meaningless*, if it belongs to any one or several of the following five groups: (a) Expressions violating the syntactical formation-rules of a given language: (b) Analytic sentences; (c) Contradictory sentences; (d) Sentences containing extra-logical terms for which no experimental or operational definitions can be provided; (e) Sentences whose confirmability, i.e., even indirect and incomplete testability-in-principle, is logically excluded by the assumptions of the system of which they are a part."²⁶

Positivist metaphysics attacks the prevailing confusions attached to meanings in philosophy. It does not, we are told, intend to reject wholesale what has been so far termed metaphysics. Only the role of metaphysics is determined in a different way, excluding all questions regarding super-phenomenal reality on the ground of their meaninglessness.

That truth should be based on the evidence of observation or experience is the cardinal principle on which the method of logical empiricism is based. It aims chiefly at a clarification of concepts, to be arrived at after dropping the redundant and absurd element generally found in philosophy as it has traditionally developed.

26. Twentieth Century Philosophy—Logical Empiricism: by Herbert Feigl, pp. 383-384.

That truth must have its foundation in experience or *anubhūti*; we will not question. Our only quarrel is with the dogmatic restriction of experience to certain forms of it. To get a 'clear' view of reality—truth without being bogged down by fictitious elements is certainly the object of all metaphysics and even of the traditional type. And to assert this is not the unique contribution of logical positivism. Its greatest positive contribution is in the field of logical and methodological analysis of unified science, its theory and procedure—this and nothing more. But this is not the whole story of human thought.

Here is but a very brief sketch of some of the main trends of logical empiricism and its claims and blunders. In criticism of logical positivism Stace raises a few pertinent questions: "What is the meaning of verification when it is said that the meaning of a proposition depends on the method of its verification? Does it mean testing the truth of the proposition by actually observing its content in sense-perception? If so, then how is it possible to understand the meaning of statements about objects not yet perceived, or of historical statements about the past, or of statements about other minds, or about interperceptual states of physical objects, none of which can ever be actually observed"?²⁷ As no satisfactory answers are forthcoming to these questions from the logical positivists, one is thrown back to the position that philosophy has a sublimer task than the detection of the sources of error in linguistic idioms and semantic misconstructions and absurd theories, however important this may be.²⁸ We may well ask, "Is the ultimate end of logic and philosophy a mere clarification of thought? And does it help in giving satisfaction to man's innermost quest for certainty? Does it help man to break through the shackles of his confused thinking so that a better view of reality is available based on precise definition?"

Logic, in the hands of the existentialist, is in no better plight. Existentialism is as strictly non-metaphysical as logical positivism, and does not determine the worth of knowledge in relation to truth but according to its biological value. It does not make any difference between the external and the internal worlds. To it a

27. Cited by D. M. Datta in his *Contemporary Philosophy*: p. 482.

28. *Logic and Language: Systematically misleading expressions*, by Professor Gilbert Ryle, p. 36.

term like 'Being' has no logical or truth-value. The greatest weakness of the existentialist philosophy is its failure to make a distinction between the physical and the psychological, whereas from the standpoint of Indian thought the distinction between the self and the non-self (*ātmānatmaviveka*) is most vital for philosophical knowledge.

I believe that India can offer a healthy alternative view to combat these logical observations of the West. The science of logic has always held a position of eminence in India. It is the science par excellence that leads to the self-transcendence of thought by the right use of the thinking process.²⁹ The importance of observation and inference—two of the most fundamental pre-requisites of logical processes—is stressed by a famous passage in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. Even *purāṇa* has its place in *pramāṇa* as *aithya* or tradition according to the *paurāṇikas*. In the *Avadhūta Prakaraṇa* we get the following passage which is striking, because of the importance attached by an *Avadhūta* or one who has liberated himself from convention and custom to the need for logical arguments and reasoning as a means to the fulfilment of the aims of life (*purushartha*) through Yoga or Liberation. It says:—³⁰

"For all beings and especially for human beings their own *Ātman* is their preceptor." For an intelligent man it is possible to decide about the best method of Self-realization, by means of observation, experiment and inferential knowledge. The *Avadhūta* is the 'free man', free from the shackles of passion and prejudice which are the two main obstacles of all clear thinking. To use the term adopted by Francis Bacon in his *Novum Organum*, the different 'idola', viz., the idols of the cave, the tribe, the marketplace and the theatre, fail to exercise their tyranny on such a person as this. The quality of disinterestedness with which he views unflinchingly the realities of life is the keynote of such a character.

With the help of observation, experimentation and inference, the *Avadhūta* is said to attain the bliss of Self-realization, according to the *Bhāgavata*. There is no disparagement of Reason here but only a supersession when one is ripe for it.

29. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra. No. 2.

30. The Divine Light: Translation by D. A. Gangoli: p. 2.

Logic aims at 'absolute freedom from pain—which gives final release' according to Nyāya Sūtra.³¹ Clarity of thought and expression are sought to help man to arrive at correct conclusions regarding the universe, its origin and structure. This is done through the method of logic—by the employment of discussion and argument. True discussion is that by means of which things become clearly known—*vāde vāde jāyate tatra bodhaḥ*. Observation or testimony (*śravaṇa*) reflection or inference (*manana*) and assimilation of the new with old knowledge (*nididhyāsana*) help in consolidation of such knowledge. The Nyāya Sūtra says: "Because of discussion, and study, doubts are removed, new knowledge is gained, conclusions and opinions formed or confirmed".³²

Among the factors of inference, the five-limbed syllogism plays an extremely important role. It is responsible for carrying clearness of thought or expression to its most perfect logical expression.

The members (*avayava*) of a syllogism, according to Nyāya Sūtra, are—proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). These members are the several logical steps towards establishing the nature of the object of knowledge. Unlike Aristotle's syllogism which is purely deductive this is a combination of deduction and induction. *Jignāsa*, the desire to know, is the initial impulse of all thinking. With regard to any theory (*Siddhanta*) formulated, there are only three alternative attitudes that one could take up. Either it is one of acceptance or rejection or unconcern. The *Siddhanta* is a hypothesis or a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school. It is a candidate for verification. And verification consists in the elimination of all doubt (*samśaya-vyudāsa*). This implies an effort to make certain that the opposite of the proposition is not true.

The desire to know arises because of doubt, or uncertainty, because properties with mutual contradictions are noticed. As John Dewey puts it, all thinking originates in a perplexity or problem. Doubt arises when we confront two possible ways of explanation only—one of which can be true, but not both. Doubt cannot prove anything by itself—it is only a half-way house to true knowledge. If one makes doubt itself the final

31. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra. 1-1-22.

32. *Jñānagrhaṇābhyaśastadvidyaisca saha samvādaḥ*. (Gautama Nyāya Sūtra : 4-2-47.)

resting place of the self, one is lost; says the Gīta: *Samsāyātmā vinaśyati*. The doubt referred to here is doubt concerning the spiritual verities of life which corrodes life at the very root. Doubt is an incentive to further thought.

Doubt has been defined by the Nyāya Sūtra (i.I.23) as 'a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, which arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception'. Doubt serves as a stimulus to further investigation and is to be carefully distinguished from error which lulls one from entertaining any desire for further knowledge.

A doubt can be dispelled by stating a counter proposition and then refuting it. This will but support one or the other instruments of right cognition, though it must not be regarded as a part of an argument to prove a proposition. What really helps one to arrive at true cognition is the statement of the proposition (*pratijñā*) which is tantamount to the formulation of the problem.

When a proposition is stated it is meant to assert or qualify the property which has to be demonstrated or proved. As the Sūtra says—"Sādhyanirdeśaḥ *pratijñā*."³³ The word '*Pratijñā*' means probandum or that which is to be proved, a hypothesis to be proved and established. The example given is 'sound is eternal'. It is proved by disproving its opposite 'sound is non-eternal'. Modern logic recognises that a hypothesis is said to be established only when it is proved that it alone and no other vital hypothesis can explain the given fact.

What proves the probandum with the help of corroborative instance is the statement of the probandum. *Dṛṣṭānta* or example is defined by the Nyāya Sūtra as the thing about which any ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion. (I.I.25) "*Udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt sādhyā sādhanam hetuḥ*".³⁴ This is to say, that corroborative instance is the link between that which is given (*Sādhana*) and that which is inferred (*Sādhyā*) on the basis of that which is given. If the same property is present in both—then the Sūtra says: "*Sādhya-sādharmyātādḍharmabhāvi*

33. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra : 1-1-33.

34. - - 1-1-34.

dr̥ṣṭānta udāharaṇam".³⁵ The familiar instance (dr̥ṣṭānta) on account of similarity to a property (common to both) of the subject and the object constitutes the corroborative instance.

There are two kinds of 'what is to be proved'—(a) sometimes it is the property as qualified by the object, e.g., 'non-eternality of sound', or (b) the object as it is qualified by the property, e.g., 'sound is non-eternal'. The word 'Taddhārmabhāvi' refers to the common or familiar instance which possesses the property that belongs also to the subject. It is said that sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced like such things as the dish, cup, etc." This is, we are told, "the statement of corroborative instance"—Udāharaṇa.³⁶

The opposite of the familiar instance is called the heterogeneous instance. 'Tadviparyayādvā viparītam'.³⁷ Vātsyāyana says that the heterogeneous instance is that instance which, through dissimilarity to what is to be proved, does not possess the property of that subject. For example, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced—for everything not having the character of being produced, is eternal'. Here sound is the familiar instance which through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved does not possess the property of the subject, i.e., non-eternality. Therefore sound is non-eternal.³⁸

Re-affirmation reasserts a subject as being so or as not so. 'Udāharaṇapekṣhastathetyupasambhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopānayaḥ'.³⁹

A homogeneous instance is one which is similar to the subject, e.g., sound is a product, where the character of being a product is affirmed of the subject sound. In a heterogeneous one, e.g., sound is not a product, where sound being a product is affirmed through denial of affirmation of the character of not being produced. There are thus two types of instances dealing with two types of reaffirmation,

And the final conclusion restates the proposition on the basis of the statement of the probans. 'Hetvāpadeśāt pratijñāyāyāḥ

35. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra : 1-1-36.

36. Vātsyāyana's commentary.

37. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra : 1-1-37.

38. Vātsyāyana's commentary on Sūtra : 1-1-37.

39. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra : 1-1-38.

punarvacanam nigamanam'.⁴⁰ The entire reasoning is now recapitulated, leading to the final conclusion (Nigamana). There is thus in all reasoning an integration of the five factors, viz., proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion.

These five factors of reasoning are chiefly adopted to clarify thought and demonstrate the thinking process, when the real nature of a thing is unknown; for the purpose of ascertaining its real character, a reasoning is put forward which indicates the need for proof which consists in showing the undesirability or absurdity of establishing conclusions, merely on the basis of perception. 'Nyayottarangalakṣhaṇa prakaraṇam'.⁴¹ The nature of inference as a leap from the known to the unknown, from the familiar to the unfamiliar, is stressed here. There can be no real thought unless one liberates oneself from the tyranny of sense-perception and from what Bertrand Russell calls 'the tyranny of the here and now'.⁴² Russell speaks the language of the Indian philosophers when he stresses that wisdom is needed in the choice of ends to be pursued and in emancipation from personal, prejudice, and comes to this conclusion very much again in the view of the Indian philosophers: 'I think the essence of wisdom is emancipation, as far as possible, from the tyranny of the here and now'. To speak the language of Vedānta, no man is really wise unless he is a *mumukṣu*, an aspirant after such emancipation.

Logical empiricism is concerned merely with clarification of meanings of words, but such a clarity can come only if there is a quest for objective truth. The chief ideas of the school of logical empiricism took root in the Vienna group started by Schlick, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and others. The new ideas were initiated by Frege and Peano and then extended by Bertrand Russell. In the maturity of Russell's thought we discover the meeting of extremes in contemporary logic.

The Indian conception of logic is, as is envisaged in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, essentially a more fruitful logic of life and becomes the basis of a more satisfactory philosophy of life. The employment of the Panchavayava syllogism to attain the maximum clarity of thought is clearly not with a view to stop at clarification

40. Gautama Nyāya Sūtra: 1-139

41. - - - 1-1-40.

42. Portraits from Memory. p. 162.

of ideas, but to lead on to a higher plane of consciousness and life. In the words of the Naiyayika, it is possible with the help of the sixteen pramanas (1-1-19) to attain a state of mind free from all affliction, a state of supreme mental health. It helps the mind to attain a more positive attitude towards life than that of logical empiricism and existentialism which engender a kind of nihilism and despair. The Nyāya prepares one to proceed from the logical to the metalogical.

The final aim of Nyāya and even of the Vaisesika is the destruction of wrong apprehension consequent on the achievement of true knowledge and a dissipation of the false values of life. This is likened to a dream dissipated by waking up.⁴³ The mind is also capable of being withdrawn from the sense organs, and turned upon itself. This is meditation, wherein no cognitions appear to the senses. This is the means of true inward knowledge, says the Sutra-*'Samādhiviśeṣābhyāsāt'*.⁴⁴ The purpose is to posit the potentiality of meditation in revealing knowledge or insight into the life of things.⁴⁵ A person desirous of learning the truth this way from another person should achieve a certain preliminary passivity in the sense that none of his own pet theories and prejudices is permitted to intrude into the process of knowing. He should be ready to correct and clarify his own view of things by choosing what is right and rejecting what is wrong among a number of mutually contradicting philosophies. It is the false conception of the true nature of things that is the greatest malady and that logic is intended to show up.

The sole purpose of Indian logic then is to enable one to pursue his determination to get at the truth. Logic is likened to the hedge of thorny branches which is put up for the sprouting seeds.⁴⁶ Logic thus is not an end in itself but a means to an end, that of cleansing the mind of its pet attractions, aversions and delusions, of all ills, by enquiring, and thus paves the way for true knowledge which leads to the emancipation of the soul. As the Avadhuta puts it:

43. Mithyopalabdhivināśastattvajñānāt; svapnaviṣayābhimānaprapñāsvat pratibodhē. G. N. S. 4-2-35.

44. Samādhiviśeṣābhyāsāt: G.N.S. 4-2-38.

45. Pratipakṣaheenamapi vā prayojanārthamarthitve: G.N.S. 4-2-49.

46. Tattvādhyavasāya - samrakṣaṇārtham jalpavitandē; beejapraroha-samrakṣaṇārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvarāṇavat. G.N.S. 4-2-50.

"The Jīva residing in this human body gains a knowledge of the science and art of reasoning through its association with the physical organism itself. Thereby it acquires the capacity to stretch the power of thought to its uttermost limits of the realization of the Absolute (Brahman)".⁴⁷ This is rationalism which leads to a supra-rational insight into reality. This is *tarka* leading to *pratibhā*.

I may conclude with quoting Gandhiji who wrote: "Rationalists are admirable beings, rationalism is a hideous monster when it claims for itself omnipotence. Attribution of omnipotence to reason is as bad a piece of idolatry as is worship of stock and stone believing it to be God. I plead not for the suppression of reason, but for a due recognition of that in us which sanctifies reason".⁴⁸

47. The Divine Light: Chapter III—Sloka 26.

48. Young India: 14. 10. 26.

Contemporary Philosophy and Social Revolution

by

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Philosophy deals with the problems of the nature of the objective world and the human knowledge. In one way or another, each philosophical system bears the imprint of its time. Philosophy ought to serve actively the urgent demands of the period. To achieve this it should know the period to understand its pressing demands. Then it would be able to be the guide for activity. We use the word "Activity" here in the broad sense of the word; not only as it concerns the conduct of the individual, his morals, his behaviour with respect to people surrounding him, but also as regards social tasks, the solution of which concerns the lives of millions of common people, of whole classes, and whole nations.

It is a well known fact that philosophy has played a very great role in social development. The better philosophy expresses the laws of the objective world and the pressing demands of social development, the more fruitful is this role; and it has always been this way. Of course, the philosophical ideas of one period have close and direct ties with the philosophic ideas of the previous period. But new ideas are not the results only of pure thought. They don't appear incidentally. The active role of the new social ideas, philosophical, political, legal, etc., is possible precisely because ideas are rooted in reality and are its reflection in the minds of men. If we divorce ideas from reality, from the social ground that gave the birth, we thereby block the way to an understanding of their role in life. How can ideas affect real life if they have nothing in common with it? How can they advance social development if they do not correspond to the fundamental problems of their time? Only by deducing ideas from the conditions of the period, by locating their objective source, is it possible for us to understand correctly and evaluate their role in the world from which they sprang.

This role is especially significant during the periods of social revolutions, that is during periods of fundamental social transformations that change the nature of social system.

Philosophical ideas that reflect the demands of the revolutionary period, the demands of the economic basis and political system of the life of whole nations exercise a powerful influence on social life. Their strength lies in the fact that they express the pressing demands of social development, it comes from the strength of the masses of the people who are inspired by these ideas. One needs only recall the role played by the Philosophy of the *Enlightenment* on the eve of the French Revolution in the 18th century. The philosophical criticism of the feudal system, of its institutions and its ideology (the criticism of Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Holback, Helvetius and other) produced a revolution in the minds of the people and prepared the political revolution that accelerated the process of transformation of the feudal society into a bourgeois society.

In a similar way the Marxist ideas, including the Marxist philosophy, were the ideological banner of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. The Marxist philosophy is a lawful result of the natural development of philosophic thought and scientific researches of Humanity. The appearance of Marxism was possible only during a period when with the development of capitalism, there appeared the working class, that bearer of the new, socialist mode of production, the material and moral moving force in the transformation of the old society into a new society. If Marxist philosophy and the Marxist theory of scientific socialism, which is an integral part of the former, did not correspond to the demands of the new period and the new social forces making their appearance on the historical scene, they would not have been able to gain such a place for themselves in the present-day world. The most convinced opponents of Marxism cannot deny its profound viability and its tremendous influence on society. But they are not able to explain the causes for this viability and they look for the explanation in accidental circumstances. Yet there can be but only one reason. The viability and strength of Marxism lies in the scientific character of the Marxist world outlook. It gave a correct answer to the questions that the development of society posed. But this doesn't mean that Marxism is a kind of dogma, or a sort of absolute truth. It is an alive theory which is developing in accordance with his-

torical development. It is for this reason that the Marxist world outlook became the lever of the great social transformations of our epoch.

The present day period in the history of humanity may be defined as the period of the growth of socialism. Modern sources of production and the latest technical revolution connected with the discovery of atomic energy are an indication of the tremendous material acquisitions of man. These material acquisitions not only make possible the transition to socialism, they make in many countries such a transition imperative. Why is it so? First, it is so because the modern productive forces make unnecessary the division of the society into classes. Modern society has now all the possibilities to develop on the road of progress without the minority of the nation exploiting the vast majority of the nation. Secondly, because the socialization of labour, which has been attained in present-day capitalist society and which unites millions of producers into a single production entity, is in glaring contradiction to the private form of appropriating the products of production, that is, the capitalist form of ownership. All this demands that Society be organised in such a way that the owners of production should be the producers themselves, and that production should be subordinated not to the interests of profit-making but to the interests of the people. Such a society would develop according to a plan and exclude the possibility of exploitation, hunger, wars, national and colonial oppression, and make labour and peace the rulers of life. Former revolutions did not do away with the exploitation of man by man, but only changed the forms of this exploitation. The task of social revolution today is to eliminate once and for all the exploitation of man by man and all that it brings with it.

Marxism has come to these conclusions by employing the method of materialist dialectics to the analysis of society. Because of this there has been worked out the materialist understanding of history (according to which the mode of production of material values is at the basis of social, political and spiritual life of the human society) and the main economic law of the development of capitalist society (the law of surplus value).

Dialectic and historical materialism serves as the philosophic foundation of the Marxist theory of social revolution. Does the statement mean that the Marxist materialism pays all attention

to material side of society and rejects the necessity and the importance of human ideals, the necessity and the importance of the high development of human mind and human emotions?

But it is not so in the least. Marxism does not deny the importance of ideals, but deduces them from social development. Ideals of Marxism are the scientifically-proved ideals, ideals based upon science. Marxism does not put aside the task of spiritual and moral renovation of man. On the contrary it sets before itself the task that all human emotions crippled by poverty and exploitation become really human.

Marxism desires to eliminate the strife for riches, greediness, egotism, cruelty, and other vices of modern society.

The main condition of such renovation of man, of the healthy development of his mind and of his emotions is the liberation of society from poverty and exploitation. This liberation is necessary for a man, who is the end but not a means in the hands of other people.

To stress this does not mean "to forget" about the intellectual and emotional side of human existence, about man's conscience, about man's spiritual power. Quite the contrary, it means to trust a man, his mind. We are against all the theories of innate depravity of man. We believe in the possibility of moral and mental renovation of man.

The marxist philosophy puts great significance upon human mind and the mind of a separate individual as well. It does by no means minimise the importance of an individual mind, but it discovers in it the elements of social mind, the elements, common to groups of men. And it can't be the other way, because living in a society an individual is not free from links with it. Individual mind is a social mind in its essence. But of course, mind of separate individual has always some specific, unrepeatable elements which it is necessary to take into account.

The principle of socialism, and communism "From each man according to his abilities" in its practical application opens new and great fields for the development of all spiritual powers of an individual. This is witnessed by the experiences of socialist reconstruction in the U.S.S.R.

Talents and abilities of the masses of people which were kept under cover before the Revolution, now have great opportunities

for the display in all the social fields, in technology, in science, in culture and in politics.

Never before in the history of Russia did the workers and peasants evince such a thirst for knowledge, a desire to master all the attainments of world culture, such creative pioneering, such striving towards constant progress in science and culture, as today. This is a living witness to the efflorescence of personality in the broadest masses of the workers, who formerly were far removed from science and culture and from participation in political activities.

Again it is argued that socialism or the transition to socialism presupposes force in the form of an armed uprising or a civil war. But this is not so. *Marrism does not at all preach force under all and any conditions.* The working class and the masses of the people are always for a peaceful transformation of power, a peaceful revolution, without the sacrifice of lives, without the destruction of the productive forces that is inevitably brought about by civil war. In answer to this question: Is it possible to destroy private property (I mean, capitalist property) peacefully? Engels answered that this would be desirable, and that we would, of course, be the last to object to this. We know that after the February Revolution V.I. Lenin posed the question of transferring the power into the hands of the workers and peasants by peaceful means, by gaining a majority in the Soviets (councils). However, when the government of Kerensky used arms against the people, the workers and peasants were forced to give up this hope. *In general, revolutionary force is the answer to reactionary force. When the latter is absent, there is also no revolutionary force.* Can one condemn the revolutionary force of the people with respect to their oppressors? We believe that one must distinguish between the actions of a bandit who mocks his victim and the actions of a person who attempts to disarm the bandit and save the victim. Force in the second case is necessary, and because it is necessary and only when it is necessary it is justifiable. If the workers and peasants of Russia had refrained from beginning the armed uprising in October of 1917, and later from the armed struggle against the internal counter-revolutionary forces and intervention, they would have doomed themselves to slavery and the undivided rule of reaction for many years to come.

The problem of force is closely connected with that of interrelation between the means and the end. *Marxists are usually*

accused that we consider any means good for the achieving of our end. But this is not so. The means which are demoralising men and are cultivating cruelty, baseness, etc., cannot serve the noble end of the liberation of the people from poverty and exploitation. Marxists consider as good and appropriate only those means that develop in those who are fighting for new society consciousness of their dignity, solidarity and mutual assistance, devotion to their common cause.

In other words, we adopt the means that are strengthening the moral consciousness of men. That is why when one says that for Marxists the morality is a matter of convenience, one reveals serious misunderstanding of Marxism.

Yes, Marxists look for the source of morality not in heaven but on the earth. Yes, they see the link between morality and the historical conditions of men's life. They see the changes of morals and moral norms in accordance with the changes of historical conditions. But Marxism is not a relativism.

Marxists don't deny that there is moral progress in the history of society. This progress is connected with the social progress, and that means that humanity goes further and further on the way of abolishing oppression and exploitation.

Morals serve the cause of progress, the cause of the liberation of each personality. Our morality serves the great task of the social revolution of our times. Marxists adopt all moral values in the real sense of the word as well as all the achievements of human culture. They appreciate all basical norms of the community which are accumulating in the progress of history.

But they insist that the voluntary execution of these norms by all men would be guaranteed only in such a society where there would be no greediness and poverty.

Does this look the negation of morality?

Of course in the life of our soviet society sometimes violations of law, violations of the moral norms of the community take place. Many of them have been connected with the cult of Stalin. But in such cases, we ourselves don't make allowance for these violations. We have criticized these short-comings and now do everything in our power in order to prevent their occurrence in future.

But because of these shortcomings and mistakes it is impossible not to see the greatness of the work our people have done and are doing. It is impossible not to see the great improvements as to the moral character of our people.

But the revolution of our period includes within it not only socialist revolutions but also anti-feudal democratic revolutions, and national-liberation movements, (in accordance with the different level of economic development of the given country, with its position in the world system of capitalism, etc.).

Lenin foresaw the beginning of the new era when all the Asiatic peoples would actively participate in the determination of their own destiny, in the determination of the destiny of the whole world.

This Lenin's forecast has come true in our time.

The disgraceful system of colonialism now is in the increasing process of collapse.

The peoples of Asia are taking their destiny into their own hands. In our time it is utterly impossible to solve the World's problems without their participation. And the two great and ancient centres of human civilization India and China again play on this world scene the role they ought to play.

Although the paths of historical development of these countries are different and different are their philosophic ideas and political views, all the peoples of Asia have common consciousness of the necessity of the struggle for their independence and sovereignty, common desire to put an end to national and colonial oppression, to maintain lasting peace between the nations.

There is no necessity here to speak of how highly we in the Soviet Union value the noble efforts of India in the struggle for independence, for peace, for the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The forces of Imperialism that have been weakened as a result of the appearance and growth of the socialist countries and as a result of national-liberation movement of the peoples, stop at nothing in their attempt to strengthen their position. They attempt to dethrone socialism and to restore the old order wherever there is the slightest possibility, and to reinstate colonial oppression and suppress the national-liberation movements of the nations.

What is the task of philosophy to-day? Should it escape from the storms and worries of the times to the philosophical ivory tower, and from there preach pure contemplation, withdrawal from the world, and the like to the people? Or should it interfere in social life by helping to something and fighting against something. The question is: whom to help and against whom to fight? The philosophers of different schools give different answers to this question. The philosophical principles underlying the various views of present-day problems differ greatly. It would be utopia to think that in our day there is possible a general philosophy for all, that the variety and contradictory character of the philosophical convictions and views could be smelted into an entity acceptable to all people, to all classes and nations.

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